Syrian academic and politician Burhan Ghalioun examines what he calls the “Eastern Question”—the foundations of the modern Levant established after the fall of the Ottoman Empire—by linking it to a “new or renewed Eastern Question” brought forth by “current events and the multi-dimensional wars unleashed by the ‘Al-Aqsa Flood.’” He rightly argues that a key foundation has been “transforming Palestine into a state solely for Jews… and, beyond that, the adoption of this state by major Western powers, integrating it into their Middle Eastern strategies to counter the growing aspirations of the region’s peoples for increased independence, sovereignty over their borders, resources, and destiny.”
Of course, much of the discourse in this article echoes common themes in popular Arab political rhetoric, so I’ll aim to offer a brief and focused critique of the points that, with due respect, I feel Ghalioun did not address adequately or appropriately.
Firstly, Ghalioun identifies the birth of the Palestinian issue, and the establishment of a Jewish state within it, as one of the key symptoms of the foundations underpinning the modern Arab Levant. Yet, he centers this issue over others, giving it a primary position, despite being the author of The Arab Ordeal: The State versus the Nation (2003).
It is well-known that the establishment of Israel—through force and with the support of major Western powers—coincided with the emergence of the “nation-state” in the Arab region. However, these “states” possessed more attributes of authority than of a state in the institutional sense, as understood in terms of institutions, laws, and citizens. It’s also important to note that these states were not born out of social forces or political and economic stakeholders, as in Europe, but rather through tribal structures (in monarchies) or the military (in republics). Even the borders in the Levant were drawn according to the designs of the dominant global powers of the time.
The point here is that Israel was established as a colonial, settler, racist, and aggressive state due to two main factors—international and Arab—which enabled the self-driven efforts of the Zionist movement to create a state and secure its safety, stability, and development to the extent that it is now attempting to reassert itself as a key player in the Arab Levant. This ambition is evident in the genocidal campaigns it is waging against Palestinians (especially in Gaza) and Lebanon, and its efforts to weaken the other regional power—Iran.
In keeping with his view that the Palestinian issue and Israel occupy a central role in explaining the conditions of the Arab Levant and the broader Arab world, Ghalioun sees Israel as the most effective tool to “break the will of the region’s peoples and subjugate them” to American influence, likening it to “a dagger in the heart of the Arab and Islamic world.”
Yet here, the author of A Manifesto for Democracy (2006) also misses an important point: it is the authoritarian Arab regimes that have broken the will of their people, subjugating, weakening, and marginalizing their societies by denying their citizens political and legal standing, opposing human rights—including freedom of opinion, expression, and democratic political participation.
Ghalioun also refers repeatedly to an “Arab and Islamic world”—rhetoric that, while apt for popular political speeches, remains vague and lacks clear political, legal, or economic definition. Language alone does not constitute an Arab region or nation, nor does religion alone create an Islamic region or nation. In fact, many states within these regions have voluntarily and pragmatically aligned themselves with the West over any other party, without any coercion in the realm of international relations—this applies to several Arab and Islamic countries.
Notably, Ghalioun insists on his perspective, stating: “Israel has become… the sharpest weapon in the hands of the West to suppress (and deter) Middle Eastern societies and peoples aspiring to break free from dependency and colonial control and to soar on their own wings…” This implies that the ailments and developmental stagnation of Arab countries are attributed to external forces, and ultimately to Israel.
But one might ask: what role does Israel play in Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Yemen, Sudan, or Egypt? Even in the Levant, has something similar happened in Lebanon, Iraq, or Syria, where Ghalioun himself served as the first president of the Syrian National Council, representing the opposition? This observation doesn’t diminish the colonial, settler, and aggressive danger Israel poses in the Arab Levant, yesterday, today, and tomorrow. However, it emphasizes the primacy of internal failings in the Arab world, which should be addressed without overlooking Israel’s threat. Internal failings do not excuse external threats, nor do external threats justify internal decay—and vice versa.
