After the fall of the regime, the owners and their heirs saw an opportunity to reclaim rights confiscated by Assad’s government. Instead, they were confronted with the ministry’s decision to uphold the expropriation decree and move forward with new investment plans.

This investigation uncovers the hidden layers of that conflict through the story of the “Syriana” swimming pool, of which nothing remains today except memories and a name on the map.

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“We had land stretching as far as the eye could see, filled with trees, crops, fruit, livestock, and workers…”

Al-Makhraz – Layali Al-Salihiya (Historical Fantasy Series, 2004) ____________________________________________________

“I am one of the owners of the Kiwan land. It was expropriated by the late Hafez al-Assad regime, and now they want to hand it over to investment companies to build tourism facilities on it. That is simply unjust before God,” says one of the Kiwan landowners.

In another video, Monzer Saeed, also a landowner in Kiwan, says: “The current government is moving toward signing investment contracts with private companies to build hotels and luxury buildings. This is private profit being made on our land. Isn’t that injustice?”

Dozens of videos circulated on the page “Owners and Heirs of Kiwan Land,” dedicated to the green expanse in the heart of the capital that was expropriated by Hafez al-Assad in the 1970s for the construction of tourist hotels.

Today, the Ministry of Tourism continues to uphold ownership of the land under Assad’s expropriation decree, while announcing “The Beaumont” project, a $300 million development.

These videos and protests emerged after dozens of landowners saw the fall of the Assad regime as an opportunity to reclaim rights confiscated under the expropriation decree issued by Hafez al-Assad. Following the announcement of “The Beaumont” project, some attempted to organize a protest in Damascus to present their demands.

Iman Al-Akk, one of the organizers of the planned protest against Damascus Governorate’s decision to establish investment projects on Kiwan land, says: “I was part of the committee that went to obtain approval for the protest. We first went to the Damascus Governorate, and then we were referred to the Ministry of Interior. From there, they sent us to the Interior branch in Marjeh, where we were told to head to the Public Relations Department. After we formally submitted the request, they asked us to start the whole process all over again.”

Al-Akk adds, “We went back to the Damascus Governorate once again, and it became clear to us that there was no approval. It was simply a stalling process. Then they told us outright: ‘There are no approvals.’”

Another member of the committee says, “Trying to get permission for the protest was like being mocked. No one helped us, and no one offered any real support.”

A Summary of the Kiwan Land Expropriation

What remains of Kiwan land in Damascus has become one of the capital’s most striking “non-landmarks.” The green space at the heart of the city, once known as the “Kiwan Orchards,” has undergone repeated transformations throughout its history. Parts of it became Umayyad Square, another section turned into Tishreen Park, while another portion became the subject of a legal dispute between landowners and the Ministry of Tourism — a conflict whose consequences continue to this day.

The dispute began under Hafez al-Assad and eventually left behind a massive pit in the middle of the capital, before the Ministry of Tourism in the interim government announced a giant new project called “The Beaumont.” Meanwhile, Tishreen Park itself was renamed “Umayyad Park.”

Kiwan land is not only part of Damascus’s popular memory and cultural identity, but also a symbol of Hafez al-Assad’s grip over state institutions, which stripped Syrian landowners of their rights and forced many to surrender their properties to the Ministry of Tourism in exchange for financial compensation, and, at times, under threats from Hafez al-Assad’s office itself.

One of these stories belongs to Mohammad Ramzi Suleimani, owner of Plot No. 2071 in Kiwan land, where he established the “Syriana” swimming pool.

When Hafez al-Assad issued the expropriation decree in 1972, ownership of the land was transferred to the Ministry of Tourism. The pool and the surrounding restaurant were demolished, while the value of the shares was deposited in the Central Bank. Ramzi Suleimani was then pressured to collect the compensation payment to complete the expropriation process.

Here is Ramzi’s story, as told by his son, Ibrahim Suleimani, who revisits his memories of the “Syriana” swimming pool, of which nothing remains today except old stories and fading memories.

It is a story of expropriation and coercion, of the dismissal of landowners’ rights even after Assad’s fall, and of a giant pit left behind in the heart of Damascus.

The “Syriana” Pool Demolished by Hafez al-Assad

At the end of the 1950s, Ramzi Suleimani purchased a plot in Kiwan land and built a swimming pool and restaurant that opened in the early 1960s.

Ibrahim, who was a child at the time, recalls how public pools were spaces of leisure for Damascenes and gathering spots for Syrian and Egyptian artists alike, including Muna Wassef, Fahd Ballan, and Abdel Fattah Sukkar.

