This topic and the document research were prepared with the contribution of colleagues Zahi Naddour and Jana Barakat.
Daraj obtained access to the file of Ahmad Hussein Al-Sharaa (better known as Abu Muhammad al-Joulani) in the notorious Palestine Branch in Damascus. In publishing Al-Joulani’s story as documented in the branch’s files, Daraj has refrained from verifying or cross-referencing the information, opting instead to present it as it appears in the file. This decision stems from the significance of understanding how Assad’s intelligence services tracked their adversary, who has now become a key figure in Syria, at least during the transitional phase.
It appears that the Syrian regime’s intelligence services were uncertain about Al-Joulani’s true identity until as late as 2016. They were torn between identifying him as Ahmad Hussein Al-Sharaa, who was already wanted by the regime, and more than four other jihadists listed in a file prepared by the Palestine Branch in Damascus. Daraj obtained images of the file’s pages during a visit to the branch. The first impression one gets from reviewing the file is that Al-Jolani was smarter than his pursuers within the former regime’s intelligence services. These agents were part of a bureaucratic machine that was unprofessional in areas outside of violence. They were an extension of the regime’s rhetoric, which one would assume the security apparatus would avoid in its professional domain.
The intelligence agents compiling the file from the branch’s bureaucratic machinery listed several names as potential identities for Al-Joulani. Ironically, Al-Sharaa’s name appears last on the list. The first name mentioned is Anas Khattab (an Iraqi national), followed by Osama Al-Hadawi, a Syrian from the town of al-Shahil. The report also speculates that Al-Joulani might be related to the Jordanian Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi and that he was in Kuwait before joining Al-Qaeda. Al-Sharaa is the final candidate listed. The uncertainty surrounding Al-Joulani’s identity is further evidenced by discrepancies within the report itself, such as conflicting birthdates. While the introduction states his birth year as 1983, the main body later corrects it to 1982 after the author of the report obtained his birth certificate from the civil registry.
Reading through the Palestine Branch reports leaves one with the impression of a massive bureaucratic apparatus managing files on wanted individuals and detainees. Al-Joulani’s file consists of approximately 100 pages. While grammatical errors are rare and the pages are meticulously ordered, the emphasis on bureaucratic structure seems to overshadow the accuracy of the information. The inefficiency of the Syrian intelligence services mirrored the stagnation in other state institutions, with their expertise limited primarily to killing and adherence to rigid rules unlikely to serve evolving tasks. In terms of information analysis, the file shows the intelligence services’ limited ability to track the shifts in Al-Joulani’s trajectory—from his involvement with ISIS to his leadership of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The file also highlights his pragmatic personality, which enabled him to navigate the numerous splits and realignments he undertook.
The report suggests that Al-Joulani successfully outmaneuvered the Syrian intelligence services, which confused details about him and his group with those of other “jihadists.” The report includes the following statement:
“In 2006, Al-Joulani left Iraq for Lebanon, where he supervised the training of the Jund al-Sham group, linked to Al-Qaeda. He then returned to Iraq, where he was arrested by U.S. forces and detained in Camp Bucca before being released in 2008.”
However, Al-Sharaa (Al-Joulani’s real name) never entered Lebanon, as those tracking his movements agree. The inclusion of this “incident” in the file likely reflects his cunning personality, which allowed him to obscure his true identity. It also seems that Qatar’s Al Jazeera channel played a role in shaping his public persona. The report states:
“Information aired by Qatar’s Al Jazeera satellite channel revealed, for the first time since the announcement of the establishment of the Levant branch of the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda in early 2012, the true identity of Abu Muhammad al-Jolani (leader of the terrorist group Jabhat al-Nusra). The report disclosed, with Al-Joulani’s consent, that his real identity was Osama Al-Absi Al-Wahdi, born in 1981 in Al-Shahil, Deir ez-Zor, to a family originally from Idlib that had relocated to Deir ez-Zor.
He enrolled at Damascus University in the Faculty of Medicine and studied there for two years before leaving for Iraq during his third year to join the Iraqi branch of Al-Qaeda following the U.S. invasion in 2003. Al-Joulani worked under the leadership of the late Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, pledging allegiance to Osama bin Laden. He quickly rose through the ranks, becoming one of the organization’s leaders and part of Zarqawi’s inner circle.
After Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. airstrike in 2006, Al-Joulani left Iraq for Lebanon, where he supervised the training of Jund al-Sham, a group linked to Al-Qaeda.”
Thus, it appears that the individual who went to Lebanon was Osama Al-Absi Al-Wahdi, not Ahmad Al-Sharaa, whose identity the Syrian intelligence services had yet to confirm.
Earlier records, dating back to the onset of the “jihad” in Iraq, show that Al-Sharaa already had a file with Syrian intelligence, though he was not yet known as Al-Joulani. According to the file:
“Ahmad Hussein Al-Sharaa, mother’s name Wedad, born in 1982, resided in Damascus—Mezzeh, Eastern Villas. He had a beard and traveled to Iraq for jihad during the U.S. war, staying there for ten days before returning to Syria. A dispute with his father ensued, after which he left home and never returned. It is unknown whether he remains in Syria or is abroad (2005 report). He was a university student.”
