A turbulent period is sweeping across the Middle East, and another, quieter war is unfolding behind the scenes, triggered by the UAE’s decision to withdraw from both OPEC and OPEC+. The country announced it will exit the organization starting May 1, 2026, bringing to an end nearly six decades of membership since it first joined in 1967.
This decision, at this particular moment, delivers a major blow to the oil cartel, especially to Saudi Arabia, its leading force, amid historic turmoil in the energy sector caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. However, the move was not sudden. It follows years of Emirati frustration with OPEC quotas perceived as unfair and skewed in favor of Saudi Arabia.
The UAE justified its withdrawal by citing its “long-term strategic and economic vision” and the need for greater flexibility to respond to market dynamics. Officials stressed that OPEC production quotas had unfairly constrained the country’s oil exports, limiting its ability to capitalize on its position as one of the lowest-cost producers within the organization.
Following the exit, the UAE plans to gradually increase oil production in what it described as a “measured and responsible” manner, aligned with demand and prevailing market conditions.
The UAE’s core frustrations with OPEC+ quotas centered on restrictive production limits that prevented it from utilizing its expanded capacity and fully benefiting from its investments in oil infrastructure. The quota system left nearly 30% of the UAE’s production capacity idle, according to a 2021 report by Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, despite the country having a production capacity exceeding 4 million barrels per day.
The UAE has repeatedly argued that using October 2018 as the baseline for production quotas was unfair, as its production capacity grew significantly in the years that followed, from around 3.17 million barrels per day in 2018 to approximately 3.8 million barrels per day, according to Emarat Al Youm.
During this period, particularly amid the Israeli-US war on Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, OPEC members and major oil companies experienced sharply uneven financial outcomes, depending on their access to alternative export routes.
For instance, Saudi Arabia saw its oil revenues rise by around 4.3% in March 2026 compared to the previous year, despite a drop in export volumes. The increase was driven by oil prices reaching $120 per barrel, alongside its ability to export roughly 5 million barrels per day via the East–West pipeline to Red Sea ports, effectively bypassing the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran recorded a 37% increase in oil revenues, while Oman saw a 26% rise during March 2026. As for the UAE, it experienced a slight decline in revenues despite export constraints, relying on the Fujairah pipeline to access Indian Ocean markets. Oil loadings in Fujairah averaged around 1.9 million barrels per day between March 20 and 24, marking an increase of nearly 57% compared to the 2025 average.
OPEC quotas stood in direct contradiction to the UAE’s strategic plan to raise its production capacity from 3.8 million barrels per day to approximately 5 million barrels per day by 2027.
The old quota system increasingly prevented the country from advancing its energy development plans and expanding its role in global energy markets.
Contentious Issues Between Saudi Arabia and the UAE
The UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC and OPEC+ comes amid a range of geopolitical factors. These tensions did not begin solely with the US–Israeli war on Iran, but were preceded by a series of divergent positions between the UAE and Saudi Arabia across multiple files. In recent years, these differences have deepened, evolving from tactical disagreements into a broader strategic rivalry for influence across several regional arenas.
One of the most prominent arenas is the Yemeni file. While Saudi Arabia supports the internationally recognized Yemeni government and its allied forces, the UAE has backed separatist movements in southern Yemen. These tensions escalated sharply in December 2025, after the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council took control of Hadhramaut province, prompting the Saudi-led coalition to carry out an airstrike on the port of Mukalla.
Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council head, Rashad al-Alimi, called on Emirati forces to withdraw within 24 hours, while Saudi Arabia described the UAE’s support for the Southern Transitional Council as “highly dangerous” and a threat to its national security. The UAE subsequently announced the withdrawal of “remaining” forces from Yemen “of its own accord.”
Other contentious files include Sudan, where Saudi Arabia backs the Sudanese Armed Forces, while the UAE supports the Rapid Support Forces. The UAE has also sought to expand its influence over key maritime routes through ports in the Horn of Africa, alongside growing economic and political competition between the two countries.
According to media reports, signs of a personal rift have also emerged between Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, with the Saudi crown prince accusing the UAE of having “stabbed” Saudi Arabia in the back.
The US–Israeli war on Iran, along with instability in the Gulf and disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz, has further strained relations. The UAE has criticized Arab states for what it described as insufficient responses to Iranian attacks, reflecting broader regional tensions.
The UAE’s Dispute with OPEC
The UAE’s decision was not sudden. It followed a series of earlier disputes and growing dissatisfaction with what it saw as preferential treatment for Saudi Arabia. A key moment came in July 2021, when Emirati negotiators withdrew from OPEC+ talks on increasing production after COVID-19 lockdown measures were lifted, leading to a temporary breakdown in the cartel’s decision-making process.
At the time, Financial Times reported a “growing consensus among officials close to Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan that the best option for the UAE might be to act independently.”
The central dispute revolved around Abu Dhabi’s production quota within a proposed plan to add 2 million barrels per day to the market to ease oil prices. The UAE refused to approve the plan unless its individual quota was increased. Eventually, Saudi Arabia and the UAE reached a compromise, raising the UAE’s production baseline from around 3.17 million barrels per day to 3.65 million barrels per day.
In recent years, multiple leaks and media reports pointed to internal Emirati discussions about the possibility of leaving OPEC. The country’s objections centered on restrictions imposed on its production capacity, which exceeded 4 million barrels per day, while OPEC quotas capped its actual output at around 3.4 million barrels.
The UAE’s withdrawal from OPEC may represent one of the clearest manifestations of its dispute with Saudi Arabia. The question remains: will this move affect the unity of the Gulf Cooperation Council amid intensifying Saudi–UAE competition?
