The participation of Suwayda’s Bedouin tribes in the July 2025 events was not a secondary or incidental feature of the violence. Rather, it was central to the military and security operations carried out by the “Transitional Administration,” which is controlled by “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham,” in its attack on the Druze-majority governorate.

Although Bedouin tribes make up less than 6 percent of Suwayda’s population of 650,000, they live in the outskirts of Druze towns, villages, and cities and maintain overlapping networks of tribal leadership. This tribal structure was mobilized to fight alongside the Ministries of Defense and Interior within the Transitional Administration against Druze areas.

These acts of systematic violence bore the hallmarks of ethnic cleansing against the Druze minority. In just a few days, they resulted in the destruction of 34 villages, the killing of around 2,000 people, and the displacement of approximately 150,000, according to local sources, since the Damascus government has yet to declare an official death toll. The region was also stripped of the basic necessities for life.

At the heart of this process, we can observe how tribal violence and communal conflict were integrated into the official repressive apparatus of the “Transitional Administration” against a community with a distinct ethnic identity living in a historically stable, urbanized region.

The Bedouin Tribes of Suwayda

Suwayda is home to several Bedouin tribes, some settled in urban areas, others still leading nomadic lives. According to the latest official census published by Suwayda’s governorate at the end of 2023, the Bedouin population does not exceed 35,000 out of the 650,000 residents of the governorate. Roughly half live in urban areas, and the other half lead unstable, nomadic lives.

Most of the urban areas inhabited by the tribes are unregulated informal neighborhoods on the outskirts of cities and villages, such as Al-Maqous, Al-Mashourib, Al-Haroubi, Rajm Al-Zaytoun, and Al-Shaqrawiya, which surround the city of Suwayda. The same applies to villages like Al-Mazraa and Ariqa, where Bedouin and Druze live in separate quarters. There are also Bedouin-specific villages such as Al-Mansoura and Al-Bustan.

In terms of tribal affiliation, Suwayda’s tribes are mainly divided into the Shanabla, led by Sheikh Saud Nayef al-Nimr; the Jawabra, led by Abu Bashar Ghaleb al-Fuhaid; and a small number of the Masa’id. In the villages of Al-Mazraa, Ariqa, and western Suwayda countryside, there are also other tribes such as the Hawasneh, led by Saqr al-Hawasneh. In the village of al-Bustan lives the Amour tribe, originally from Homs, led by Jamil al-Balaas.

Each Bedouin area—whether an informal neighborhood, village, or mixed settlement—has its own local dynamics, leadership figures, families, armed groups, and militias. Some areas are dominated by a single tribe, while others are mixed, adding to the complexity of understanding local dynamics.

For example, the al-Haroubi neighborhood in the city of Suwayda is inhabited by the Jawabra tribe, while al-Shaqrawiya is mostly Jawabra with a minority of Shanabla. In al-Mazraa, tribal identity gives way to family identity; the Bedouins there are known by their family names rather than their tribal affiliations.

In addition to this complex tribal map within Suwayda, other tribes—such as Madaljeh, al-Salout, al-Biyadin, and al-Shar’a—live in the volcanic al-Lajat region, which lies between western Suwayda and eastern Daraa countryside to the north.

Conflict Between Bedouins and Druze?

In May 2025, a group from the “General Security” forces made up of Bedouins from the village of Mtolleh, part of the al-Nuaim tribe affiliated with the Ministry of Interior, set up a checkpoint on the Damascus–Suwayda road. This came in the wake of the incitement campaign titled “We Want to Annihilate the Druze”, which coincided with armed military attacks on Druze communities in the Damascus countryside. These attacks resulted in the displacement of some Druze families from Ashrafiyat Sahnaya and the General Security’s takeover of Jaramana and Sahnaya.

The checkpoint was used as a political tool to extort and collectively punish the Druze of Suwayda, particularly those rejecting integration into the Transitional Administration. These violations triggered a cycle of reciprocal kidnappings between Bedouins and Druze in the city of Suwayda, following the torture of a Druze merchant at the Mtolleh checkpoint in the first week of July.

In response, a Druze armed group kidnapped several members of the Bedouin community from the nearby village of al-Maqous. In retaliation, a group of Bedouins from al-Maqous set up a checkpoint on the Suwayda–Dahr al-Jabal road and kidnapped several Druze passersby, most of them farmers. This armed group from al-Maqous, part of the Shanabla tribe, functions as a militia affiliated with the “Southern Tribes Gathering,” led by Syrian-Jordanian businessman Sheikh Rakan al-Khudair, whose name is often linked to drug smuggling across the border.

Al-Khudair managed to recruit a few hundred fighters from Suwayda’s Bedouin tribes after the fall of the regime, with help from defected officer Hossam al-Karashi, the actual military commander of the Gathering. Al-Karashi was formerly a member of the extremist Omari Brigade in Daraa during the Syrian war and is now affiliated with the Ministry of Defense.

Tribal elders of the Shanabla and Jawabra in Suwayda rejected al-Khudair’s newly imposed and trans-tribal authority, viewing him as a threat. They issued statements condemning him. However, the financial incentives al-Khudair offered played a major role in recruiting fighters, especially those with criminal backgrounds or histories of gang activity. The Gathering attempted to incorporate its recruits as a unified bloc into the Ministry of Defense, but this move failed for unclear reasons. It appears the Gathering now coordinates directly with the newly formed Syrian Intelligence apparatus, bypassing the Ministry of Defense.

