With the expiration of the renewed ceasefire agreement, Israeli occupation forces have withdrawn from villages in southern Lebanon, except for five strategic positions where they announced their continued presence for “security reasons.” These points, all located outside residential areas, are distributed as follows: in the western sector on the Labouneh hills, in Jabal Balat between Ramyeh and Marwahin, in Jal al-Deir south of Aytaroun in the central sector, in Wadi Hounin between Markaba and Houla, and on the Hamamess hill south of Khiam in the eastern sector.
Following this withdrawal, Lebanon’s official institutions now face a new phase that requires a comprehensive reassessment of its strategic choices—choices that, until now, the Lebanese state had little role in shaping. The events of the past year have revealed a fundamental shift in the balance of power and have exposed the fragility of the previous political equations that governed Lebanon for decades.
One of the clearest signs of this political transformation is the removal of the “Army, People, and Resistance” principle from the government’s ministerial statement under Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. It has been replaced by a commitment to Lebanon’s right to self-defense under the United Nations Charter and the full responsibility of the state for national security and border defense. This marks a shift toward strengthening the authority of the state—though it also increases its responsibilities. For 25 years, the “trilogy” of the army, people, and resistance effectively legitimized the presence of armed militias without defining the political limits of their influence. Over time, Hezbollah in particular expanded its grip, controlling not only decisions on war and peace but also influencing various state policies despite its parliamentary representation and role in successive governments.
Is It Possible to Free Lebanon from Foreign Influence?
I begin this discussion in the form of a question because distinguishing between what is possible, probable, and necessary is essential. Ideally, Lebanon should rid itself of all foreign influence, starting with the near-total American hegemony—lest critics accuse the writer of being “pro-American.” But is this truly feasible under the new circumstances that have emerged from a war Lebanon was never capable of fighting in the first place? Even within the realm of possibility, there are varying degrees and timelines, influenced by a multitude of internal and external factors.
In reality, Lebanon has lost nearly all its traditional sources of strength due to the recent war—even if Hezbollah remains the most prominent of these forces. However, the party’s role has historically weakened the state, undermined the rule of law, and reinforced Iranian influence, which in turn paralyzed political and constitutional processes. Unlike the illusion of facilitation, Iran’s dominance in Lebanon has always been one of obstruction. Lebanon has shifted from being a mere “arena” for regional and international rivalries—like other weak or war-torn states—to becoming a battleground for full-scale power struggles, with near-total American influence now replacing Iranian dominance.
This situation raises crucial questions—beyond Hezbollah’s usual accusations of treason—about how Lebanon can reclaim as much sovereignty as possible without engaging in new wars and confrontations that would only further deteriorate its economic and political conditions and deepen its dependence on foreign powers.
Lebanon’s minimal political immunity has now collapsed entirely. The focus must now be on how to gradually rebuild this immunity, which is only possible through the state itself. It is no longer sufficient to argue that Lebanon’s foreign entanglements stem from its geopolitical position, its historical ties to the Palestinian cause, or its internal political struggles, often framed along sectarian and tribal lines. History has repeatedly shown that every foreign intervention under the pretext of supporting an internal faction has eventually turned into a major liability—sometimes even an existential threat to Lebanon, which has never gotten a proper change to set the foundations of stability since its founding.
Iranian dominance isolated Lebanon from the Arab world and, to some extent, the international community. It also weakened state institutions to the point where the term “state” itself became a source of ridicule. Furthermore, the repeated wars—over which the Lebanese state had no decision-making power but bore all the consequences—have devastated Lebanon’s infrastructure. Now, we are witnessing a shift where American and, indirectly, Israeli influence is taking center stage. This transformation is not occurring through the state and its institutions, as Hezbollah-affiliated voices claim, but through the collapse of a state that has been economically and politically crumbling for years. In its current weakened state, Lebanon cannot simply extricate itself from the aftermath of a war it did not initiate, fought against one of the most powerful military forces in the world. The mere suggestion that Lebanon should confront this new hegemony head-on is suicidal. It would only perpetuate Lebanon’s suffering, turning the country into a sacrificial pawn for unrealistic ambitions.
However, this does not mean ignoring the possible ways to mitigate the crisis caused by foreign dominance. Achieving this, though, requires a long-term strategy and smart diplomacy to rebuild Lebanon’s ties with its Arab surroundings and the international community. It also necessitates launching profound political and economic reforms, starting with a serious reassessment of the sectarian political system—historically the main cause of the “national state’s” weakness and its failure to modernize. The idea of establishing “citizenship” as a political foundation, replacing sectarian affiliation, is no longer just an unrealistic ideal, as the defenders of the status quo claim. Rather, it has become a pressing necessity for survival.
