The suicide bombing that struck the Syrian capital and targeted a church, killing and injuring dozens, occurred at a moment of stark political clarity. Many elements of the report suggest that ISIS is behind the attack. A suicide bomber carrying a rifle and wearing an explosive belt carried out the crime. Before detonating himself among the worshippers, he opened fire and killed several, according to some witnesses. ISIS suicide bombers have long followed the same script in Iraq, Syria, and other countries.
Attributing the Damascus crime to ISIS, as the Syrian Ministry of Interior has done, does not weaken the argument that the attack occurred in a “political moment.” To be clearer: the church bombing took place while the U.S. and Israel were dismantling Iran’s nuclear program. It was, in fact, a moment surrounded by defeats closing in on Iran and its proxies across the region.
As for the supposed sectarian divide between Iran and ISIS, this becomes meaningless when we recall the history of instances in which ISIS and similar groups were employed by regimes with no sectarian affiliation to the group.
Syria offers rich examples in this regard. When the former Baathist regime released hundreds of jihadists in the early days of the revolution, it did so with full awareness of the consequences. The regime had accumulated considerable expertise in the nature and operations of jihadist groups. It knew precisely where the released prisoners would go and what they would do. Nor should we forget the regime’s role in harboring, organizing, and arming Iraqi jihadists, and sending them to Baghdad to fight the Americans.
Iran itself adopted the Syrian playbook in Iraq. The flow of ISIS fighters into Iraqi cities was part of an Iranian project. The fall of Mosul to a handful of ISIS fighters, and the withdrawal of more than 50,000 Iraqi soldiers from the city, was suspicious, to say the least.
ISIS emerges on demand. Tehran has invested in it, just as Gulf regimes have, in the context of their sectarian conflicts with Iran. Turkey also facilitated the entry of jihadists into Syria through its territory. In Lebanon, we all witnessed how Fatah al-Islam was born and how it was sent from Syria to Nahr al-Bared.
ISIS cannot operate or awaken without a “political moment.” In Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki’s bloodthirsty crackdown on the Sunni cities’ uprising awakened the group, presenting it as the “sword of the Sunnis.” Funds flowed in from the Gulf, and fighters arrived from around the world.
Viewing Syria as the ideal battleground against the American-Gulf project brings us back to the decision by Iran and the Syrian regime to turn Iraq into a confrontation zone with the U.S. military.
ISIS is not separate from the broader picture. It does not operate in isolation. Its supposed “slumber” in the desert, whether Syrian or Iraqi, is symbolic of its relationship with urban powers: it emerges from the desert when a role is assigned to it. The tools of its trade are always available. Our societies are always packed with elements it can exploit.
Violence, jihadist ideology, the legacy of Baathist rule, disbanded armies, and sectarian divisions all are engines of ISIS’s operations. But these engines do not run without external fuel. They must be connected to a sectarian project, then to funding, followed by arms supplies, recruitment routes (via Turkey and the Gulf), and most importantly, media platforms that turn its actions into the centerpiece of public life (such as Al Jazeera).
The “resistance” in Iraq aligned the interests of the Syrian (Alawite) regime with remnants of the dissolved (Sunni) Iraqi army and with Iran’s desire to fight the U.S. military—thus producing the “jihadists,” including, ironically, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. This context brings us back to Sunday’s church bombing in Damascus.
ISIS lies dormant in the desert, while the regime in Damascus is currently the darling of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. At the same time, Iran and its proxies are taking blows unlike anything they’ve experienced in over forty years. Syria is the weakest link, the one most likely to be targeted by anyone seeking to curtail U.S. and Saudi influence.
This does not mean Syria will witness an Iraq-style scenario. Anyone wishing to activate ISIS from the desert into urban Syria faces challenges not present in Iraq. The sectarian draw that empowered ISIS in Iraq does not exist in Syria, where Sunnis would be fighting other Sunnis. Gulf funding would also be less available. However, Syria’s porous borders, particularly with Iraq and Lebanon, could provide logistical support for the group. Fighters, historically, have joined the jihad when it became a cause for the “Sunni nation,” something unlikely to happen in Syria today.
Yesterday’s bombing in Damascus is a security incident that is unlikely to develop into a daily political reality. However, it is a sign of a broader scenario that may extend beyond Syria. If the intention is to shift the function of the proxies in Iraq and Lebanon from direct confrontation with the Americans to disrupting their project in Syria, then we could see a spread of security unrest to both countries.
Viewing Syria as the ideal battleground against the American-Gulf project brings us back to the decision by Iran and the Syrian regime to turn Iraq into a confrontation zone with the U.S. military.
The Damascus bombing occurred during a “political moment” of similar nature. It is almost certain that ISIS carried it out, and it would be wise to remain suspicious, especially since we have seen all this before, in both Iraq and Syria.
