The recent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip did not succeed in opening the door to a new political phase; rather, it exposed the fragility of the internal Palestinian situation and brought old practices back to the surface, confirming that the division remains the de facto ruler on the Palestinian arena.

Since the truce entered into effect on October 10, it became clear that Hamas exploited the relative calm to reorganize its security and administrative institutions and to reinforce its grip on the Gaza Strip, in the absence of any local force capable of opposing it or curbing its dominance.

A video clip showing security officers affiliated with Hamas executing a group of young men from the al-Daghmash family in the al-Sabra neighborhood, on the pretext that they cooperated with the Israeli occupation and committed crimes, stirred wide controversy in the Palestinian street. That incident was not the first: a few weeks earlier security groups affiliated with the movement attacked the al-Mujayida family in al-Mawasi, Khan Younis, and killed several of its members on the same allegation — at which point Israeli aircraft intervened and killed some of the force’s members.

These practices revived Hamas’s record of extrajudicial killings and public executions during its past rule, which constitutes a blatant violation of human rights and legal standards that criminalize any punishment without a fair trial.

What is striking is that the public debate around these incidents did not stem from a principled stance against killing outside the law, but from the political division itself: some defended these executions as “a deterrent to chaos and treason,” while others condemned them based on their political rivalry with Hamas, not on the basis of defending the rule of law and the right to life. This in itself is a dangerous indicator of the erosion of legal and rights-based concepts in the Palestinian collective consciousness, under the pressure of division and political alignment.

The truce, which had been promoted as an opportunity to rebuild national unity, has in practice turned into a new phase of consolidating the status quo in Gaza. While the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah was pre-occupied with its internal files and accused of having abandoned Gaza for more than a decade and a half, Hamas was restructuring its governmental institutions, appointing its new officials, and imposing on the ground a strict security regime under the banner of “restoring stability.”

In doing so, the movement has exploited the political vacuum to reproduce its authority, rather than to contribute to building a shared national project. The absence of any serious path toward ending the division has left Palestinian society in a state of political disorientation: no real reconciliation, no unified national administration, and not even a clear reconstruction project. More dangerously, this reality gives Hamas a perpetual justification for continuing its security-clamp policy under the claim of “preserving internal security” in the absence of alternatives.

The violations of fundamental rights, from freedom of expression to the right to a fair trial, continue in Gaza under the pretext of war and chaos. This pattern reflects a transformation of the concept of security into an end in itself, while law is marginalized and dissenting voices are silenced.

Even youth movements and popular initiatives that previously attempted to criticize the living conditions or administrative corruption were met with repression and investigation.

Despite international criticism that called on Hamas to halt field executions and acts of retaliation, the movement continues to govern as a de facto authority: it pursues those it labels “outlaws,” imposes taxes and customs duties on traders, and manages its security and civil institutions as if the war had brought no fundamental change in the nature of governance. This means that the publicly announced suspension of executions was nothing more than a political tactic to reduce international pressure—not a genuine shift in approach.

In the context of extensive destruction of judicial and justice infrastructure, and the absence of institutional structures for any independent civil system, there appears to be no near-term possibility for genuine reform or accountability. Hamas governs today through de facto power, taking advantage of the lack of an alternative and the weakness of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

But the central question that arises is: will Hamas remain in power?

The Israeli and international conditions—especially those that re-emerged in political plans based on the Trump peace plan—aim to remove Hamas entirely from the administration of Gaza, replacing it with a civilian or international authority that oversees reconstruction and guarantees security for Israel.

Yet the on-the-ground reality indicates that Hamas is still the only organized force capable of managing people’s affairs, even at a minimal level, and any attempt to sideline it without a real national alternative may lead to the return of chaos and internal explosion.

Herein lies the dilemma of this phase:

If Hamas remains due to power and organization, its continued rule without reform or accountability means the continuation of justice’s absence and the erosion of public trust.

But if an alternative administration were to arrive under Israeli conditions, respect for human rights and rule of law would be at even greater risk, because such an administration would work under external security supervision, not recognizing Palestinian sovereignty in the first place.

In the end, the reality of Gaza today cannot be read apart from the equation “power versus legitimacy.” Hamas holds the reins of governance but loses the trust of the people; the international community condemns its practices, yet implicitly acknowledges it as the only entity capable of managing the enclave in the absence of statehood.

Between one and the other, the people of Gaza remain the perpetual victims of de facto policies, division, and the absence of justice, waiting for a phase whose contours are not yet clear—a phase that may determine whether Hamas remains in power, or whether Gaza moves towards a new administration that differs in name only.