There is no equivalent in Arabic for the phrase “Déjà vu,” which captures the feeling of seeing something and believing you’ve seen it before or experiencing something you think you’ve lived through in the past. What is happening in Syria feels like a kind of déjà vu.

You can experience déjà vu without fully understanding it—a flood of memories surfaces, some beautiful but most painful, distressing, and bleak. Over a week ago, reports began emerging of movements among Syrian Islamist armed factions. At the time, the most reasonable analysts suggested that any such movement, if it happened, would be limited in scope, aiming to stir up the stagnant swamp that has plagued the north for five years. These same years have seen Israeli forces repeatedly violate Syrian airspace to strike Iranian-linked targets, leaving them battered and exhausted.

But what transpired was monumental—in the literal sense of the word, not the metaphorical one. The enormity of the event is not diminished by the rush of many commentators to describe it as “expected” or “natural.” We’ve grown accustomed to this breed of analyst, who somehow always “knew” something was going to happen but, for some reason, chose not to share their insight beforehand.

Within 48 hours, the factions of Fatah al-Mubeen, Ahrar al-Sham, and a handful of other groups from the so-called “Syrian National Army” had overrun vast areas previously controlled by the regime and its Iranian allies. In just 24 hours, they seized Syria’s second-largest city, taking full control.

Twenty-four hours were enough for these factions to reclaim areas the Assad regime, with Russian airpower, needed four months to retake in 2016. How did Assad’s forces manage to pack up their equipment and retreat so swiftly? Isn’t this yet another déjà vu moment, one that takes those of my generation back to another withdrawal in June/July 1976?

Living on the High of Euphoria

We Syrians live on euphoria. Like all the oppressed, marginalized, and powerless, Syrians wait for an event that can lift their spirits—a sudden, overwhelming joy that compensates for years and decades of oppression. It’s a joy that floods their souls, heightens their adrenaline, and momentarily makes the misery bearable.

In such moments, Syrians pour into real streets to distribute sweets or flood virtual spaces to exchange congratulations, share videos, and hurl enormous quantities of curses. It’s a strange catharsis—expelling part of their grief, sadness, and depression through chanting, takbeer, or invective. It has happened many times.

I don’t like to recall that some Syrians celebrated on September 11, 2001, handing out sweets. Nor do I want to remember their cheers for the tyrant Saddam Hussein when he invaded a neighboring sovereign country. And I certainly don’t want to remember the frenzied joy that overtook some on October 7, 2023.

There is no shame in euphoria itself, except that it often ends with a slow descent into melancholy, dragging us through all the stages of grief: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and finally, reluctant acceptance. Sometimes, after every swift ascent, we find ourselves plummeting again. This happened on October 6, 1973, when sudden joy drove us to the rooftops to watch the air battles and Israeli missiles being downed. We were certain we had reclaimed the Golan Heights, perhaps even reached Tel Aviv.

But by October 12, 1973, we were stunned by the halt of the Syrian advance, the counteroffensive, and the Israeli forces seizing new villages, displacing more people to Damascus and its countryside. We denied it, we raged, we bargained, we despaired—and finally, we accepted, subdued. We endured decades under the same ruler who lost the war twice but declared victory both times. And we were forced to adopt his narrative of triumph. Then he turned his weapons against us and our siblings in Lebanon.

Back to Square One

Here we are, repeating the cycle once again. Undeniably, the crumbling regime in Damascus has plunged the country into an abyss of poverty, hunger, and despair. Equally undeniable is the right of millions of displaced Syrians to hope and work toward returning to their homes.

In recent months, Russian forces, along with Assad’s regime and Iranian-backed militias, have repeatedly violated the de-escalation agreements, resuming missile and artillery shelling via drones and targeting civilians and public infrastructure.

The bombing of a school in the city of Ariha last Tuesday, which claimed the lives of several civilians, including children, was the latest episode in this series of violations. Naturally, these escalating hostile actions have intensified public pressure to halt such attacks, which are seen as a precursor to an intensified campaign to tighten the noose around opposition-held areas and exacerbate the suffering of Syrians living there.

What is abnormal, however, is for a foreign government occupying part of Syria’s territory to spearhead action, not to solve the Syrians’ plight but to address its own concerns. Almost everyone agrees on Turkey’s role in the recent developments, a fact disputed only by those deceiving themselves. Yet, while Syrians largely concur on Ankara’s involvement, they diverge on the extent, ranging from tacit approval to outright orchestration and leadership.

For my part, I find it difficult to believe that the leaders of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Ahrar al-Sham—who have previously shed much of each other’s blood—voluntarily formed a joint operations room, planned step-by-step, and executed meticulously aligned scenarios. It is almost certain that the operation was directed, planned, and led by Turkey, which managed to reconcile these “brothers-in-enmity” and align them toward a shared goal executed with precision. Let’s not forget that such a well-coordinated campaign would have been impossible without intelligence and technology that these warring factions lack.

Turkey: The “Silent Partner”?

While there is significant debate over Turkey’s direct involvement in the HTS-led offensive, there is little doubt about its logistical and strategic support for factions like the Syrian National Army. This underscores Ankara’s indirect influence on the dynamics of the battlefield.

Turkey’s role aligns with its broader strategic objectives: maintaining influence in northern Syria, countering threats posed by Kurdish groups like the YPG—which Ankara views as an existential threat near its borders—and securing its national security interests. This attack presents Turkey with an opportunity to consolidate its foothold in Aleppo while curtailing Assad’s advances in areas close to its border.

