More than a month after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, several countries are bracing for the repercussions of the significant change in Syria, particularly concerning the issue of foreign jihadists in the country. Thousands of fighters from extremist organizations, most notably ISIS, along with their families and children, are detained in camps such as al-Hol and al-Roj in Syria’s desert region. Additionally, others who may have been held in Assad’s prisons were reportedly released during the liberation of these facilities.
Tunisia is among the Arab countries concerned about this new reality, fearing the potential return of its extremist citizens who had joined militant groups in Syria over the years. The country must prepare logistically and securely to face this threat while grappling with a severe economic and financial crisis, leaving it ill-equipped to bear this new burden. Moreover, its overcrowded prisons are not ready to accommodate these potential returnees—an argument echoed by many nations reluctant to repatriate their citizens from Syria, such as France.
Tunisian Jihadists in Syria
Since 2011, Tunisians have been among the most represented nationalities in jihadist arenas, joining extremist organizations primarily in Syria and Libya and to a lesser extent in Iraq. The recruitment and travel of Tunisian extremists to Syria unfolded in two distinct phases.
The first phase, between 2011 and 2013, occurred after the “Ennahda Movement” won elections for the Constituent Assembly. During this period, when the party held all reins of power, it allowed groups like Ansar al-Sharia and other extremist factions to operate openly in public squares and mosques. The movement also encouraged fighters to travel to Syria under the pretext of “supporting Syrians in their efforts to overthrow Assad’s regime.”
The second phase, spanning 2013 and 2014, saw a sharp increase in the number of Tunisian extremists traveling to Syria. At the time, Ennahda faced accusations of facilitating the travel of jihadists to Syria. Investigations revealed that one of its members, a businessman, had established an airline allegedly responsible for transporting Tunisian youths to Turkey, from where they would later cross into Syria to join jihadist groups.
This period coincided with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s declaration of the Islamic State in June 2014. Notably, some Tunisian fighters initially joined Jabhat al-Nusra before switching allegiance to ISIS following conflicts between the two organizations. Libya also served as a logistical and training base, as well as a convenient launching point toward Turkey and then into Syria and Iraq, especially after descending into security chaos following the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime.
The issue of recruiting Tunisian youths to conflict zones, particularly jihadist groups, is among the most critical cases currently under investigation by the Tunisian judiciary. Despite numerous charges against individuals involved, the matter remains unresolved. Prominent figures implicated include Ali Larayedh, former Minister of Interior and Vice President of the “Ennahda Movement,” who held office during the peak of recruitment activities, as well as senior security officials. Rached Ghannouchi, another senior Ennahda leader, has also been accused of involvement in facilitating the travel of jihadists. However, he denies these accusations, describing them as “attempts to eliminate a political rival by President Kais Saied.”
How Many Tunisian Jihadists Are There?
There are no precise statistics on the number of Tunisian fighters in armed groups, but a 2015 UN report estimated over 5,000 Tunisian fighters in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. However, the latest official figures from the Tunisian Presidency indicate that 2,926 Tunisians are affiliated with jihadist groups in these regions. Tunisian authorities claim to have detailed knowledge of these individuals, including their numbers and distribution across countries.
Reports suggest that Tunisian jihadists are among the most dangerous fighters, often holding leadership positions in extremist groups. Notably, two Tunisians were implicated in the brutal torture and execution of Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh, a widely publicized act of violence.
Following international campaigns against extremist groups, particularly ISIS in Syria, many Tunisian fighters were killed or captured by former Syrian authorities and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Despite widespread public opposition in Tunisia to the return of these fighters—as seen in protests in 2016 calling for a ban on their repatriation—the Tunisian government has not responded to SDF appeals for countries to reclaim their nationals from camps like al-Hol and al-Roj. Similarly, Tunisia has not facilitated the return of fighters detained by the Assad regime, even though the regime has shared detailed information about them with Tunisian authorities.