The Gathering also built strong ties with Druze “Sheikh” Suleiman Abdulbaqi from Suwayda city and his militia “The Mountain’s Free Gathering,” as well as with “Sheikh” Laith Al-Balaous in the town of al-Mazraa, whose militia split from “Sheikh Al-Karama Forces.” Both Abdulbaqi and al-Balaous’s groups are affiliated with the Ministry of Interior and comprise only a few dozen members each. Laith al-Balaous’s group includes both Druze and Bedouins from al-Mazraa, most of them with criminal records or involved in kidnappings for ransom, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking.

On the night of July 14, despite an agreement to exchange kidnapped Druze and Bedouins following the Al-Maqous events, the Ministries of Defense and Interior launched a military assault from western rural Daraa toward al-Mazraa. From there, they moved into all Bedouin-inhabited areas in western rural Suwayda, where the Southern Tribes Gathering played a critical role in combat and navigation.

The breakthrough into western Suwayda occurred along axes that exclusively passed through tribal clusters and villages, areas outside previous frontlines and unexpected by Druze factions. This was facilitated by Laith al-Balaous and his militia in al-Mazraa, who reassured locals of their safety and guided attacking forces through side agricultural roads. From al-Mazraa, the attackers advanced toward key areas like Al-Mansoura and al-Shaqrawiya, both Bedouin villages northwest of Suwayda.

From these positions, the Ministries’ forces managed to breach some city neighborhoods and commit mass atrocities against civilians. Meanwhile, the armed tribal militias of the Southern Tribes Gathering opened distraction fronts around the city to divide Druze fighters.

Even though Laith al-Balaous had surrendered the town of Al-Mazraa without a fight and opened a route for the attacking forces, the town was still overrun. Remaining residents were either kidnapped or killed, all homes were looted, and the town was burned.

On July 16, 2025, due to the resilience of local Druze resistance and Israeli airstrikes targeting the attackers’ headquarters and convoys, the Ministries’ forces withdrew from some combat axes. Immediately after, the Transitional Administration launched its backup plan: a live, public display of its new weapon—the tribes—to resume attacks on Druze urban centers and commit systematic acts of violence.

This time, the justification was the claim that Druze groups were holding Bedouin tribespeople as hostages. And indeed, violations against the tribes were committed by some Druze actors, resulting in about 20 Bedouin civilian deaths in the city of Shahba. These violations are criminal acts, even if they were not systematic or were locally contained. The Druze spiritual leadership issued a statement condemning any attacks on innocent civilians from the tribes, especially those not involved in fighting.

As for the Bedouins of al-Maqous, who had actively participated in battles, sniping, and sabotage—and whose area was reached by Ministry forces—they fled eastward in Suwayda following the Ministries’ withdrawal. A similar situation occurred in the Mshawrib neighborhood of Suwayda, home to a gang notorious for fighting alongside the Transitional Administration. A closer look at Mshawrib reveals complex local tribal dynamics. This neighborhood, inhabited by a few hundred, is controlled by a gang led by Safi Abu Thulayth and Ahmad al-Sheikha. Over the years of war, this gang shifted allegiance from Hezbollah to Syrian intelligence, to ISIS, and finally to the Southern Tribes Gathering.

This gang is considered the main actor in smuggling and storing drugs and weapons across the Syrian-Jordanian border. Just before the Assad regime’s fall, Air Force Intelligence arrested Ahmad Al-Sheikha for transferring an ISIS cell to Suwayda city to carry out suicide attacks. Al-Sheikha was released after the regime’s collapse.

On another front, the Fazaa Arab tribes insist on not leaving Suwayda until all “kidnapped tribespeople” are freed from Druze custody, as they claim. Many of the Fazaa tribal leaders have publicly challenged the head of the Transitional Administration, threatening to continue the fight if the captives are not released. Interestingly, this aligns with the desires of many Druze to end the recurring skirmishes and kidnappings that have long threatened civil peace, especially since the tribes joined combat through the Southern Tribes Gathering.

Notably, a U.S.-brokered agreement reached on July 16, 2025, by U.S. envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack—under Saudi, Turkish, and Jordanian sponsorship—included a clause requiring the evacuation of Suwayda’s Bedouin tribes from two crossings between Suwayda and Daraa.

Indeed, clashes began to subside as this evacuation plan was implemented. Bedouin tribes in Shahba left first, followed by 400 people from al-Kafr on July 24, despite not having taken part in the fighting.

The July 2025 events reveal a coercive strategy pursued by the Transitional Administration: combining official forces with tribal networks to subjugate Suwayda. After the Ministries’ forces failed to penetrate, a backup plan was launched to bring in tribes with no ancestral ties to the governorate and mobilize them by invoking perceived “injustices” against Suwayda’s tribes.

In the background, we see a web of interests between the Transitional Administration’s security apparatus, tribal leaders across Syria, and the Southern Tribes Gathering, exploiting tribalism as a military and security tool—from the Mtolleh checkpoint, to the Al-Maqous gang, to western Suwayda’s tribes and urban militias that helped execute the attack, guide convoys, and confuse Druze defense lines. The dominance of well-funded gangs and unchecked weapons has eroded all grounds for coexistence and entrenched a campaign-style pattern of tribal raids into urban zones, aimed at political submission.