“We will sue the Lebanese state before U.S. courts because it harbors a terrorist organization.”
The head of the Israeli delegation made this statement to the Lebanese negotiating team during meetings in Washington. It lies behind the Lebanese state’s retreat from its right to pursue legal action against Israel over war crimes it has committed, and continues to commit, in Lebanon.
Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri said that the threat was relayed to him by the head of the Lebanese delegation, former ambassador Simon Karam.
According to the Lebanese government, this threat was one of the factors that led the Lebanese delegation to accept the broad wording of Article 13 of the Trilateral Framework, under which Lebanon pledged to refrain from taking international legal or political steps that Israel considers “hostile or harmful.”
Speaking at a discussion organized by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Beirut, Mitri said: “In exchange for dropping the purported lawsuit, Lebanon gave up its right to take legal action against Israel.”
The threat was closer to a negotiating pressure tactic than to a realistic legal course of action that could actually be pursued before U.S. courts. The U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) establishes, as a general rule, that foreign states enjoy immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, subject only to specific exceptions. Accusing Lebanon of harboring an organization designated as terrorist is not, in itself, sufficient to strip it of that immunity, since the United States has not officially designated Lebanon as a state sponsor of terrorism.
Lebanon built an archive of violations without paving a path to the courtroom, while an Israeli legal threat was used to restrict its judicial options.
Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri confirmed that the so-called “framework agreement” was not submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval and is therefore not binding on the government. He explained that Prime Minister Nawaf Salam interpreted Article 13 as “preventing legal action against Israel while negotiations are underway,” without preventing the National Committee for International Humanitarian Law from continuing to document violations or pursuing legal action in the future.
The prime minister stressed that “it is a trilateral framework, not an agreement,” according to Mitri.
According to lawyer Najib Farhat, Article 52 of the Lebanese Constitution grants the president the authority to negotiate and conclude international treaties in agreement with the prime minister, provided that they do not enter into force until approved by the Council of Ministers. In some cases, parliamentary approval is also required. Farhat therefore stresses that “the negotiating delegation cannot, on its own initiative, waive on behalf of the Lebanese state its right to take legal action against Israel or restrict its ability to resort to courts and international mechanisms.”
Since the framework was signed in Washington at the end of June 2026, public debate has focused on the scope of Article 13 and on whether it effectively restricts Lebanon’s right to pursue international legal action against Israel. But the use of legal accountability mechanisms does not, in practice, hinge on whether or not a framework agreement exists. It has already been stalled by the absence of political will, both in Lebanon and internationally.
As for the text of the framework itself, it “contravenes international public order, because international crimes, including war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, are not subject to statutes of limitations and cannot be waived,” lawyer Najib Farhat told Daraj. He added: “Waiving Lebanon’s right has no legal effect, even if Parliament were to ratify this agreement.”
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri also rejected any waiver of Lebanon’s right to pursue legal action against Israel over Israeli acts of genocide, saying that “existential threats do not give anyone the right to act under any pretext, whether under the framework agreement or any secret annexes.”
Between the Committee’s Files and the Courtroom
The National Committee on International Humanitarian Law, established by decree on June 21, 2010, is chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri and relies on a team of volunteers to document Israeli violations. Mitri explains that this documentation carries national and moral significance: it preserves the memory of victims. It helps prevent a recurrence of the civil war, which was accompanied by the erasure of collective memory. Documentation also has a political dimension, as Israel faces growing international isolation as its attacks are documented. Legally, the documentation provides material that could be used as evidence should a path toward judicial accountability open up in the future.
Alongside the work of the National Committee on International Humanitarian Law, an assessment mission dispatched by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights is preparing a report on violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, which will be presented to the Human Rights Council once completed. The report does not itself constitute an accountability mechanism. Still, it strengthens the UN record of violations and could provide a basis for later calls to establish an independent investigative mechanism or pursue action before other international bodies. Human Rights Council resolutions also carry political and moral weight, helping shape international positions and determine the priorities of UN institutions and agencies, as well as their work on the ground.
Mitri said that Israel has a long record of violations of international humanitarian law and that Lebanon is no exception. He noted that Israeli officials have repeatedly threatened to raze southern Lebanese villages and towns to the ground, as they have done in Gaza. Mitri stressed, however, the need to distinguish between documenting violations and establishing criminal responsibility for them. Characterizing such acts as war crimes or crimes against humanity remains a potential legal classification until a competent judicial body investigates them and issues a ruling.
In this context, Mitri outlined three avenues for pursuing action to hold Israel accountable: the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, and the United Nations General Assembly, which can request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice.
Political and Legal Obstacles
Despite the multiple legal avenues available for holding Israel accountable internationally, activating some of them still depends on a Lebanese political decision. In contrast, others face jurisdictional limitations, require state consent, or are constrained by weak enforcement mechanisms. Some of these avenues may lead to binding judgments, while others result in advisory opinions that are not legally binding.
