On Sunday, amid increasing calls to bolster the role of the Lebanese Army after the war, particularly in relation to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1701 and 1559—which emphasize that only the Lebanese Army should bear arms—Israeli forces killed three Lebanese soldiers in an airstrike on an army truck in Hanine, South Lebanon.
The Israeli army quickly apologized, calling the incident “unfortunate circumstances” and stating that they were unaware that the truck belonged to the Lebanese Army. The statement further added, “Israeli operations are not aimed at the Lebanese Army, and we apologize for these unfortunate circumstances.”
One of the most striking scenes in Lebanon today is the absence of the Lebanese Army in the clashes and skirmishes between Hezbollah and Israeli forces along the border. For many Lebanese, this situation is not unusual and no longer raises questions. However, for foreign observers and Western media, the army’s absence from battles defending its borders is perplexing. The Financial Times recently noted that since Israeli forces invaded South Lebanon and began fighting Hezbollah on the ground for the first time in two decades, one notable absence from the conflict has been the Lebanese Army.
Nevertheless, the Lebanese Army has suffered casualties, with eight soldiers confirmed killed, and an estimated 16 more soldiers reportedly killed while off duty, according to CNN. Despite the escalation of conflict, the army has refrained from direct involvement in these battles due to its limited capabilities and international agreements that prevent it from engaging in direct confrontation with the Israeli military.
Key Challenges for the Lebanese Army
The undermining of the army’s capabilities is part of a broader effort to weaken the state’s authority and strip it of its power over decisions of war and peace. The army, as described by Sami Halabi, Director of Policy at the Alternative Policy Institute (API), in an interview with Daraj, is “a reflection of the country.” According to a study by API, the power-sharing and sectarian distribution of positions that govern the state also affects the Lebanese Army, exposing it to “political maneuvering and polarization”. The top positions in the military reflect Lebanon’s sectarian structure: the army commander must be a Maronite Christian, the chief of staff a Druze, and four generals must represent the Sunni, Shia, Greek Orthodox, and Greek Catholic communities.
Halabi emphasizes: “We must consider that the structure of the Lebanese Army depends on what is expected of it. Politically, there is no consensus on its role. The only agreement is that the army should provide public employment. Without political agreement on the national defense role, the army ends up trying to do everything, and when you try to do everything, you end up doing a little bit of everything but not enough in any one area.”
International and regional agreements reached after Lebanon’s civil war (1975-1989) determined that the Lebanese Army should not engage in direct confrontation with Israel. According to Halabi, there were several reasons for this: “Firstly, they did not have the capability; secondly, there was an occupation; and thirdly, they would not have been effective in removing it. Who filled the vacuum? Hezbollah and other groups. In the 1990s, Hezbollah had legitimacy because of the occupation.”
Moreover, Hezbollah wields significant influence over the Lebanese Army and plays a key role in its decision-making processes. Halabi notes, “There is a balance of power within the army… the army institution is part of a broader regional agreement on power balance.” He adds, “If Hezbollah loses, we all lose [as Lebanese], and if it wins, it wins.”
Regarding employment in the public sector, it’s important to note that the Lebanese Army has around 80,000 personnel, which is quite large for a small country like Lebanon, according to API. The army also provides services and necessities for the families of its personnel.
How U.S. Aid Limits the Army’s Capabilities
Since 2006, U.S. military aid to Lebanon is estimated at $3 billion, with $2 billion provided in weapons, according to The Intercept. API also notes that the United States has supplied over 80 percent of the equipment used by the Lebanese Armed Forces, including aircraft, vehicles, weapons, and other gear, as part of its counter-terrorism efforts in the region.
A study titled “U.S. Military Assistance to Lebanon: Equipping LAF Not Transforming It,” published on the Lebanese Army’s website in 2012, notes that U.S. interest in supporting the Lebanese Army grew after the 2006 conflict, particularly following the “Cedar Revolution” in 2005 and the withdrawal of the Syrian army after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
The Bush administration in 2006 sought to increase security aid to Lebanon. It was the third time in 25 years that the U.S. aimed to expand military cooperation with the Lebanese government. In the early 1980s, the U.S. provided the Lebanese Armed Forces with $145-190 million in grants and loans and further military aid in the early 1990s, mostly in non-lethal equipment such as M-113 vehicles and UH-1 helicopters. For the first time since 1984, the Bush administration requested Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Lebanon in its 2006 fiscal year budget. According to the study, the war in summer 2006 prompted Western and Arab donors to increase aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces, with the Bush administration increasing its support to $42 million to supply equipment and spare parts.
Following a clash between the Lebanese Army and Israeli forces on August 3, 2010, the U.S. temporarily suspended military aid, while Iran offered its own military assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Obama administration and Middle East experts, per the study, expressed concern that cutting military aid would severely affect the army’s ability to act as a regional stabilizer, empowering Hezbollah and pushing Lebanon further under Iranian influence. The Obama administration continued to support the Lebanese Army and Internal Security Forces through appropriation laws for 2009, 2010, and 2011, and the support has continued since.
The U.S. publicly expresses its interest in strengthening the Lebanese Army and the state. During a U.N. Security Council meeting on October 10, U.S. Deputy Ambassador Robert Wood emphasized that the international community must focus on empowering Lebanese state institutions. He added, “The solution to this crisis is not a weaker Lebanon, but a strong, sovereign Lebanon, protected by legitimate security forces represented by the Lebanese Armed Forces.”
However, the reality is different. Halabi tells Daraj: “The Americans are not interested in having a Lebanese Army capable of defending itself… They haven’t given Lebanon or its army the ability to have air defenses.” He adds: “Despite all the issues with the Israelis, they are the ones doing the dirty work in the region, not just militarily but also in intelligence. So, the Americans will not provide the Lebanese Army with anything that approaches the deterrent effect Hezbollah possesses, meaning we’ll continue to go in circles until there is a regional agreement on how to ensure the country’s security.”
What Is the Outlook for the Conflict?
“The ground invasion isn’t happening quickly because the Israelis are trying to weaken Hezbollah’s capabilities from the air as much as possible and want to see if the Lebanese will turn against each other during this time, further weakening Hezbollah’s abilities. They are heavily focusing on social cohesion,” says Halabi.
He continues, “The Americans will have to make concessions, the Israelis will have to make concessions, the Lebanese will have to make concessions, and Hezbollah and Iran will have to make concessions.” Halabi suggests that these concessions may be profound. The future of the conflict and the country will depend on the outcomes of field battles in the coming days and weeks. Unfortunately, the Lebanese people and their army remain mere spectators, awaiting the results of these battles and the fate that awaits them.