Moreover, rebuilding the economy in a way that contrasts with the model established by Hariri-era policies—which empowered an alliance between bankers and politicians—is essential. Implementing a comprehensive and integrated economic plan is the most critical step in any effort to gradually reduce foreign dependency.
The Case for Positive Neutrality
Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Bechara Boutros al-Rahi was unable to convince Hezbollah, a significant portion of Lebanon’s ruling forces, or even part of the Lebanese population of the urgency of adopting “positive neutrality” before it was too late. Perhaps Patriarch al-Rahi was the most modest and realistic figure in the previous phase, yet in Lebanon, modest proposals are often met with ridicule. At the time, the Lebanese still held strategic leverage and had the practical ability to integrate Hezbollah’s weapons into a framework where they would only be used by decision of the Lebanese state—whether for offense or defense—even if that meant forming a joint defense council between the state and Hezbollah.
For years, such an arrangement seemed possible, but Hezbollah’s overconfidence led both itself and Lebanon to a stage where considering any military options outside the state became impossible, despite the state’s overall weakness. However, the severe security breaches within Hezbollah have narrowed the gap between it and the Lebanese state in this regard. The state, as an entity enjoying international legitimacy and diplomatic strength, now wields more power than an organization that lacks these advantages. Instead, Hezbollah has turned Lebanon into a frontline battleground, against the will of most of its people, rendering the country a mere security pawn in Iran’s hands—one that Tehran burns at will, gambling with it like a horse in a race.
A large segment of Lebanese people failed to learn from Iran’s abandonment of Lebanon and Gaza at the most critical moment. Despite years of military and financial support, when the moment of truth arrived, Iran’s response was limited to indirect measures and weak reactions to Israel’s repeated violations of Lebanese sovereignty. Meanwhile, Israel secured decisive backing from the United States and Europe, which escalated to direct military interventions when needed. Israel has allies willing to fight its wars to the last breath, whereas Lebanon has been left with nothing but empty promises and illusions.
Yet, there are still those who peddle these illusions left and right, branding anyone who rejects them as a traitor or a Zionist agent. Lebanon’s official stance must reconsider the proposal of “positive neutrality” as a strategic option. This requires, first, an acknowledgment of Lebanon’s modest geopolitical position; second, a realistic acceptance of the historical defeat and a rejection of false victory narratives; and third, an understanding of the country’s real strengths and weaknesses beyond the two flawed paradigms imposed on the Lebanese: “Lebanon’s strength lies in its weakness” or “Lebanon’s strength lies in militias’ weapons.”
“Positive neutrality” is not possible without adopting a balanced diplomatic approach, beginning with a clear policy of non-alignment in regional conflicts. Lebanon must rebuild and restore its relationships with all regional and international actors without fully aligning itself with any single side. The country can no longer afford the isolation that forces it into absolute submission as the only alternative. For example, Lebanese diplomacy should seek to leverage relationships with China, India, Russia, African nations, and Latin America just as much as it benefits from its ties with the Gulf states, the United States, or the European Union. It must establish sustainable partnerships with developing nations within mutually beneficial and complementary frameworks across various sectors.
Nawaf Salam’s Government and the Collapse of the Erasure Paradigm
The current government may be the “best possible” outcome under the present circumstances. Nawaf Salam successfully avoided the “blocking third” strategy, stripping Hezbollah of its ability to paralyze decision-making. However, this government’s lifespan is expected to be short, and its rescue mission is vast and urgent. The newly appointed Finance Minister, Yassin Jaber, declared in his first press interview after his appointment that he would not use his ministerial signature as a tool for obstruction. In practical terms, the ministers appointed by political parties cannot openly declare their partisan affiliations, which could be interpreted as an implicit intent to hinder governance and obstruct the implementation of UN Resolution 1701. This not only reaffirms the statements made by the Prime Minister and the President that the current government does not include ministers affiliated with political parties, for it would signal the return of the specter of war.
Western pressure to exclude Hezbollah from Salam’s government was evident, particularly following the visit of U.S. Deputy Special Envoy for the Middle East, Morgan Ortagus, to Beirut. These pressures led to the dismantling of obstructionist tactics, especially after Ortagus used the Presidential Palace as a platform to deliver a statement that was humiliating to Lebanese sovereignty. She reinforced the firm stance of the new U.S. administration under Donald Trump, thanking Israel for its “defeat of Hezbollah.”
This was the moment when the Shiite duo fully grasped the predicament awaiting them if they continued to impose obstructive settlements in the same manner they had since 2008. Of course, numerous statements followed, including one from Hezbollah, condemning what it called a “blatant interference in Lebanese sovereignty and a breach of all diplomatic norms.” This is a legitimate concern that all Lebanese political forces—including Hezbollah—should reject. However, despite its rhetoric, Hezbollah has long subordinated Lebanon’s interests to Iran’s agenda, just as the Lebanese Forces position themselves as the spearhead of the so-called “sovereignty alliance.” That does not change the broader reality: Lebanon’s political class is now almost entirely subservient to American influence—at least for the time being. This is the primary reason why the obstructive forces, represented by the Shiite duo, have begun gradually abandoning their previous tactics. After multiple maneuvers and political explorations, they eventually resigned themselves to the new political reality, choosing to salvage whatever shares of power they could before risking total loss.