On April 26, 2024, more than two years before the framework agreement was signed, Lebanon’s Council of Ministers, headed by Najib Mikati, instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to lodge a declaration with the International Criminal Court accepting the Court’s jurisdiction over crimes within its mandate committed on Lebanese territory since October 7, 2023. The previous government, however, reversed its decision before it was implemented. According to Mitri, “the new government has not reversed that reversal, and I do not think it will.”
The previous government’s decision was based on Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, which allows a state that is not a party to the Statute to accept the Court’s jurisdiction for a specified period. Accepting the Court’s jurisdiction does not automatically trigger an investigation, nor does it allow Lebanon to prosecute Israel, as the ICC deals exclusively with the criminal responsibility of individuals. The Court may examine crimes within its jurisdiction regardless of the identity of their perpetrators, provided they were committed on Lebanese territory during the period covered by the declaration.
Successive events in recent months, from the U.S. military operation inside Venezuela, which involved the arrest of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife and their forcible transfer to the United States, to military operations against Iran conducted without authorization from the UN Security Council, have exposed the fragility of the international legal order and its inability to subject powerful states to the same rules with the same effectiveness as weaker states.
This fragility is also evident in the international justice system, which lacks enforcement mechanisms independent of states’ willingness to cooperate. As a result, justice shifts from a principle that is supposed to apply equally to all into a selective process shaped by power dynamics and political alliances. As the Coalition for the International Criminal Court explains, international justice “cannot function without state cooperation.”
“Lebanon joining the International Criminal Court would not guarantee justice, but it would be a prerequisite for opening up one avenue toward it, since the Court has no police force of its own to enforce its decisions,” lawyer Najib Farhat said. The arrest of suspects and their appearance before the Court therefore remain dependent on cooperation from states parties to the Rome Statute, as well as on political power dynamics.
In November 2024, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on suspicion of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza. Nevertheless, Hungary received Netanyahu on an official visit in April 2025 without arresting him. The Court subsequently found that Hungary had failed to comply with its obligations and referred the matter to the Assembly of States Parties. In January 2025, meanwhile, the Polish government adopted a resolution guaranteeing the “free and safe participation” of senior Israeli officials, including Netanyahu, in events marking the 80th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz.
The International Court of Justice also offers avenues through which Lebanon could bring a case against Israel, provided there is a legal basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, such as a treaty in force between Lebanon and Israel containing a clause referring disputes over its interpretation or application to the Court. South Africa pursued this route in its case against Israel, relying on Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
According to lawyer Najib Farhat, however, “the binding nature of the Court’s judgments and provisional measures is largely formal, because it has no enforcement body of its own.” If a state refuses to comply with a judgment, the other party may turn to the Security Council under Article 94 of the UN Charter. Any measures taken by the Council to enforce the judgment, however, remain subject to the political balance of power within it.
Lebanon could also push within the United Nations General Assembly for the adoption of a resolution requesting an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on Israeli violations. Although advisory opinions are not legally binding, they can carry significant legal and political weight and, depending on their content and on the positions and practices of states, could help Lebanon advance other avenues for legal action.
National Courts: Legal Avenues Open to Individuals
Lebanese citizens’ ability to turn to foreign courts to pursue accountability for Israeli violations varies considerably. In many cases, these legal avenues remain limited to citizens of those countries or individuals with a legal connection to them that allows their courts to exercise jurisdiction.
On August 11, 2026, the Arab American Civil Rights League and others filed a lawsuit before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Caterpillar. The case was brought on behalf of Lebanese plaintiffs who are U.S. citizens, after their homes, property and livelihoods in Lebanon were destroyed as a result of Israeli military operations.
The plaintiffs based their case on the Leahy Law, which prohibits U.S. military assistance to units of foreign security forces when there is credible information that they have committed gross human rights violations. They also sought to hold the defendant companies responsible for continuing to supply Israel with weapons, equipment, and military technology despite documented evidence of widespread violations and severe harm to civilians. Such lawsuits may open a legal debate over corporate responsibility and the limits of continued U.S. military support. Still, they do not constitute a prosecution of Israeli officials responsible for the violations.
In a separate legal avenue, French-Lebanese filmmaker Ali Cherri, together with the International Federation for Human Rights, filed a complaint in April 2026 before the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Unit of the Paris Judicial Court against unknown perpetrators. Cherri called for an investigation into an Israeli strike that targeted an apartment he owns in Beirut’s Nweiri neighborhood on November 26, 2024. Unlike the U.S. lawsuit, the French complaint seeks to open a criminal investigation into a potential war crime and identify the individuals responsible.
Important as individual lawsuits may be, they are no substitute for action by the Lebanese state to establish Israel’s responsibility for violating its international obligations and to seek reparations for damage inflicted on state property and that of Lebanese citizens.
In this context, Mitri said: “The day will come when we pursue legal action, but we must keep the case alive in international forums.”
Yet keeping the case alive, necessary as it may be, is not enough to achieve justice. Documentation preserves evidence and the memory of victims, but it does not, on its own, translate into accountability. How long will Lebanon continue accumulating evidence without a political decision to move it from the archives to the courtroom?
