It’s crucial to reiterate that the arrest of Riad Salameh is not a triumph for Lebanon’s judicial system. For the past five years, the judiciary has been complicit in the suffering of the Lebanese people, first by remaining silent about the illegal capital controls imposed by banks on depositors, and second by turning a blind eye to the billions of dollars transferred by these banks to benefit politicians.

Now that the judiciary has been forced to issue an arrest warrant for the former Central Bank governor, we must consider what comes next. After all, it was the citizens, journalists, and activists who pressured the financial prosecutor, Ali Ibrahim, to charge Salameh, only after the scandal echoed through European courts. It wasn’t the Lebanese judiciary responding to local pressure, but rather to the European legal system, which had become the final hope for those seeking justice.

The next chapter in Lebanon’s financial collapse scandal revolves around the banks themselves. These institutions profited far more from the theft of deposits than Riad Salameh ever did. Over 60 banks gambled with the deposits of Lebanese and Arab clients, reaping massive profits during the era of financial engineering. But when the crisis hit and bankruptcy was declared, they passed the losses onto depositors, washing their hands of any responsibility.

Even after the collapse, the banks continued their misdeeds. They closed their branches to the public for two weeks, yet kept their main offices open for politicians. Everyone knows that over $10 billion was transferred during that two-week period.

This is just a snapshot of the banking operations conducted without capital control. The more serious issues of money laundering, legal evasion, and documented manipulation of ownership, often with the Central Bank’s complicity, offer further grounds for exposing the banks to European courts—just as was done with Salameh.

For those who talk about the distinction between “good banks” and “bad banks,” it’s important to note that no Lebanese bank refrained from illegally freezing deposits. There are no “good banks” in Lebanon—only bad ones, and worse ones.

Perhaps five or six of Lebanon’s largest banks could serve as a case study, given the well-documented violations they’ve committed. These include illegal foreign transfers, manipulation, and profiting from Riad Salameh’s financial schemes. At the top of the list is Bank Audi, followed by Bank Al Mawarid (whose chairman, Marwan Kheireddine, a failed parliamentary candidate aligned with Hezbollah and Amal, has made headlines for his role). Also implicated are SGBL, owned by Antoun Sehnaoui, and Banque du Liban et d’Outre-Mer (BLOM), Cedrus Bank, as well as partnerships between the Hariri family and the Lebanese-Jordanian-Egyptian businessman, Alaa Khawaja, through BankMed.

There are numerous documents that Lebanese courts have ignored, which incriminate these banks. These documents are available for anyone willing to continue the fight. After all, what could be more damning than the documented transfers of millions of dollars by Bank Al Mawarid for the benefit of Nady Salameh, Riad’s son, at the height of the capital control period? Or the transfer, also documented, that former prosecutor general Ghassan Oueidat admitted to benefiting from through Bank Audi?

This is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the banks’ crimes. Any judge, whenever their conscience awakens, could issue an arrest warrant against a bank owner or board member. The Lebanese Code of Money and Credit grants them this authority.

Unlike Riad Salameh’s assets—which, even if seized for the benefit of depositors, would not exceed $1 billion in the best-case scenario—the potential recovery from prosecuting the banks could yield more than ten times that amount. This excludes the $8 billion in Optimum’s accounts, revealed by the Kroll report. If it turns out that this was an attempt to conceal losses, it proves that Salameh manipulated this amount and sought to hide his actions through Optimum.

Just as Salameh lived a life of extravagance during Lebanon’s collapse, flaunting his wealth until his last day outside prison, the bankers have not hesitated to indulge in the fortunes built from the hard-earned money of the Lebanese people. Today, they’re enjoying their time in luxury resorts and European summer getaways, while Lebanon’s impoverished depositors remain trapped in a bankrupt country.

The banks should be the second target in the fight for accountability. The third—and most critical—target is the ruling political and militia class. The majority of the $100 billion stolen from Lebanon sits in the accounts of these individuals in European banks. And since we failed to confront them during the October 2019 uprising, we must now engage in a parallel battle—this time, against Swiss banking secrecy.

For that’s where our deposits are hidden.