“It was an elegant recreational and sports facility in the heart of Damascus, and a well-known social gathering place,” he says.

In 1979, Ibrahim was eight years old. He still remembers how his father received the expropriation order from the Ministry of Tourism, based on Legislative Decree No. 1976 issued by Hafez al-Assad in 1972. The stated purpose of the expropriation was the construction of “tourist hotels.”

That marked the beginning of a long conflict between the landowners, the Damascus Governorate, and the Ministry of Tourism. As the Syria Report summarized it, the Directorate of Urban Planning and Development in Damascus continued to classify Kiwan land as agricultural and prohibited construction on it in order to preserve the capital’s green spaces. As a result, the Ministry of Tourism never carried out any projects on the land, while the governorate halted the issuance of building permits in the area and even banned the restoration of existing structures. This ultimately led to the spread of informal and unregulated development in the area.

Ibrahim tells us that between 1980 and 1981, his father received an offer from InterContinental Hotels Group to build a hotel on the land of the swimming pool. The lucrative proposal was welcomed by the family, but there was no way to overturn the expropriation order.

According to Ibrahim, his father contacted Dhu al-Himma Shalish, one of Hafez al-Assad’s close associates, who agreed to try to recover the land on the condition that he would receive a majority share in the project. Ibrahim’s father agreed, but, as he recalls, “Hafez al-Assad refused any discussion regarding Kiwan land.”

The entire facility was demolished in 1983, and the compensation money was deposited in the bank. Ibrahim’s father tried to maneuver around the process and avoided withdrawing the full amount at once, but he was ultimately forced to accept the payment under threat.

The loss took a severe toll on his health, which deteriorated rapidly afterward, and he died a few years later.

The Barren Land of Kiwan

Since the expropriation of Suleimani’s land, the Ministry of Tourism has never carried out any of the promised “investment projects.” Yet satellite imagery reveals that several small-scale projects were established on the site.

Starting in 2009, the Suleimani family and other landowners attempted to rely on rulings by Syria’s administrative judiciary, which considered such expropriations to suffer from a “serious defect that renders them void,” because the authority that seized the land never initiated the projects it had originally claimed justified the expropriation.

But herein lies the paradox: according to the decree itself, the land was expropriated for investment projects, not for projects serving a genuine public benefit.

During Bashar al-Assad’s rule, repeated promises were made about projects supposedly planned for Kiwan land. In 2006, the Kuwaiti Syrian Holding Company and Mohammed Abdulmohsin Al-Kharafi & Sons established the “Kiwan Real Estate Company,” and the foundation stone for the project was laid by then–Syrian Prime Minister Mohammad Naji al-Otari.

In 2010, the company’s board of directors was re-elected, and discussions once again resurfaced about building an InterContinental hotel on the site.

More than two decades after the land was expropriated, and with no projects ever built on it, the Suleimani family joined a lawsuit seeking to recover the land from the Ministry of Tourism before the State Council in 2007 (Case No. 3204).

The case was ultimately dismissed in 2009 and struck from the record, accompanied by a blunt warning delivered to the family: “Do not ask for this land back, or it will end up belonging to Bashar and Maher al-Assad.”

The Syrian uprising erupted in 2011, bringing construction activity on the land to a halt. In 2016, then-Minister of Tourism Bishr Yaziji reaffirmed that tourism projects would be built on Kiwan land and that the property belonged to the ministry.

In 2019, the Ministry of Tourism once again revived plans for the site, this time proposing the establishment of an environmental park and offering alternative housing to residents.

The paradox is that attempts by Kiwan landowners to invoke the legal principle of the “nullity of expropriation” are consistently met with the argument that the property owners have already collected the compensation money deposited in the bank.

This argument completely ignores the pressure and coercion imposed on the owners. After all, who in Syria could realistically defy the security apparatus, especially when even Dhu al-Himma Shalish himself failed to intervene successfully?

Then the Regime Fell… and the Mega Projects Began

After the fall of the regime, Ibrahim’s family quickly filed a new lawsuit in 2025 before the Administrative Court against the Ministry of Tourism, demanding the restoration of their property rights and ownership, relying on the judicial doctrine of the “nullity” of expropriation.

But less than two months after the case was filed, the State Attorney responded with a firm rejection: “We deny the claimant’s case in its entirety and oppose its requests, which lack any legal basis.”