But amid the current developments in Syria, voices are growing louder, urging Tunisia to prepare adequately for the potential return of extremists from the region. The National Observatory for the Defense of the Civil State has warned of the risks to Tunisia stemming from the new Syrian landscape, particularly the possibility of Tunisian fighters returning home after their involvement in the Syrian conflict.
Munir Al-Sharfi, the director of the Observatory, stated, “These individuals may be instructed by the entities or leaders who recruited them to return to their home countries after completing their mission in Syria. This represents a significant threat to Tunisia’s national security, particularly given their violent religious extremism, which poses a danger to the civilian trajectory of the Tunisian state. There is also the potential for these individuals to carry out missions that could destabilize the country.”
Aliya Al-Alani, an expert on Islamic groups, echoed these concerns, telling Daraj: “The return of extremist fighters following Assad’s fall poses a serious threat not just to Tunisia but to the entire Maghreb region. Libya is likely to serve as the primary gateway for returning fighters to infiltrate Tunisia, given its fragile security situation and the presence of organizational networks that support extremists.”
Preventative Measures in Tunisia
It seems that Tunisian authorities have recognized the looming threat and are preparing for the potential return of extremists, whether through Turkey or Libya. They are taking some precautionary measures, though not explicitly linked to fears of returning fighters from Syria, amid the country’s shifting dynamics.
Notably, the Tunisian constitution does not allow the state to prevent any Tunisian citizen from returning to their homeland. The 2015 Counterterrorism Law stipulates prison sentences ranging from six to twelve years for anyone who joins, knowingly and willingly, any terrorist organization inside or outside Tunisia. However, the government’s apparent reluctance to assume responsibility for its citizens echoes the European approach to its own fighters in Syria.
One of Tunisia’s first steps to manage the return of fighters was announced recently by the state-owned airline Tunisair. Flights arriving from Turkey, a major gateway for Tunisian fighters joining extremist groups, will now be redirected to a separate terminal at Tunis-Carthage International Airport. This terminal, typically used for pilgrimage trips, will allow for stricter screening procedures.
While this is a step in the right direction, it remains insufficient. Tunisia continues to rely heavily on a security-based approach, neglecting reintegration mechanisms.
Tunisia faces a severe crisis of overcrowded prisons. Accommodating returning fighters within existing facilities poses significant risks, including the possibility of radicalizing other inmates. If these individuals mix with the general prison population, the facilities could become breeding grounds for extremist ideology. Such a scenario was reported in 2016, when returning jihadists reportedly dominated Tunisian prisons, operating like gang leaders and attacking non-compliant inmates.
The country must create dedicated facilities to house returning extremists. However, given Tunisia’s dire financial situation, establishing new prisons or expanding existing ones seems unattainable. Additionally, security forces need significant upgrades in training and resources to handle this new wave of challenges effectively—demands that Tunisia’s strained budget cannot currently meet.
Another major concern is the activity of extremist networks already present within Tunisia. These networks could provide safe havens or logistical support for returning fighters. Many of these individuals possess advanced combat training gained from their involvement in the Syrian conflict. Compounding this issue, some fighters may re-enter the country covertly, using fake identities reportedly obtained in Syria.
The reclassification of certain groups following Assad’s fall might introduce new legal ambiguities. For instance, someone deemed a terrorist in Tunisia may not hold the same designation internationally, complicating efforts to prosecute such individuals. Tunisian judges could face significant challenges in addressing these cases due to differing legal frameworks across countries.
Although Tunisians are among the most represented nationalities in extremist organizations, the government has yet to adopt a comprehensive policy to combat radicalization and reintegrate returnees. Authorities claim that a reintegration program has been in place since 2017, but the reality suggests otherwise. Tunisia continues to focus almost exclusively on security solutions, neglecting social initiatives to curb youth radicalization, programs to prevent recruitment within prisons, and practical strategies to help reintegrate returnees into civilian life post-incarceration.