Every time the American envoy Tom Barrack lands in Beirut, the debate over Hezbollah’s weapons resurfaces, with a new element added to the mix. Initially, the discussion focused on the presence of weapons south and north of the Litani River, then on the distinction between heavy and light arms. At one point, it even included weapons in Palestinian refugee camps. The latest addition to this long-standing issue came in the wake of the clashes in Suwayda, introducing a new supposed role for Hezbollah’s arms: protecting Lebanon from the “Arab tribes” that “invaded” the Suwayda governorate.

This latest mission, repelling potential raids by Bedouin tribes, places Hezbollah in a position it likely never wanted for itself: fighting alongside the Israeli army, which had already launched its own campaign to counter these attacks.

This logical yet unrealistic paradox is part of the current narrative surrounding Hezbollah’s weapons. The recent war between Israel and Hezbollah caused massive confusion around the purpose and legitimacy of this arsenal. It has become increasingly difficult for Hezbollah to convince anyone that its weapons can deter Israel from bombing — let alone destroying — Lebanon. The idea that Hezbollah could occupy the Galilee, once touted by the group, no longer even works as a joke. The militant rhetoric — the songs, the declarations about missiles and readiness — has become empty noise.

Today, Hezbollah’s weapons are without a story. They are just weapons. True, unlike the Israelis, we Lebanese don’t know much about their condition, storage locations, or how many people carry them — but we do know, and feel, that they no longer serve a clear mission. Even Hezbollah’s Lebanese rivals, who have often been on the receiving end of this arsenal, now sense that the weapons are rusting and incapable of shifting the political balance internally. The issue is larger than a simple Israeli strike. The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has made rebuilding Hezbollah’s military capacity nearly impossible.

These are weapons without a project, neither domestic nor regional. Just weapons. So when Tom Barrack says that Hezbollah’s arms are a Lebanese problem, he means exactly that. They are no longer an Israeli or Syrian concern. One could even argue that they are no longer a problem for all Lebanese, only for some. Lebanese Sunnis, for example, are no longer intimidated by Hezbollah’s weapons; they are now aligned with something stronger than Hezbollah itself. While the arms may still unsettle Lebanon’s Christians, they also know that regional shifts have weakened the weapon’s threat against them.

It is likely that Hezbollah, among other losses, has lost its ability to leverage its weapons in exchange for internal political gains, in other words, to trade arms for constitutional or political power. The value of these weapons has diminished. And when they were valuable, Hezbollah chose to prioritize their regional function, opting to dominate the Lebanese state from outside its formal administrative and political structures. Today, however, those Lebanese factions once willing to pay the price for Hezbollah’s arms no longer believe the weapons are worth the cost.

Despite this dead end, the Amal-Hezbollah alliance is waging its last battle in Lebanon, though no one can say for certain where it’s headed or what its horizon might be.

When Hezbollah risks the future of Lebano, and the future of the Shiite community, to defend weapons that no longer have political utility, the only explanation may be that its leadership is holding out for a failure in Syria.

When that failure seemed imminent, as seen in the fall of Ahmad al-Sharaa in Suwayda, a new mission for the weapons suddenly emerged: to protect Lebanon from the invading tribes. But this mission requires a shift from the original one: fighting Israel. And now, Israel itself has taken up the same mission in Suwayda!

So, fighting the tribes may now mean fighting alongside Israel.

The second function of clinging to the weapons lies in their role in creating a social base closely tied to Hezbollah — a base that feels superior to other Lebanese communities. Giving up the weapons would mark the beginning of a new phase: exploring the possibility of a broader Shiite political representation beyond the current Hezbollah-Amal alliance.

Tom Barrack was right when he said Hezbollah’s weapons are a Lebanese problem.