According to the ruling, the Ministry of Tourism remains the legal owner of the land. The ministry’s lawyer further argued that the Expropriation Law does not specify a time limit for “implementing the purpose for which the expropriation was carried out,” because expropriation decrees “do not expire with time,” citing judicial precedent dating back to 1976.

Most importantly, the defense emphasized that the expropriation compensation had already been paid, referring to the money Ibrahim’s father was forced to accept.

Yasser Shalti describes the ministry’s continued reliance on expropriation decrees issued under both Assads as part of the logic of “state continuity” adopted by the current authorities.

He argues that this approach is “a major reason behind many of the problems we are seeing today,” including adherence to international debts, long-term contracts, and expropriation decrees, among others, “because such decisions do not automatically fall with the collapse of the ruling authority.”

Marco Olabi argues that: “From a legal standpoint, expropriation is supposed to be an exceptional measure tied to a clear and direct public benefit, such as building a road, a school, or a public facility that serves society as a whole.

But the problem begins when expropriated land is later transformed into an investment asset generating commercial, tourism, and residential profits, as is happening with Kiwan land today.”

Olabi adds: “In this case, the legitimacy of the expropriation becomes ethically and legally questionable, especially when the original owners were deprived of benefiting from the massive increase in the land’s value over the decades.

It can therefore be argued that continuing to enforce expropriation decrees dating back to Hafez al-Assad’s era, without revisiting them in light of the land’s current investment-driven use, effectively amounts to recycling the old tools of power to serve a new rentier model.”

Syria’s “new” judiciary continues to ignore the coercion and intimidation exercised by the Assad authorities through both the security apparatus and the courts, while adhering rigidly to the letter of the law and to Hafez al-Assad’s decrees themselves.

This same approach can also be seen in relation to Decree 66 issued by Assad, as the Damascus Governorate continues to maintain ownership of confiscated lands because the original owners had already received compensation. The decree is framed as an “urban planning measure” rather than an expropriation decree, although, according to Amnesty International, it contributed to covering up war crimes.

Yasser Shalti says: “Challenging the fairness of the compensation could constitute a legal argument, as could proving that the owner accepted it under coercion and pressure. But the strongest legal argument remains the failure to implement the project itself, as well as the failure to use the land for the purpose for which it was expropriated. That could entitle the owner to reclaim the property or seek additional compensation, but such claims would still require a legal provision allowing for it.” 

The Suleimani family plans to appeal the ruling and continue its attempt to recover the land, or at the very least secure a role as a partner in its future investment projects.

But on one morning in April 2026, Ibrahim woke up to the announcement of “The Beaumont Damascus,” a project backed by Ahmed al-Sharaa and launched jointly by the Syrian Investment Authority, Ezdihar Holding, founded by Wafiq Reda Said, and the Ministry of Tourism.

The project spans 77,000 square meters and is valued at $300 million. According to Syrian Tourism Minister Mazen al-Salhani, its goal is to “revitalize the tourism sector and strengthen Syria’s appeal as a promising investment destination,” adding that the project “has the potential to transform the face of tourism in the country.”

He also stressed that “the ministry places the highest importance on establishing the principles of institutional governance in the management and investment of state assets, based on its commitment to absolute transparency throughout all stages of contracting and implementation.”

We attempted to trace the registration and background of the Syrian company “Ezdihar,” particularly since the Saudi company bearing the same name uses a different logo and makes no mention of projects in Syria. However, we found no clear record of the Syrian company.

At the same time, Syria’s state news agency, Syrian Arab News Agency, reported that Wafiq Reda Said had announced an initiative “offering 30 Ministry of Tourism employees fully funded training scholarships to participate in intensive programs at the Saïd Business School at the University of Oxford, covering hospitality, project management, and tourism investment.”

We contacted Saïd Business School, which stated: “We have no connection to The Beaumont project and have not signed any memorandum of understanding with Ezdihar.”

Marco Olabi comments: “The ministry does not treat Assad-era decrees as rights-based cases open to review, but rather as ‘real estate assets ready for investment.’ In other words, the state sees itself as the full legal heir to past expropriation decisions, regardless of the nature of the regime that issued them or the extent of their injustice.” 

He adds: “In the specific case of Kiwan land, we can see that the property remained tied to repeated investment schemes for decades, from projects proposed during the Assad era to the current ones. This indicates that the function of the expropriation was never temporary or linked to an urgent public need, but rather became part of a long-term policy aimed at controlling high-value land and repurposing it economically.” 

