“This article was first published by The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP)”
On April 26, 2026, the trial of nine defendants accused of committing serious crimes under the Assad regime began in Damascus, in what the government described as the start of transitional justice trials in Syria. It features Atef Najib, whose name has been widely associated with the crackdown on peaceful protests in Daraa at the early stages of the revolution.
What happened in Daraa in 2011 was only the beginning of the atrocities endured by civilians for over 14 years: mass killings, arbitrary detention, torture, enforced disappearances, chemical weapons attacks, sexual violence, widespread displacement, and more. Addressing these crimes requires a highly sensitive and comprehensive justice strategy that deals with the past, recognizes all victims and their nuanced needs, and guides Syria toward a just and stable future.
All eyes are on this trial and what it may deliver for Syrians, as it is the first test of the Syrian judiciary in examining serious crimes committed during the Assad era. It is a testament that justice could be delivered for victims even if delayed. However, the absence of a coherent transitional justice strategy risks limiting the trial’s impact on comprehensive, long-term efforts to bring the justice that Syrians deserve.
From Daraa to court
Fifteen years have passed since a group of children in Daraa was arrested and tortured for simply writing anti-regime graffiti on a school wall, sparking the uprising in 2011. People in Daraa took to the streets demanding the children’s release and calling for the overthrow of the Assad regime. The peaceful protests were met with brutality, as security forces shot protesters, conducted mass arbitrary arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, and other grave human rights violations. One of the principal suspects linked to these events is the former head of the Political Security branch in Daraa, Brigadier General Atef Najib, who is Bashar al-Assad’s cousin and one of the regime cronies who abused his position to build his own empire in the city.
In a historic moment for Syrians, Najib is now on trial in Damascus, alongside eight other senior officials tried in absentia. These include former president Bashar al-Assad, his brother and commander of the Military Fourth Division Maher al-Assad, former defense minister Fahd al-Freij, as well as Muhammad Ayman Ayoush, Louay al-Ali, Qusay Mayhoub, Wafiq Nasser, and Talal al-Osaimy. All held senior positions in the military and security apparatus and are accused of grave violations committed against civilians since the early stages of the uprising.
Unlike proceedings before foreign courts, this trial is taking place close to the victims, the public, and the places where the crimes were committed
The trial carries profound symbolic weight for victims, who never imagined that they would live to see such names being prosecuted in the country. It also holds a major legal significance as the first domestic trial in Syria addressing serious crimes committed by Assad regime officials. Unlike proceedings before foreign courts, this trial is taking place close to the victims, the public, and the places where the crimes were committed. It lays the ground for establishing an official judicial record before a Syrian court and sets an important precedent for future accountability efforts.
The trial is one of the steps taken by the interim government to achieve transitional justice in Syria. In March 2025, the Constitutional Declaration was issued, recognizing transitional justice and laying the initial ground to prosecuting international crimes. Two months later, in May 2025, the National Committee for Transitional Justice was established, and it began engaging with victims and drafting a Transitional Justice Law that regulates different justice pathways, including criminal accountability, reparations, and truth seeking measures.
Yet, to this day, the law has not been enacted, and there is no transparent transitional justice strategy explaining how this trial fits within the country’s broader justice process. This raises concerns that, despite its significance, the trial may proceed without the necessary legal and institutional frameworks.
Putting the cart before the horse
Even though Syrians have widely welcomed the trial of Najib and others, it is taking place before the state has published, or probably even set, a transitional justice strategy. This strategy is essential to clearly define the trajectory of the justice process and manage public expectations. It should explain to the public what transitional justice in Syria will look like, how long the process may take, who will be prosecuted and for which crimes, who will be recognized as victims, and what non-judicial mechanisms will be available to address their needs and priorities.
On the legal side, the yet-to-be-enacted Transitional Justice Law is essential, as it is expected, among other things, to criminalize war crimes and crimes against humanity that are not recognized under the current Syrian Penal Code. Although the indictment sought to characterize the acts attributed to Atef Najib as international crimes, these crimes and their penalties still need to be codified in domestic law. Such codification is necessary for the court to adjudicate these crimes properly. Without it, the court risks inconsistently relying on international law to fill gaps in domestic legislation or stretching existing legal frameworks beyond their intended scope.
