The renewed proposal to name Nouri al-Maliki for a third term as Iraq’s prime minister appears to confirm that Iraq, like many Arab countries, remains trapped in a kind of political stagnation that recycles failure and reproduces familiar names, patterns, and traditional alliances. These forces have repeatedly proven their incompetence, backwardness, and inability to manage the country’s affairs, whether in security, development, education, the economy, the environment, or in freeing society from the dominance of political loyalties, religion, and militias. Since 2003, they have failed to guarantee Iraqis their rights to safety, equality, freedom, and sovereignty. Rather, they have actively suppressed these demands, particularly during the youth-led October (Tishreen) uprising.
This entrenched deadlock is compounded this time by a new element. U.S. President Donald Trump warned Baghdad against forming an Iran-aligned government in response to the announcement by the “Coordination Framework” of its nomination of former Iraqi prime minister Nouri al‑Maliki to lead the new government.
Al-Maliki’s nomination comes on the back of the results of the most recent parliamentary elections, in which the “Coordination Framework”, a bloc comprising Shiite parties, secured a parliamentary majority. This majority includes seats held by the State of Law Coalition, led by al-Maliki himself, as well as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and the Badr Organization. These are Shiite political formations aligned with Iran, whose coordination typically plays a decisive role in forming Iraqi governments and naming prime ministers.
As for the warnings, which drew notable reactions within Iraqi state institutions and among political figures opposed to Iranian dominance, the U.S. administration hinted at the possibility of imposing economic sanctions on Iraq. Such measures could extend to Iraqi oil revenues held in New York. At the same time, these signals reflected Washington’s determination to curb Iran’s influence in Iraq through its affiliated groups, and to break Tehran’s grip over Iraqi political and sovereign decision-making.
Moreover, the warnings have introduced an external layer of complexity on top of the internal challenges facing the formation of Iraq’s new government. Al-Maliki’s nomination has met with strong political opposition, preventing him from securing the broad national cover required. It has also fueled Shiite–Shiite tensions inside parliament, particularly between the blocs aligned with Nouri al-Maliki and Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani. Within this context, an intense competition has emerged among Shiite factions to win over Sunni and Kurdish parties, themselves divided between supporters and opponents of the nomination.
At the same time, al-Maliki’s bid has raised fears that Iraq could once again sink into a deeper cycle of security breakdown and instability. Should he prevail, he is expected to loosen the grip of armed Shiite militias over politics, the economy, and public life, a move that would likely revive practices of looting, smuggling, and patronage. Added to this are concerns related to his political approach. During his two previous terms as prime minister, al-Maliki demonstrated full alignment and loyalty to the Iranian regime, turning Iraq into a rear base for the Quds Force and a stage for displays of power by its commander Qassem Soleimani. He also tied Iraq to the strategies of the so-called “Axis of Resistance.” He is widely known to have been responsible for the release of hundreds of ISIS members from Iraqi prisons and for opening the borders to allow them into Syria, a move that helped shift the balance of the Syrian conflict in favor of the Assad regime.
According to the political convention that took hold after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the premiership has gone to the Shiites, the speakership of parliament to the Sunnis, and the presidency to the Kurds. By contrast, the Iraqi constitution stipulates that the speaker of parliament produced by the legislative elections tasks the largest parliamentary bloc with forming the government, in this case, the Coordination Framework. Nonetheless, Iraqi politicians argue that activating the quorum mechanism based solely on a majority of seats, at the expense of consensus, could deepen political divisions and push the country into a higher level of tension, generating additional crises.
Regardless of internal opposition, Shiite fragmentation, or the debate between quorum and consensus, al-Maliki’s return for a third term remains little more than wishful thinking. His chances this time are more closely tied than ever to the escalating confrontation between Iran and the United States, with Iraq almost certainly one of its main arenas.
If Washington were to launch a military strike against Iran, or if Tehran were to carry out its threat of igniting a regional war, neither Iraq nor its government would be spared, and al-Maliki’s ambitions would evaporate. If, on the other hand, the two sides were to reach a deal, they would likely return to political brinkmanship, leaving Iraq unable to satisfy either side, and al-Maliki’s dream would still be lost.
Iraq today is thus caught between the possibility of al-Maliki’s withdrawal, with all the political and constitutional crises that would entail, and the possibility of his remaining in the race, a scenario that could lead to a direct confrontation with Washington.