Continuing with general statements, Ghalioun asserts: “Arab countries lost several military battles, starting with the 1949 war, then in 1956, 1967, and 1973.” This, however, does not apply to all countries, and these battles were mostly imposed by Israel, with the exception of one (the 1973 war).
Furthermore, the myth surrounding the 1948 war—that multiple Arab armies entered Palestine—was promoted by Israel to portray itself as the victim to the world and to affirm its strength before its society and Jews globally. To illustrate, the total Arab forces numbered no more than 60,000, while the 600,000 Jewish settlers in Palestine had between 80,000 and 120,000 members in well-armed Jewish militias (Haganah, Stern, Irgun) with superior leadership. These militias later became the core of the Israeli army after the establishment of Israel.
The point is that Arab regimes did not prioritize the fight against Israel in their policies, for several reasons, including their incapacity, especially after the devastating defeat in June 1967. During that brief war, Israel overpowered several Arab armies, including those of the two leading “nationalist” and “progressive” Arab states of the time.
This also refutes the claim that Palestine was a central issue on the Arab agenda, except insofar as it was used to cover up defeat, thereby justifying authoritarian regimes, consolidating their power, and stripping their populations of rights, freedoms, and resources under the pretense of resisting Israel.
In reality, these regimes later revealed their authoritarian nature openly, no longer needing the Palestinian cause or resistance to legitimize themselves or bolster their rule. They used their “national” interests as a pretext, even as they claimed the Palestinian leadership had abandoned resistance in favor of establishing an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza.
On Iran, there is much in Ghalioun’s article that I agree with. However, he states: “Just as the West used Arab regimes and Iraq in the initial phase to weaken Iran’s revolutionary policies, it now uses Iran’s nationalist drive for revenge to thwart the efforts of all Arab countries in pursuing progress and development and to block any potential opportunities for cooperation among them.”
This statement raises three points. First, the description of “Iran’s revolutionary policies” does not reflect the nature of the Iranian regime that emerged after the fall of the Shah. Second, his reference to “the efforts of all Arab countries toward progress and development, and potential cooperation among them” contradicts the reality of weak, dependent, and often fractious regimes.
Third, the U.S. and Israel have capitalized on Iran’s policies, even enabling them in the region. This explains how Iraq was handed to Iran on a silver platter after the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003, through armed sectarian militias. The U.S. has largely ignored Iran’s growing influence and the militias it established, which have fragmented state structures and societies in the Levant and Yemen, using Iran as a specter and threat against regional regimes.
There are several fundamental ideas where I find common ground with Ghalioun, particularly his point about the organic connection between the West and Israel. I have often argued that Israel is not merely a state in the Middle East but an international project situated within it from its founding. This explains the West’s—especially the U.S.’s—commitment to ensuring Israel’s security and qualitative superiority in terms of security, economy, and technology in the region. This critical aspect is often overlooked or misunderstood by Arab decision-makers, whose policies are often inconsistent or misguided.
Nevertheless, it is equally essential for Arab perceptions to acknowledge that Israel’s success is not only due to its military, technological, and economic power or the West’s commitment to its security and superiority. Israel’s strength also lies in its ability to establish a state built on institutions, laws, and citizenship (at least for its Jewish citizens), which remains a crucial weakness among Arab states.
In the conclusion of his article, Ghalioun suggests that “even if it were possible to escape from the Palestinian issue, which has been a burden on weak and divided Arab countries, there is no escaping the confrontation with Israeli ‘thuggery,’ whether Palestinians continue their struggle, surrender, or are exterminated. Israel, as it exists today, will remain a detonator in the region, imposing its agenda and dominance and denying the people their freedoms…” However, this too is a generalization often repeated in Arab discourse. What may apply in the Levant does not necessarily apply to the Gulf or North Africa. Additionally, the situation is not determined solely by Israel’s actions but fundamentally by the actions of the regimes controlling societies in those regions. Notably, Ghalioun does not address what should or could be done in response to these challenges.
In conclusion, Ghalioun’s article is thought-provoking and deserves further discussion, expansion, and enrichment. It also demands a consideration of possible actions to take in light of these experiences, events, and sacrifices.
