The new identity of Syria might seem clear to many Syrians—an identity shaped by the revolution, its slogans, and its symbols over the past decade. Assad has fallen, and with him, the era of “forever.” Today, Syrians rejoice while trying to understand the context and rapid sequence of events that led to his downfall.
Signs of this clarity—of identity—have emerged as Syrians hastened to declare aspects of their new national identity, which they deemed self-evident, whether they were military personnel or civilians, conservatives or liberals. For instance, the Syrian independence flag was embraced as the revolution’s flag. Similarly, a national anthem derived from a poem by Omar Abu Risha was widely shared as the anthem of the new Syria. To a lesser extent, Syrians also agree on the concept of a civil state, though opinions diverge on whether governance should be centralized.
Thus, Syria’s identity is open for discussion and negotiation. Syrians are eager to define and proclaim this identity. While some key political aspects remain deferred until the transitional phase becomes clearer, other elements, such as the flag and anthem, have been declared as givens.
Reevaluating the “Givens”
Considering the flag and anthem as givens does not fully reflect the diversity of Syrian identities. Even if these symbols resonate with many, they may not represent all citizens. More pressing issues—like the structure of governance, freedoms, and the state’s framework—are likely to dominate discussions in the next phase. What must each group in Syria contribute to build an inclusive national identity?
Today, Syria is governed by factions that existed before Assad’s fall. These factions lack a unified legitimacy and have faced opposition from Syrians for their policies. With the regime’s collapse, international actors have swiftly moved to send delegations, signaling intentions to involve these factions in the political process and transitional period—perhaps even to lead it.
The transitional phase demands a high level of consensus and flexibility from these factions, which not only fought the regime but also battled each other. The result is a Syria marked by deep injustices, latent revenge, demographic changes, mass killings, and a complete lack of trust among its diverse communities.
Syria has a long history of grievances, but two major ones stand out in recent years: those of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Kurds. Both groups have faced the threat of total annihilation—not just for opposing the regime, but because of their identities.
The regime committed massacres against the Muslim Brotherhood, both before and after the infamous 1982 Hama massacre, targeting Islamists as its primary enemy. During the Syrian revolution, the regime’s violence disproportionately affected the Sunni community. Meanwhile, the Kurds faced systematic erasure and atrocities under successive Syrian governments, as well as attacks by opposition forces, Islamist groups, and a Turkey-backed war that continues to pose threats.
Significantly, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Kurds are the only two groups with organized armed forces on the ground—the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Each has its own governance structures and alliances, both regional and international, making them pivotal in shaping Syria’s new identity.
Who Represents the Syrians?
While these two forces do not legitimately represent the Syrian people as a whole, they symbolize, in part, two major currents in Syrian society. One is a conservative current aligned with political Islam, advocating for laws rooted in Sharia, a strong Arab identity, and nationalism. The other calls for secularism, decentralization, civil governance, and the protection of minorities and pluralism, moving away from a singular Arab identity. Both sides, however, have committed violations and engaged in conflicts over controlling land and people.
Thus far, HTS has shown some flexibility toward other factions and has adopted a more conciliatory tone, even with those associated with the fallen regime. HTS has not aligned itself with Turkey or the armed opposition in targeting Kurdish forces and has refrained from labeling the SDF as a terrorist organization.
Notably, there have been instances of peaceful handovers of territory and mutual protection agreements for areas under their respective control. Meanwhile, the SDF has expressed openness to dialogue with any new authority in Damascus. It has raised the independence flag over its institutions and emphasized its commitment to a unified Syria.
Today, Syrians must understand the new reality of Syria and embrace all forms of change. The new Syria is not merely about changing its flag, anthem, or leadership but about pursuing fundamental transformations in the structure of the state and the nature of governance. Syrians fear a return to centralized authority in Damascus, which could hinder them from achieving the aspirations they have long fought for, particularly after experiencing and practicing freedoms in European societies, where many have even participated in parliamentary processes.
In northeastern Syria, grievances extend beyond Kurdish communities to include Arabs and Assyrians. The neglect and marginalization imposed by successive governments were compounded by the dominance of Syria’s industrial cities, leaving rural and remote areas overlooked.
The people of northeastern Syria have long endured stereotyping and condescension. While Syria’s media, art, and literature have traditionally reflected the identities of cities like Damascus and Aleppo, the country’s rich linguistic and cultural diversity has been largely ignored. Recognizing this diversity in theory is one thing, but rebuilding trust among Syrians will require tangible actions and concessions from all sides.
A Shared Identity for All Syrians?