Flipping through the file reveals that the Assad regime’s intelligence services were chasing a man far more cunning than they were—someone with multiple names, faces, and locations who remained elusive even after his identity was confirmed. Suspicion accompanied every stage of the intelligence officers’ analysis of Al-Sharaa’s trajectory.
The file also contains photographs of individuals in Al-Joulani’s circle who were killed, with their names written below the images. As one browses through these photos, the question inevitably arises: What allowed Al-Joulani to survive all this death surrounding him?
The file includes sections suggesting that the former Syrian regime’s intelligence services had been monitoring Al-Joulani’s transformations since 2016. However, their observations were unprofessional, conflating various entities they claimed were supporting him:
“It is certain that the terrorist group Jabhat al-Nusra will, in the coming period, seek to change parts of its behavior toward the local community and attempt to build closer ties, whether by providing military support to other factions or by expanding its relief efforts. The group will also aim to strengthen its connections with regional powers (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar), offering verbal assurances of its severance from the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda.”
In this context, Syrian researcher Hussam Jasmati told Daraj:
“It is clear from the report that they had no understanding at the time of Al-Joulani’s personality or the reasons behind his actions. Al-Joulani severed ties with Al-Qaeda because the organization no longer served his purpose. Initially, he turned to Al-Qaeda out of necessity, as we all know, to gain legitimacy in confronting the Islamic State of Iraq. Once he felt he had moved beyond this need, he immediately sought to break away, alongside other considerations.”
He added: “From the beginning, Al-Joulani aimed to create his own independent organization. When he simultaneously announced the severance of ties and revealed his face publicly, it was a declaration of both his individuality and his group’s independence. He wanted no authority above him. Even during his relationship with Al-Qaeda, it was conducted without coordination with Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the severance was also done without consultation. During their affiliation, Al-Joulani did not follow Al-Zawahiri’s directives, send reports, or adhere to any organizational commitments.”
The final identity attributed to Abu Muhammad Al-Joulani in the file aligns with what we all know today, supplemented by the account of his recruitment at a mosque in the Mezzeh (Eastern Villas) area. The report attributes this to one Laith Muhammad Issam Al-Abbas (mother’s name Fida, born in 1978), who lived in Mezzeh near Dar Al-Baath. Al-Abbas had previously traveled to Saudi Arabia for work and was reportedly involved in recruiting youth for the Wahhabi movement in the Al-Qaryatayn region. He was also implicated in facilitating the movement of extremists to Iraq, in coordination with Maher Marwan Idlabi.
Al-Sharaa, who managed to deceive the former regime’s intelligence services, appears to have leveraged these skills to mislead both ISIS and later Al-Qaeda. It seems the former regime only belatedly recognized his exceptional ability to manipulate and evade, as revealed by the intelligence documents when his skills began to impact jihadist factions within both organizations.
This insight, at least, is what emerges from the file.
The irony is that Al-Sharaa himself had been interrogated back in 2003. According to the file, he visited Branch 235 on November 10, 2003, for questioning regarding his illegal departure to Iraq for jihad against the U.S. occupation.
He had previously reported to Branch 235 “on November 10, 2003, for questioning regarding his illegal departure from Syria to Iraq with the intent of participating in jihad against the U.S. occupation. He was later interrogated by Branch 243 about his illegal reentry into Syria and the circumstances surrounding his travel to Iraq to fight alongside the Iraqi people. He was eventually released after denying any affiliation with political parties or extremist religious organizations.”
Jordanian researcher Hassan Abu Hanieh, an expert on Islamist groups, stated in an interview with Daraj:
“Al-Joulani was a figure known to only a very small number of people. Even Iraqi intelligence did not know his true identity, despite detaining him for many years. When he was released in 2011, he had been detained under the identity of an Iraqi named Adnan Ali Al-Hajj, which led them to believe that this was his real name.”
Similarly, Syrians also lacked accurate information about him. Names like Osama Al-Absi, which indicated he was from Al-Shahil, were circulated, but there was no genuine understanding of Abu Muhammad al-Joulani’s character. At times, he was even considered a fictional or non-existent figure.
Al-Joulani’s Family Background
Ahmad Al-Sharaa’s father, Hussein Ali Al-Sharaa, was an employee at the Prime Minister’s Office in Damascus. In 1980, he moved to Saudi Arabia, where he worked at the Ministry of Oil, returning to Syria in 1995 to resume his role at the Prime Minister’s Office. After a dispute with the office, he transferred to the Ministry of Planning. In 1999, he resigned and opened a real estate office in Mezzeh, Damascus.
After Ahmad Al-Sharaa returned from Iraq, a conflict arose between him and his father, prompting Ahmad to leave home and never return. The father’s whereabouts also remain unknown, according to the report.
