In Damascus, one is struck by the pervasive influence of Iran. What the city’s residents convey about Tehran’s presence in their lives can only be described as an occupation. The bewilderment stems from the blatant visibility of this occupation and the brazenness of its practices. The tendency of people to exaggerate the severity of this presence also arises from their deeply ingrained feeling that it is, indeed, an occupation.
In the city, while the Baath regime has maintained its visual presence, “Khomeinism” has infiltrated the fabric of daily life. A road might be blocked because it leads to an area used by Iranians for their religious rituals, or a checkpoint once manned by Hezbollah could still scrutinize the IDs of passersby. Elsewhere, an Iraqi militia might have established itself.
The sensitivity toward Iran’s presence in Damascus transcends its sectarian dimension and extends into the realm of nationalist sentiment. For example, religious Shiite shrines inscribed with names in Persian, with smaller Arabic script beneath them, have become fodder for local gossip, which grew louder after the regime’s collapse. The competition between Iranian traders and the city’s merchants—such as in selling glass produced at a factory built by an Iranian company in rural Damascus—has further fueled resentment.
This perspective may not be new or surprising to the residents of Damascus, but for visitors to the city after the regime’s collapse and the flight of its leaders, the clarity of Iran’s influence is striking. This clarity is unlike anything seen in other areas of Iranian dominance, such as Beirut, Baghdad, or perhaps Sanaa. It may stem from the ceremonial clash between the “capital of the Umayyads” and the practices of the “loyalists,” or perhaps from the uneasy integration of the Damascene urban temperament into the ritualistic practices of visitors from sectarian strongholds in neighboring countries.
What Damascus has experienced over more than a decade is an ineffective attempt to subjugate a city known for its warmth and non-confrontational nature. This dynamic might differ when discussing other Syrian cities, but Damascus—long accustomed to living under a Baath regime that ruled it from the outside—has found the Iranian influence far more bitter.
What did the Iranians truly aim to achieve by amplifying their presence in Damascus? The scale of their presence goes beyond mere political influence or control over the Baath regime.
In this sense, the notion of the “Shiification of the city” resonates with the feelings of many locals. This development evokes deep sectarian fissures that date back to the Umayyad era, reviving a division that was never fully healed but rather absorbed into the projects of modern, albeit failed, states—states that redirected their societies toward other paths of fragmentation.
Reports on the extent of Iranian real estate investments in Damascus are conflicting, but locals attribute these activities to a “settler” agenda in their city. There is a tendency to exaggerate the scale of these investments, fueled by a pervasive sense of violation that leads many to believe numerous stories. Yet this does not negate the fact that hundreds of properties—especially in Shiite-majority neighborhoods and around the Sayyida Zainab and Sayyida Ruqayya shrines—have been purchased by Iranians. Additionally, a significant number of buildings and properties near the Iranian embassy and consulate have also been acquired.
The issue of Iranian real estate and commercial investments in Damascus, and in Syria more broadly, is set to become a contentious topic in the coming phase. The anticipated “new regime” in Syria is likely to develop a relationship of enmity with Tehran and, of course, with Hezbollah. Meanwhile, ownership of these properties has already been transferred in the official records of Damascus to their new owners. Recently, Iran hinted at the debts owed to it by the Syrian state, which, according to Iranian claims, exceed $50 billion. This evokes parallels with the debt crisis between Iraq and Kuwait following the Gulf War, which ultimately led to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.
Iran’s presence and influence in Damascus are not just about dominance and control; they also include the ongoing Israeli airstrikes on the city. These strikes have targeted headquarters, consulates, and residential apartments, which, to the shock of many Damascenes, were revealed to house officers and officials from Hezbollah or the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The strikes, notably, did not target the regime’s facilities, which locals despise. They understand that their government poses no threat to anyone but themselves. Interestingly, while Israel remains an occupier of their Golan Heights and is generally disliked, its targeting of these foreign intruders has not stirred significant resentment among locals. As some Damascenes put it, the Israeli-Iranian conflict in Syria is a “war between invaders.”
Iran’s influence in Damascus has laid the groundwork for a deep and enduring resentment that will likely persist for decades. The ambition to promote Shiism in Damascus is met with a strong counterreaction, often expressed through stories filled with exaggeration and hyperbole.
While opponents of the former Syrian regime may disagree on many issues, they unanimously agree that the Iranian phase in their city’s history has been the darkest. It combined the regime’s brutality with an external force that sought to manipulate and reshape the identity of their city.