Many Syrian voices fail to give sufficient attention to the concerns and demands regarding the country’s diverse sub-identities. They view the revolution’s victory as sufficient reassurance that the new Syria will belong to everyone. However, they overlook decades of war, fragmentation, and mistrust. As one group, particularly the Sunni majority, edges closer to power, it often disregards the grievances of Kurds and other minorities, offering only empty reassurances. Worse, some accuse these groups of lacking patriotism, treason, or separatist ambitions.
Over the past decade, the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria has emerged as one of the most pragmatic actors in the Syrian conflict. It has demonstrated notable flexibility in balancing basic service and security needs, strengthening military alliances, and navigating regional dynamics. The Administration has distinguished itself with a unique identity and culture, setting it apart from its surroundings.
While it has achieved many gains, the Autonomous Administration has also faced existential threats, making it, thus far, one of Syria’s most organized and effective actors. Despite debates over the legitimacy of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Autonomous Administration, their political program offers a unifying vision for Syria, embracing secularism and decentralization. The question remains: can other Syrian actors present an equally inclusive and promising vision?
The Assad regime never provided Syrians with a unifying identity. For decades, its sole offering was the identity of “Assad’s Syria.” On the other hand, the opposition has also failed to present an inclusive national identity. In fact, the actions of some opposition groups have alienated minorities, particularly the Kurds. During the “Dawn of Freedom” battles and the Turkish-backed operations of the Syrian National Army, certain factions expressed intent to eliminate Kurdish presence entirely, reviving memories of systematic violations against them.
After the SDF was besieged in Aleppo’s Ashrafieh and Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods, as well as in Tal Rifaat, opposition factions forced the SDF to retreat to its territories in eastern Syria. This triggered yet another wave of mass displacement for already forcibly displaced populations from Afrin and other areas. Even after the regime’s fall, these displaced people have not returned to their homes. Despite avoiding direct confrontations and offering reassurances to civilians, the Kurdish community continues to distrust these factions.
Certain segments of Syrian society—both conservatives and liberals—persist in demonizing the Autonomous Administration’s project, portraying it as an ethnically Kurdish initiative opposed to the revolution. This narrative has increased the SDF’s popularity among residents in eastern Syria, including Kurds, Christians, Arabs, and those wary of political Islam. Simultaneously, it has caused the project to become more insular, distancing it from a broader national identity. Ironically, for local opponents of the SDF, it has become a refuge from the potential violence of central authority or even ethnic cleansing, pushing them to favor the SDF over Damascus’s centralized rule.
Beyond the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
The SDF and its political arm, the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), recognize that militia-style governance is a thing of the past. In recent years, they have made structural changes to address this.
Since the 2018 defeat in Afrin, for instance, the SDC has increased engagement with other communities, relied more heavily on the SDC as its political representative, and incorporated the Democratic Union Party (PYD) into a broader coalition. The SDC also revived the slogan of federalism during its 2018 conference and adopted a reasonable stance on political decentralization in its social contract, while offering all necessary reassurances to participate in a transitional phase under the revolution’s banner and flag.
However, demands persist for the SDC to separate its political decision-making from the PKK. While this is both a political and popular demand, Syrians must also understand the historical, social, and political contexts of Kurdish society and its relationship with the PKK.
The PYD cannot ideologically separate itself from the PKK because Syrian Kurds are integral to the PKK’s structure. Since the late 1970s, they have fought and volunteered within its ranks.
Syrian Kurds have historically felt disconnected from the states they were annexed into, naturally aligning themselves with Kurdish movements and liberation struggles that resisted projects dividing their communities. The PKK’s presence in Syria reflects the belief of many Syrian Kurds in the PKK’s fight for Kurdish rights in Turkey.
This dynamic parallels Palestinians rallying around liberation movements advocating for their historical rights to their land. While the PKK acknowledges that the tools of resistance have changed and that armed conflict is no longer its primary option, it seeks to address the Kurdish question within the framework of the Syrian state. Demanding that Syrian Kurds dissolve their movements is unrealistic; instead, these movements must be included and their legitimate demands understood.
Labeling Syrian Kurdish projects as “terrorist” or “separatist” only serves Turkish interests. Over the years of the Syrian war, Turkey has occupied Syrian territories, altered their demographics, and imposed policies of Turkification.
These concerns have not disappeared. Therefore, recognizing and engaging in dialogue with the Autonomous Administration during the transitional phase is essential. There must be openness to changes in the state’s structure, name, and symbols—whether related to secularism, the color of the flag, or the lyrics of the national anthem. After half a century of authoritarian rule, Syria’s identity must be open for discussion, without conditions or vetoes.