Al-Joulani has several siblings. One brother, Maher Al-Sharaa, studied gynecology in Russia and is married to a Russian woman. In the file, Daraj found a request from “Russian friends” for more details about him. Al-Joulani’s brother-in-law, Khaled Hashish Salama (married to his sister Shahenda), worked for the Baath Party branch in Daraa. He was detained by Branch 265 for possessing ammunition and was released on April 1, 2013. Later, Salama was reportedly kidnapped by an armed terrorist group on February 28, 2014, and his fate remains unknown.
Key Jordanian Figures
The file on Al-Jolani in the Palestine Branch, reviewed by Daraj, mentions the names of two Jordanian nationals who played pivotal roles alongside Al-Jolani. However, as Jabhat al-Nusra began reorganizing its ranks, it transferred and removed its most prominent military and religious leaders in the southern region of Daraa and Quneitra. Among those removed were:
Dr. Sami Al-Aridi – General Sharia Judge of Jabhat al-Nusra.
Eyad Al-Toubassi (a.k.a. Abu Jleibib) – Military commander, Jordanian national.
The report also references Jordan as a potential supporter of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (the rebranded Jabhat al-Nusra) after its split from Al-Qaeda, reflecting strained relations and mutual distrust between Jordan and the former Syrian regime.
Jordanian researcher Hassan Abu Hanieh added:
“Abu Jleibib was among the first to join ISIS in 2011 and worked closely with Abu Muhammad al-Joulani. He held the position of southern emir for a long time. Sami Al-Aridi, on the other hand, was not initially part of Al-Qaeda or ISIS. He was in Jordan, and later joined them in the south, alongside Abu Anas Al-Sahaba (Mustafa Saleh Abdul Latif), who served as the military commander for Jabhat al-Nusra. After a dispute with ISIS, Abu Anas aligned himself with the Islamic State, while Abu Jleibib and Sami Al-Aridi remained loyal to Al-Qaeda.”
Abu Jleibib was killed in 2018 while attempting to return to southern Syria to establish a new Al-Qaeda base. Some reports attribute his death to Syrian forces, while others suggest Al-Joulani orchestrated it because Abu Jleibib opposed severing ties with Al-Qaeda. His family was later detained. Sami Al-Aridi was also arrested but later released and remains active in the “Guardians of Religion” group, according to Abu Hanieh.
Al-Joulani’s Rejection of ISIS
The report notes Al-Joulani’s rejection of ISIS, particularly his refusal to merge Jabhat al-Nusra with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s group under the new name “The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” (ISIS). Al-Joulani’s pledge of allegiance to Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri was viewed as a strategic escape from the forced merger, allowing Jabhat al-Nusra to avoid becoming an extension of ISIS in Syria.
The 2016 report did not overlook the analysis of the transformations of Jabhat al-Nusra (which had by then become Jabhat Fath al-Sham), noting that:
“Al-Joulani understands the unique characteristics of the Levant and its distinction from other jihadist arenas. Jabhat al-Nusra demonstrates flexibility in applying interests and Sharia rulings. Moreover, it does not seek to demand allegiance or impose its control over other factions. Al-Julani also worked to establish the Mujahideen Shura Council to prevent leadership of the front from being confined to a single individual, the ‘Emir,’ as is typical in traditional jihadist organizations.”
However, while the regime anticipated the flexibility of Jabhat Fath al-Sham, it did not foresee the extent of the transformation the group would undergo:
“The idea of a completely new front with a fundamentally different ideology and direction from its predecessor seems almost impossible. It is certain that the terrorist group Jabhat al-Nusra (Jabhat Fath al-Sham) will, in the coming period, attempt to modify some of its behavior towards the local community, civilians, and other factions. This might include offering limited military support to certain factions, expanding its relief activities, or easing its religious restrictions on the population. It is also likely to seek closer relations with regional powers (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar) compared to before, offering verbal assurances of its disassociation from the terrorist organization al-Qaeda.
However, the group’s foundational ideological and organizational structure will pose significant obstacles to maintaining this path of rapprochement and making concessions to other factions. Its deeply rooted religious nature will prevent it from accepting practices it fundamentally considers heretical or idolatrous. It is unlikely that much time will pass before it clashes again with the local population and other terrorist factions, particularly given its history of armed confrontations, some of which were violent and caused significant casualties among civilians and members of rival factions. Many were also captured by the group during these confrontations.”
Turkey’s Role
At the time, the regime’s report viewed Turkey’s push for Jabhat al-Nusra to sever its ties with al-Qaeda as a reaction to the “failed coup attempt on its soil.” This move, it argued, was part of Turkey’s effort to escalate its regional influence following the disappointment President Erdoğan faced from Western allies. The aim was to assert Turkey’s role, regional power, and ability to shape events. The report also highlighted a series of understandings between regional powers supporting the armed factions in Syria (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar), forcing Jabhat al-Nusra to align with them to facilitate new directions in Syria that could garner international approval.
However, the report noted that the primary objective was to send a message to external powers signaling the group’s willingness to open up to new relationships that would legitimize its presence in Syria. This strategy was indeed adopted by al-Jpulani from that point forward, culminating in his leadership of military operations and of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, with the overarching goal of toppling Bashar al-Assad’s regime.