Close observers of the conflict, analyzing reports meticulously, recognize that such an offensive could not have been spontaneous. It culminated from long-term preparations overseen by Turkish intelligence. It is believed that Turkey played a role in uniting extremist factions in northern Syria under the umbrella of the Syrian National Army and HTS, enabling joint operations and tactical coordination. This reflects Turkey’s calculated approach to achieving its military and geopolitical objectives.

Not for Our Sake

It’s crucial to understand that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s efforts are not motivated by goodwill toward Syrians. For over a year, Erdoğan sought a settlement with Assad through Russian mediation, but his attempts ultimately failed due to irreconcilable demands—chief among them Assad’s insistence on a full Turkish withdrawal from northern Syria.

The current conflict underscores Turkey’s refusal to relinquish its strategic foothold, anticipating potential security and political ramifications. Simultaneously, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s dialogue with his Russian counterpart signals Ankara’s intent to manage the unfolding situation diplomatically while safeguarding its strategic leverage.

Erdoğan aims to bolster his negotiating position while achieving multiple objectives through this recent campaign: facilitating the return of Syrian refugees, curbing Iran’s influence, and, most importantly, neutralizing the Kurdish threat—or even eradicating it altogether.

Erdoğan could not repatriate the three million Syrian refugees in Turkey to areas under Assad’s control or to the Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria. Nor was he able to return them to the narrow strip controlled by his Syrian military proxies under the banner of the “Syrian National Army” in the Euphrates Shield and Peace Spring regions. However, the occupation of a major city like Aleppo and its surrounding towns, extending to Hama, could create the conditions necessary for their return. This strategy might allow Erdogan to repatriate up to two-thirds of the Syrian refugees currently residing in Turkey.

Turkey’s involvement in the ongoing offensive in northern Syria reflects a calculated effort to counterbalance Iran’s influence in the region, exploiting the conflict to weaken Tehran’s strategic position. Through the military operation led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, Ankara has positioned itself as a counterforce to Iran-backed militias, which have played a pivotal role in supporting the Assad regime. The offensive offers Turkey an opportunity to disrupt Iran’s operational capabilities in key areas near Aleppo and Idlib, undermining its ability to use these regions as logistical and strategic hubs to advance its broader regional agenda.

The Key Issue: The Kurds

The Kurdish question remains central. The Kurdish movement, particularly the armed faction led by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), poses a significant challenge not just to Turkey but also to Iran. Ankara accuses the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), along with its political arm, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), and its military wing, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), of being mere extensions of the PKK.

In my view, Erdoğan’s primary objective isn’t to weaken or save Assad or to bring about radical political change in Syria but to diminish—or completely eliminate—the Kurdish presence in northeastern Syria.

Regrettably, many Syrians, especially in northern and northeastern regions, share Erdoğan’s chauvinistic views. This convergence of Turkish ultranationalism and Arab chauvinism aims to dismantle the Autonomous Administration and the SDF.

I hold serious criticisms of the AANES, the SDC, and the SDF. I don’t see northeastern Syria as a genuine model of democracy. However, I must acknowledge that the political, civil, and human rights framework there is more advanced than under Assad or Erdoğan. The Kurdish component of this administration consists of Syrian citizens, first and foremost. Treating them as outsiders or enemies violates basic human rights and the principles of the Syrian revolution itself.

I recognize that a portion of the Kurdish population is emotionally and ideologically connected to the extremist and terrorist ideology of Öcalan. However, a larger segment of Syrian Arabs, in turn, align themselves with the Turks, Iranians, or even Israelis. Let us not use this point as a source of contention—it is always wiser for those living in glass houses to refrain from throwing stones.

Turkey’s multifaceted role in northern Syria reflects its balancing act between supporting opposition factions, confronting Kurdish and Iranian forces, and navigating regional diplomacy. As the conflict evolves, Ankara’s actions will remain pivotal in shaping the balance of power in Syria, highlighting its broader ambitions to consolidate influence and protect national interests in a volatile geopolitical landscape.

In Syria, we have a saying: “Whoever tries the tried has a corrupt mind.” We have already experienced the rule of extremist Islamist factions firsthand. We’ve seen how they impose their laws on both Muslims and non-Muslims, the devout and the secular. We’ve witnessed their treatment of women, their imposition of taxes, their drug trade, and their financial corruption. We’ve seen their leaders transform from modest individuals to ostentatiously wealthy elites. Can we really trust them again after all that?

Yet, I still have a question—perhaps it’s merely wishful thinking, a desperate search for a glimmer of hope: Could this reshuffling of the cards, amidst Iran’s weakening, Russia’s challenges, Hezbollah’s retreat, and Assad’s caricature-like impotence, pave the way for a comprehensive solution in Syria?

Yesterday, I read a statement by the Syrian National Coalition that, for once, appeared balanced, measured, and written in political—not emotional—language. Part of it read:

“Syria must be brought to safety, protected from divisive and separatist projects. We want Syria to be an independent state with full sovereignty over its territory—a state governed by a system based on democracy, justice, freedom, and the rule of law that guarantees the rights of all citizens in all their components and safeguards their freedoms.”

If someone genuinely thinks in this manner and reaches out to all Syrians, perhaps they could find Syrian and international support to set them on the right path. Or perhaps not.