As war in Lebanon continues, internal divisions and proxy embeddedness remain obstacles for any progress towards ending the war. Although the Lebanese government signaled its readiness to pursue a ceasefire and direct talks with Israel, deep-seated disagreements within Lebanon prevent any real advancement. In proxy wars, groups do not only fight on behalf of their sponsor states but become entangled in the sponsor’s interests. This means that the goals needed to end the conflict for the proxy group now overlap with the conditions that the sponsor state requires to agree to stop the war, a clear nested conflict situation.
Ceasefire and peacebuilding mediators explain that prospective negotiations can only happen when the “ripe” moment is achieved, characterized by three conditions: (1) a mutually hurting stalemate, (2) a way out, and (3) a representative spokesperson.
None of these conditions are met in Lebanon, nor are they likely to be met soon, as internal political bargains reveal. Lebanon’s hopes for ending the war hinge only on international pressure; from France, European partners, or a US policy reversal.
A mutually hurting stalemate is when all parties recognize that continued fighting inflicts unacceptable costs and no longer offers tangible advantage. In 2024, while Hezbollah appeared to capitulate after the assassination of their experienced commanders and the pagers attack, the tipping point was not achieved for Israel through military means but through external US pressure. Today, with the US an active party in the war, even direct calls by the Lebanese Government will meet deaf ears until Israel is pressured to negotiate. The Lebanese Government’s call comes too late, as it has not exercised full sovereignty since February 2025, making this attempt merely symbolic.
Disarming Hezbollah was never just a security necessity, it was always a statement on state legitimacy. Israel currently has no strong motivation to enter negotiations. It is not experiencing a “hurting stalemate,” and without such pressure maintains significant leverage, allowing it to dictate terms and delay withdrawal until circumstances are more favorable than those in the November 2024 ceasefire agreement.
The second condition, a cohesive spokesperson to negotiate on behalf of Lebanon, is equally unmet. Lebanon’s internal bargaining works against achieving it. The insistence that the negotiations team represent all major sects signals to the world that it is business as usual. There is a cognitive incapacity to trust a team that may not include a Shiite lead, leaving South Lebanon feeling unrepresented.
This is even more dangerous when representation criteria are based on sectarian divides, as the negotiating team’s cohesiveness will be tested alongside the power structures within it. The likelihood that a Shiite representative holds veto power and the ability to leave the team if Shiite needs are deemed unmet is high. Any position taken by this individual would reflect Hezbollah’s demands if nominated by Speaker Nabih Berri or Hezbollah themselves, reducing the rest of the team to actual mediators brokering between Israel and the Shiite representative, rather than a cohesive unit negotiating on behalf of Lebanon.
Last week’s attack on the government’s decision to expel the Iranian Ambassador, and the attack on Shiite Minister Fadi Makki for attending a government meeting, illustrate this precisely. Any assurances offered by the Lebanese negotiating team are inherently limited by Hezbollah’s approval and its ability to not follow through on them within its clear sponsor-proxy nested conflict dynamic.
What has become more evident and more dangerous in recent days is that Hezbollah’s survival can no longer rely solely on military means but must be translated into political gains. Since the government failed to monopolize the use of arms over the past year and a half, stepping in now comes a little too late. Hezbollah’s relationship with the government is now marked by tension and mistrust, underscored by its refusal to align its interests with those of the state and its threats to target the government once the war ends.
This was made evident by prominent Hezbollah figure Mahmoud Qumati, who issued a direct warning describing their unresolved issues as “unfinished business” after the war’s conclusion, echoed by Wafic Safa’s latest media appearance. Such statements confirm that Hezbollah can only justify the war to its constituency through internal political gains and Iran’s gains rather than through protecting Lebanese territories or villages.
Any negotiations preserving a sense of “face” for Hezbollah would contradict the goals of the international community, including Europe, and come at the expense of the Lebanese government, which will be challenged by sovereign voices within Lebanon.
The effectiveness of government-led negotiations is therefore continually undermined by Hezbollah’s Iran-backed agenda and its challenge to state legitimacy and autonomy. As an Iranian proxy, this draws a bleak picture: Hezbollah’s war objectives no longer stop at its own narrowed goals within Lebanese politics but extend to securing maximum gains for Iran.
For Lebanon, any negotiations to reach a fruitful agreement, the government must go beyond the traditional agenda of withdrawal demands and border redrawing, akin to Resolution 1701. It must approach negotiations with a comprehensive, detailed plan for Hezbollah’s disarmament and the monopolization of military force within its borders, one that goes beyond previous drafts of the past 15 months, with explicit steps and a specific implementation timeline. The negotiations team must comprise highly qualified and experienced negotiators representing Lebanese interests, not sectarian constituencies. Only by presenting a credible strategy demonstrating clear commitment to a new Lebanon can the groundwork for lasting security be laid. Engineering such a solution is not merely a matter of diplomatic finesse it must be credible.
