The expansion of Israeli attacks across Lebanon, reaching Beirut, signals a potentially worsening trajectory, one that could prove catastrophic for the country’s future. The “belt of fire” targeting the southern suburbs, along with strikes in Ramlet al-Baida, Aramoun, and central Beirut, in addition to the bombardment of dozens of towns and villages in the south and the Bekaa, is unfolding alongside increasing ground incursions and the evacuation of nearly a quarter of the country’s territory.
At the same time, Israeli media is intensifying its rhetoric about plans to target Lebanon’s infrastructure, and Israel has already begun striking a number of bridges in the south. All of this is taking place amid a troubling regional and international silence, one that is nearly unprecedented even when compared to the 1982 invasion. Meanwhile, France, which is leading ceasefire efforts, appears hesitant in its approach.
As major powers remain preoccupied with direct confrontation with Iran and its repercussions in the Gulf, Lebanon’s position on the international agenda is declining. It is increasingly treated as an extension of a broader regional front, rather than as a standalone crisis requiring urgent intervention. This shift in the international approach opens the door to the possibility of Lebanon being turned into a long-term war zone, potentially extending beyond the current confrontation in the Gulf.
Within this broader conflict, Lebanon appears marginal in major strategic calculations. This marginalization may lead to the erosion of red lines that previously allowed the country to navigate past wars, including the relative shielding of areas that were not directly targeted. The targeting of Christian villages in the south signals an Israeli shift in this direction. Today, Lebanon is viewed in many international decision-making circles as part of an Iran-led axis in this confrontation.
Based on this, any negotiation process this time is unlikely to come from external actors, as it did in previous experiences, particularly in 2006 when Washington and Paris led a clear diplomatic track. No serious external initiative currently appears on the horizon to contain the escalation in Lebanon. Instead, the course of events will largely depend on the Lebanese state and its ability to alter the existing equation, and perhaps more importantly, to redefine its image and position.
Restoring international attention, particularly from the United States and key Arab states, is contingent on the Lebanese state’s ability to take tangible steps within the context of the regional confrontation with Iran. This includes curbing Iran’s influence and limiting its capacity to use Lebanon as a platform through Hezbollah and networks linked to the Revolutionary Guard.
Such steps are not only intended to alter the immediate situation on the ground, but also to redefine Lebanon’s position in the eyes of international decision-makers, a crucial factor in determining the level of pressure or protection the country may receive.
While the deportation of some Revolutionary Guard members from Lebanon in early March drew limited attention in certain capitals, the move remains largely symbolic and insufficient. What is required goes far beyond that and cannot be reduced to the issue of arms control alone. Even if efforts to consolidate weapons under state authority accelerate, this remains a long and complex process that Lebanon does not have the time to translate into immediate political outcomes.
More urgently, what is needed are political measures with clear implications, steps that would redefine Lebanon’s position in this conflict and enable actors in Washington, Paris, Riyadh, Doha, and Cairo, who still place their bets on the Lebanese state, to regain the initiative in the face of more hardline voices within those capitals.
In this context, the government appears in need of decisions that are both clear in meaning and intent, beginning with political steps that reposition Lebanon regionally and signal a different trajectory in managing its foreign relations. Rebuilding both internal and external trust also requires allocating an exceptional budget to arm the Lebanese Army, prioritizing it above all other concerns, on the basis that safeguarding the lives and security of Lebanese citizens is the state’s primary responsibility, and enabling the military institution to strengthen its authority and prevent any armed activity outside the framework of legitimacy.
The government must also present a clear vision for a negotiating framework with Israel and its objectives, and communicate it directly to the Lebanese public. The debate should not remain confined to the mere question of whether to negotiate, but should instead shift toward ending the aggression and safeguarding sovereignty.
Domestically, large-scale displacement and economic collapse are deepening social fragility, making any prolonged war an existential threat that goes beyond the military dimension to a broader societal breakdown. This places the state before an unprecedented test of its capacity to endure.
As some regional actors attempt to avoid direct involvement in the confrontation, the Lebanese state no longer has the luxury of waiting. Aligning with the interests of the Lebanese people requires a clear geopolitical positioning aimed at removing Lebanon from the heart of the open confrontation between Israel and Iran.
The central question remains: can the Lebanese state reposition itself sufficiently to avoid becoming a prolonged battlefield? Containing the level of Iranian involvement in Lebanon, and limiting its use as a conflict arena, may be a necessary condition to reduce the intensity and cost of Israeli attacks. The answer to this question will determine whether Lebanon is heading toward another phase of containment, or toward a long war it lacks the capacity to withstand.