Despite losing its ability to block political decisions, attempts to completely erase Hezbollah from the Lebanese scene remain unrealistic and have already proven futile. What is new, however, is that the attempt to eliminate Hezbollah’s opposition within the Shiite community has also failed. Lebanon is now witnessing the formation of a new political equation, one in which no single faction can erase another. Over time, this equation will become more entrenched in previously exclusive party strongholds, with state institutions and governance mechanisms gaining ground. At the same time, individuals are increasingly engaging in political and union activities beyond the reach of party control and repression—without the need for direct confrontation or the perception that their mere presence constitutes a threat. Lebanon has yet to overcome the dominance of sectarian and party-controlled territories, but it is slowly moving toward loosening the grip of these forces, even as clientelist networks continue to operate openly under the guise of “consensus” and “sectarian balance.”
The renewed sectarian rallying around Hezbollah is primarily a symbolic act of restoring dignity, necessary for psychological recovery and the healing of deep wounds inflicted by the war. This process may also serve to gradually steer Lebanon away from internal explosions triggered by the volatile interplay between the fading illusion of “excessive power” and the emerging reality of “limited power.” Politically, however, Lebanon’s strategic options have fundamentally shifted.
Every passing day without implementing Resolution 1701 or fully executing the Taif Agreement deepens Lebanon’s crisis, making it clear that the issue is not just a political rivalry between competing projects but rather a fundamental breakdown of the political system itself. The system has reached a point where it can no longer renew itself without undergoing an internal rupture—typically expressed through armed conflict or political assassinations. At such a stage, contradictions reach their peak, leaving no room for compromise or common ground, transforming the country into an open-ended battleground. Moreover, Lebanon’s reconstruction is now directly tied to the effective implementation of Resolution 1701.
The End of an Era
The argument that there is no alternative to armed militias as a defensive framework has been gradually collapsing for years, particularly since the political clash between Hezbollah and the Lebanese opposition to Syria’s military and security presence in Lebanon in 2005. Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian war, under the pretext of combating “Takfiri terrorism,” later revealed deeper motives—primarily the protection of overlapping interests between the party and the Assad regime. These interests go far beyond Syria serving as a conduit for Iranian arms to Hezbollah; they are tied to organized crime, smuggling networks, and drug production.
Subsequently, in 2019, Hezbollah further alienated segments of the Lebanese population by fiercely defending the government of Saad Hariri, who ultimately chose to step down to avoid bloodshed—despite enjoying support from all security forces, including the military, the Interior Ministry, and the Shiite duo. Hezbollah then forced Lebanese society to confront the consequences of economic collapse from a position of complete paralysis, coercing people into accepting that Lebanon’s financial meltdown—one of the three worst global crises in the last 150 years, according to the World Bank—was not a collapse at all, under the absurd slogan “We do not collapse.” The party also obstructed the investigation into the Beirut Port explosion, which devastated a third of the capital and killed scores of people, by fueling internal Donquixotian conflicts and resorting to its usual claims of victimhood.
These actions were followed by a severe security breach within Hezbollah, which continues to this day, and the immense destruction wrought by the war that Hezbollah had vowed to rebuild. The party also made numerous promises—many of which have since proven empty—such as the existence of shelters and safe havens for displaced and vulnerable populations. This political mismanagement extended beyond Lebanon, affecting Syria, the Gulf states, and even Cyprus. The accumulated failures of Hezbollah’s militia model leave no room for renewal under any pretext.
If this means that Lebanon must temporarily accept American hegemony as a necessary evil, then so be it—at least until the Lebanese can assess their losses, tend to their wounds, recover whatever rights they can through non-military means, and allow the Lebanese state to regain a modicum of political and diplomatic balance. Rebuilding even part of what was destroyed by the unholy trinity of militias, banks, and sectarian power brokers is a crucial step toward stability.
The current phase requires Lebanese leaders and citizens alike to seriously contemplate how to navigate out of this renewed cycle of foreign domination and begin constructing a future based on a strong, functional state rather than perpetuating the logic of militias and reliance on external forces. Lebanon is at a historic crossroads, and the Salam government must exhibit extraordinary political courage and wisdom in its decision-making. Courage, in this context, does not mean blindly adhering to confrontational politics but rather moving beyond it—by acknowledging the fragility of the Lebanese state’s political and economic structure while avoiding submission to foreign influence or the sectarian divisions that obstruct necessary structural reforms.
