It is difficult for the so-called “remnants” in the Lebanese context to challenge the appointment of former ambassador Simon Karam to the Mechanism Committee tasked with negotiating with the Israeli delegation on the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, despite the fact that the man’s history is filled with positions confronting both the dominance of the former Syrian regime over Lebanese political decision-making at the time and, later, Hezbollah’s influence after the Syrian withdrawal.
This is because any attempt to undermine him would take us back to that dark chapter of lean years during which Ghazi Kanaan relentlessly pursued Simon Karam, whether when Karam was governor of the Bekaa or ambassador in Washington. It would also revive the rhetoric of the so-called “resistance” at the time, when Karam succeeded in securing the Israeli withdrawal from the Jezzine district as a prelude to a complete withdrawal from Lebanese territory, through the “Jezzine First” plan, which the resistance then labeled “the Jezzine withdrawal conspiracy.”
Karam’s appointment today appeared as a coordinated step stemming from a decision to add a political dimension to the Mechanism Committee. It was met with a corresponding Israeli move, as confirmed by Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s statement to Al Jazeera that Lebanon is ready for negotiations “beyond the military level” with Israel.
Meanwhile, Benjamin Netanyahu’s exaggerated portrayal of the move as a major turning point in the negotiation track with Lebanon seems aimed at obstructing it and provoking objections to it. He knows that his announcement that he has sent a delegation to Lebanon for negotiations will not be received with comfort within Hezbollah’s circles, which still retains political influence in Lebanon.
The so-called “resistance camp” is no longer in a position today to engage in the kind of “random accusations of treason” it practiced in the era of Ghazi Kanaan and, later, Rustom Ghazaleh. And while the appointment of Karam will not bring it any sense of comfort, it is likely to keep its reservations to itself. President Joseph Aoun is the one who appointed him, and its relationship with Aoun is currently good. Moreover, the scale of U.S. pressure on Lebanon leaves little room for Hezbollah to impose conditions. More importantly, Karam comes to his new position from a place of absolute clarity in his genuinely independent southern political choices. It is also worth noting here that Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri was not far removed from the appointment decision.
There is no doubt that Simon Karam is a sovereign political figure, but his version of sovereignty is of a different kind from the one the “resistance camp” knows how to play with by invoking the threat of civil war. His sovereignty is grounded in law, not in sectarian division. He comes from a southern political tradition that cannot be outbid on patriotism, and from civic relationships that are not built on sectarian identity. Still, he is clear in his political positioning, whether through his role in the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, his declared stances against illegal weapons, or earlier against the occupation by the former Syrian regime’s army.
The appointment of Simon Karam is almost the only tangible step the Lebanese state has taken in its search for a way out of the deadlock imposed on the country by the so-called Support War.
Karam has previously entered the arena of negotiations and succeeded at the time in achieving progress through the “Jezzine First” initiative. But that success was counted against him rather than in his favor, as Ghazi Kanaan then unleashed the full machinery of the “resistance camp” against him. Karam resigned from his post and chose to resume his political work from outside the structures of power.
The task will not be easy for the son of the southern city of Jezzine, but this time the difficulty will come from both sides of the negotiation. On one side stands Hezbollah, clinging to its weapons north of the Litani; on the other stands the Israeli decision not to withdraw from the Lebanese territories it has recently occupied, and even more so its rush to implement the step of establishing a buffer, uninhabited zone. Netanyahu is fixated on the buffer zone, and Hezbollah meets this fixation by holding on to its weapons.
Simon Karam does bring with him an encouraging diplomatic experience, even though today’s landscape is far more complex. There is an Israeli decision to impose a buffer zone and an Iranian decision to maintain Hezbollah’s weapons. Caught between the two, Lebanese diplomacy is tasked with drawing in international conditions and imposing them on both parties to the war.
