Questioning the war has become taboo in Iraqi politics.

Not because the answer is impossible, but because merely asking it exposes an entire network of interests, illusions, and narratives that have been built over two decades.

A simple question that should be self-evident in any normal state: who decides on war? Why is it fought? And who pays the price? becomes, in Iraq, a form of intellectual rebellion.

The irony is that Iraq has paid an enormous price for wars, more than almost any other country in the region over the past forty years. Yet the public discourse still treats war as if it were an inevitable fate, or a sacred mission that must not be questioned.

The moment someone dares to ask, Is this our war?, an entire chorus of voices rises to accuse them of cowardice, betrayal, or weakness.

Yet what is rarely said out loud is that a large part of this chorus is made up of militias that sell their rhetoric and positions to the highest bidder. In doing so, they reproduce the same narratives that keep Iraq permanently cast as a fighter in other people’s wars.

Iraq as a Battleground for Proxy Wars

Since 2003, Iraq has no longer been merely a state grappling with internal conflicts. It has gradually turned into a venue for settling scores. Major and regional powers found in the fragility of the Iraqi state an opportunity to manage their rivalries away from their own territories.

As a result, Iraq has become a crossroads where American and Iranian interests intersect, alongside Arab–Iranian rivalries and even broader international calculations. Each time a crisis erupts in the region, Iraq appears to be pulled automatically into it, without anyone asking whether this actually serves the interests of Iraqis.

The Question Is Not Only Moral, but Deeply Political

The question here is not merely moral. It is profoundly political: who decided that Iraq should be part of these wars? Was it the people? Was it the state? Or are they the armed groups that possess the power to impose decisions of war and peace outside the institutions of the state?

In many instances, the country turns into a space for exchanging military messages rather than a party that actually holds the authority to escalate or de-escalate. This reality exposes the fragility of Iraq’s position within the web of regional tensions, especially as its cities become targets for strikes from both sides of the conflict: American and Israeli forces on one side, and Iranian actors on the other.

The Politics of Fear and the Manufacturing of an Enemy

The easiest way to push an exhausted society toward war is to manufacture fear.

In Iraq, this tactic has been used repeatedly. The future is portrayed as an imminent catastrophe, and people are told that danger is approaching their doorsteps, that they must fight before it reaches them.

Iraqis are told, for instance, that Israel will one day dominate the Middle East and eventually reach their homes. Yet the irony is that this idea is not new to the Arab political imagination. It is a premise that entire generations have grown up with for more than seventy years.

Despite this, those generations have not succeeded in building a political, economic, or scientific project capable of confronting this supposed threat. Instead, the issue has often been transformed into a permanent slogan for mobilization and recruitment rather than a genuine project for liberation or resistance.

The greater paradox is that the same discourse warning Iraqis about Israel simultaneously calls on them to line up behind a battle led by Iran. This raises an even more sensitive question: if occupation is defined as a foreign power controlling the decisions of another state, how should one describe what Iran has done in more than one Arab country?

Iranian Influence: Between Support and Hegemony

In Yemen, Iran plays a clear role in supporting the Houthi movement both militarily and politically. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has evolved into a military force that surpasses the authority of the state.

In Syria, Iranian-backed militias participated in the war alongside the regime. In Iraq, meanwhile, Iranian influence has become embedded in the country’s political and security equations.

People may differ in how they assess this role. Some see it as support for the “axis of resistance,” while others view it as a form of regional expansion. What cannot be denied, however, is that this influence has reshaped the balance of power within several countries in the region and has directly affected their sovereignty and national decision-making.

The question therefore, appears legitimate: if we reject a potential occupation in the future, how should we deal with an influence that already exists in the present?

The Shift in Discourse After October 7

The events that began on October 7 pushed the region into a new phase of conflict. At first, the confrontation was framed as a battle for Palestine, a narrative that found broad sympathy across the Arab street.

Over time, however, the discourse began to shift. Instead of focusing on the Palestinian cause as a struggle for national liberation, some platforms began moving toward an explicitly sectarian rhetoric that included daily incitement, insults directed at Arabs, and sectarian mobilization that extended far beyond Palestine itself.

This is where the most dangerous transformation occurred. A cause that once united Arabs has, in some narratives, become a tool for sectarian division.

The Paradox of Sinwar and Iran

In this context, Mohammed al‑Mukhtar al‑Shinqiti, an associate professor of political ethics and the history of religions at Hamad Bin Khalifa University, offers a striking account based on private correspondence suggesting that Yahya Sinwar sought to draw Iran directly into the war. At the same time, however, he reportedly rejected the idea of turning Hamas into merely a shield for the project of Wilayat al-Faqih.

This paradox reveals the complexity of the regional landscape. Forces whose interests converge in confronting Israel do not necessarily agree on the political project that should shape the region.

In other words, even within what is often called the “axis of resistance,” there are hidden struggles over influence, leadership, and identity.

Iraq Between War and National Disorientation

Amid these dynamics, Iraq appears to be the country paying the highest price without truly holding the decision. The Iraqi state is still struggling to rebuild its institutions and reclaim its sovereignty after decades of wars, sanctions, and occupation.

Yet instead of focusing on the most important question, how do we build a nation? Public discourse often revolves around another one: how do we participate in other people’s wars?

As a result, the very idea of the state becomes blurred. Political boundaries are unclear, security decisions are not monopolized by the state, and the economy remains tied to the fluctuations of regional conflicts.

Under such conditions, the future becomes a constant source of anxiety for Iraqi citizens. Will they live in a stable country, or in a new battlefield every few years?

The Deferred Question

The issue may not simply be that Iraq faces external threats. All states face such challenges. The real problem is the absence of open debate about the country’s priorities.

Normal states constantly ask: What are our interests? What are the limits of our commitments? And when do we say that this is not our war?

In Iraq, however, the question seems perpetually postponed, because answering it could threaten an entire system of political, military, and economic forces that benefit from a state of permanent conflict.

What Does Iraq Need?

Iraq does not need more grand slogans. What it needs is a simple and clear national project: a state capable of protecting its borders, an economy that provides a dignified life for its citizens, and a foreign policy that places Iraqi interests first.

This does not mean abandoning Arab or humanitarian causes, foremost among them Palestine. Rather, it means approaching them with the rationality of a state, not the emotions of militias. Strong states support just causes, but they do not destroy themselves in wars over which they have no decision.

The central question in Iraq today is not only about identifying the enemy. It is also about who holds the power to determine the country’s path. Does that decision come from state institutions representing the public will, or is it shaped by power balances that see Iraq merely as part of a broader regional conflict?

As long as this question remains unanswered, Iraq will continue to risk finding itself once again at the center of a war it did not choose, paying the price with the blood of its people and the future of its generations.

In that sense, the seemingly simple question, Is this our war? may in fact be the most revolutionary question in Iraq today.