The continued reliance on Hafez al-Assad’s expropriation decree, along with preserving the land’s investment-driven framework, has left Ibrahim with several questions: “Wouldn’t it be logical to return the rights to their original owners, especially considering that the Ministry of Tourism is not authorized to sell land expropriated for public benefit and turn it into real estate investments and commercial offices?”

He adds: “We are fully capable of managing and investing in our land in the way we see fit.”

On the other hand, Muammar Al-Dakkak, Deputy Governor of Damascus for Technical Affairs, pointed during an interview on state television to the argument repeatedly invoked whenever legal or legislative change is discussed in Syria: “We are waiting for the People’s Assembly, because laws concerning this specific issue will be introduced,” referring to the issue of expropriation. 

Shalti offers a political interpretation of what is happening today. He argues that the current government’s transfer of power from Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali, the last prime minister under Bashar al-Assad, without formally declaring the fall of the government itself, and therefore without creating a rupture that would allow challenges to previous bilateral agreements, international projects, decrees, and laws, was intentional.

According to him, this was done “to preserve the legitimacy of the previous authority, and consequently the continuity of its decisions and laws. This is clearly reflected in the decrees and circulars being issued today, which continue to rely on the oppressive laws enacted under both Assads.”

What Did Syria’s Ministry of Tourism and Transitional Justice Authority Say?

We contacted Syria’s Ministry of Tourism, which stated that “the Kiwan land file is being managed within a comprehensive legal and institutional framework, in accordance with the provisions of the Expropriation Law and the objectives linked to public benefit and sustainable tourism development.”

The ministry added that it “has not abandoned the purpose for which the land was expropriated, but is currently working to complete tourism and development projects on the site in a way that generates economic, service-oriented, social, and environmental value for the city of Damascus and the local community in general.”

It further stressed that “any measure related to lifting the expropriation or altering its legal status is subject exclusively to the legal procedures and sovereign mechanisms stipulated under the applicable laws and regulations.”

The ministry further stated that it “has, since the completion of the expropriation procedures, fulfilled all resulting legal and humanitarian obligations, including the proper payment of expropriation compensation and the transfer of ownership in the land registry in accordance with legal procedures, in addition to coordinating with relevant public authorities to provide alternative housing for eligible families.”

It also noted that the ministry later adopted “a broader humanitarian and social approach that took into account the conditions of many families residing on the site, reflecting the state’s commitment to balancing the requirements of development with considerations of social and humanitarian stability.”

The ministry clarified that “Syrian legislation governing expropriation, along with established judicial precedents, does not link the validity of expropriation to a specific timeframe for implementing the project, given that major development projects are tied to changing planning, economic, and procedural considerations that may affect the timing and phases of implementation.”

We contacted Syria’s National Authority for Transitional Justice to ask about the rights of the landowners and the new project. The authority responded:

“The National Authority for Transitional Justice has given considerable attention to the issue of housing and property rights since the very first moments of its establishment, considering it one of the files directly linked to the processes of truth-seeking, justice, reparations, and guarantees of non-repetition. Among the most prominent violations documented over past decades is the issue of forced expropriations in their various forms across different Syrian regions.

The authority is currently conducting a broad study of this issue to develop an integrated strategy that defines its role within its temporal and thematic mandate, in addition to reviewing the laws and legislation that should be incorporated into the Transitional Justice Law to ensure justice for those harmed by violations of housing and property rights.”

We asked the authority about the concept of “void contracts” under Syrian administrative court jurisprudence, and whether such legal references could be relied upon to restore the rights of former landowners. It responded:

“In principle, legal references and judicial precedents, including those established by the Syrian Administrative Court, constitute an important part of any legal process related to property rights and expropriation, particularly in cases where the purpose for which the expropriation was carried out was never fulfilled.

However, the authority does not interfere in the work of the judiciary or in adjudicating ongoing legal disputes. Rather, it works within a broader framework focused on documenting violations affecting property rights, studying their consequences, and developing legal and restorative mechanisms capable of addressing these issues within the context of transitional justice.”

The authority concluded its response by stating: “Transitional justice is not limited to accountability alone. It also includes addressing the impact of past policies on economic and social rights, as well as property rights in general.

From this perspective, the authority is currently preparing a document outlining the conditions for reconstruction from a transitional justice standpoint, in order to ensure that no future projects are carried out at the expense of victims’ and property owners’ rights.

Work is also underway to document the damages and violations affecting property ownership, and to review the laws and procedures that undermined property rights during the previous period, in preparation for developing programs and plans aimed at restoring rights and providing redress to those affected, according to priorities and criteria that take into account the scale of harm, vulnerability, and available resources.”