In addition to that, the Syrian Penal Code does not criminalize certain crimes, such as enforced disappearance, persecution, or forced deportation, despite their widespread occurrence during the Syrian conflict; and these charges might be relevant to the Atef Najib case. A stark example of the current legal framework’s shortcomings is that defendants were not charged with enforced disappearance, but with kidnapping—the closest available, yet legally insufficient, equivalent under existing law. Syrian criminal law also does not recognize the principle of command responsibility, which holds superiors accountable for failing to prevent or prosecute crimes committed by their subordinates. This means that these acts have no grounds for prosecution under the existing legal system.
Finally, the absence of a transitional justice strategy leaves a critical legal issue unaddressed: the possible application of capital punishment. Many Syrians support imposing this sentence, and the court is likely to go that way in the case of Atef Najib and subsequent trials. Yet, without judicial reforms ensuring fair trials and compliance with international standards, its application risks violating international law. The strategy must also take into consideration that carrying out death sentences could undermine international judicial cooperation, potentially weakening broader justice and accountability efforts.
A people-centered approach?
Beyond legal considerations, proceeding with trials without a transitional justice strategy risks undermining the very purpose of transitional justice: addressing the past in a comprehensive manner that recognizes the full scope of harm endured by victims and advances a just, peaceful, and stable future. Achieving this purpose requires placing people at the heart of the process and ensuring they are fully informed of its broader justice pathways and framework.
Given that criminal accountability alone cannot deliver comprehensive justice to all victims, a clear strategy is needed to clarify what other non-judicial, victim-oriented mechanisms are available, including reparations programs, truth-seeking mechanisms, and institutional reforms. This would help manage victims’ expectations, clarify how the intended justice process will address the root causes of the conflict, and reinforce a victim-centered approach rather than one focused narrowly on individual perpetrators.
A comprehensive strategy is required to ensure that people remain at the center of the process, with meaningful engagement before, during, and after trials to foster inclusion and ownership
Transitional justice trials are also distinct from ordinary criminal proceedings. Beyond holding perpetrators accountable, they contribute to documenting victims’ experiences and supporting lasting peace and stability. Their effectiveness therefore depends on the capacity of judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers to manage complex proceedings and to engage appropriately with victims. This includes expertise in applying international law in ways not previously used within the Syrian criminal justice system, as well as a specialized approach to interviewing victims and witnesses, collecting and assessing evidence, and handling digital materials and other technical means of proceedings. Most importantly, these trials require a strong degree of sensitivity toward victims and the harm they have suffered, including the ability to assess testimonies that may appear contradictory or inconsistent due to the passage of time and the traumatic impact of the crimes on victims’ ability to recall events.
For these reasons, a comprehensive strategy is required to ensure that people remain at the center of the process, with meaningful engagement before, during, and after trials to foster inclusion and ownership. This requires a structured framework to inform and educate the public about justice processes. The framework must outline the legal, physical, psychological, and financial support available to victims and witnesses, and address the needs of vulnerable groups, including children, women, and survivors of torture and sexual violence, ensuring their protection where necessary. Without such a strategy and frameworks, trials risk diverting from their intended purpose.
The need for course-correction
The opportunity to recalibrate remains within reach. This requires issuing a transparent and well-communicated transitional justice strategy that places victims and affected communities at its core, establishes meaningful mechanisms for participation rather than tokenistic inclusion, and provides effective protection for victims and witnesses. The strategy must be inclusive of all victims and avoid prioritizing one group over another. Therefore, achieving accountability means that perpetrators from all parties to the conflict in Syria, and not just members of the former Assad regime, must be prosecuted. The strategy should also ensure a structured civil society participation in monitoring and support of justice processes.
The parliament should be fully constituted and activated to enact the Transitional Justice Law. The law must place victims’ rights at its core and strike a credible balance between domestic and international legal standards.
Finally, judges, prosecutors, and lawyers representing both victims and defendants should be trained to handle atrocity crimes and engage properly with victims and witnesses. While such trainings have started to take place in Syria, further capacity-building is still needed. The transitional justice strategy should also set a plan to reform the judicial system, preserve the records of the justice process, and make them publicly accessible. This would help create an enduring judicial legacy that officially documents what occurred in Syria and helps prevent recurrence.
These steps are not a luxury in a complex context like Syria, as the cost of proceeding without a strategic approach to transitional justice may ultimately outweigh the short-term benefits of rushing into trials.
