Since the fall of the Assad regime at the end of 2024, relations between Damascus and Suwayda have entered a steadily escalating path of political tension, alongside mounting pressure to dismantle Druze factions and hand over their weapons. After their first military confrontation in late April and early May, the two sides reached the “May 1 Agreement.” However, in the final week of June, the Transitional Administration proposed fundamental amendments to the agreement, which were rejected by the Druze spiritual leadership.
Following that, Damascus began preparing for a military operation intended to be swift and decisive, forcing Sweida’s Druze factions to yield to its authority.
This article examines the behind-the-scenes decision-making process for the “July Operation,” the preparations that preceded it, the armed forces mobilized for it, and the battle strategies that were adopted.
A Faltering Political Track
After a series of measures adopted by the Transitional Administration since Assad’s fall in December 2024—such as the Victory Conference, the appointment of a transitional government, the National Dialogue Conference, and the Constitutional Declaration—the rift between Damascus and Suwayda widened rapidly. By late March of that year, it appeared that Damascus had no serious political offer regarding equal citizenship, democracy, or participation in governance and decision-making. On the contrary, its demands were increasingly focused on the disarmament and dissolution of Druze factions, without providing any genuine political guarantees to allay Druze fears about the nature of the new authority, which carried a Salafi-jihadist background.
Meanwhile, the Transitional Administration viewed Sweida’s stance as an act of rebellion and refusal to join its project, a project dominated by former leaders of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. The administration repeatedly attempted to circumvent the local Druze community—whether by negotiating with non-Syrian Druze leaders, or by attempting to manufacture new leadership within the governorate that lacked any popular legitimacy.
Over time, the Transitional Administration seemed to conclude that containing Suwayda and the Druze communities in the Damascus countryside would only be possible through military means, especially after it became clear that the Druze spiritual authority, represented by Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, firmly rejected the state project that Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham sought to impose from above.
After incitement campaigns declaring Druze as heretics and traitors, in late April the Transitional Administration launched a military campaign against Druze communities in the Damascus countryside, in Jaramana, Sahnaya, and some villages north and west of Suwayda. These communities resisted through local factions. During the operation, the first agreement under fire was reached, known as the “May 1 Agreement.” It stipulated the activation of local security, police, and public safety forces within Suwayda governorate, drawn from the local population, while the state assumed responsibility for securing the Damascus–Suwayda highway.
The Transitional Administration, however, failed to implement any of the terms. It did not activate the judiciary, police, or public security forces inside the governorate, nor did it provide salaries, prepare headquarters, or distribute equipment and uniforms—according to local sources. Instead, the administration moved toward an alternative plan: pressuring the Druze into renegotiating under duress to surrender their weapons and dissolve their factions, while ensuring that part of the public security forces within the governorate would come from outside Sweida, by building a Druze counterweight against Sheikh al-Hijri.
This track also included turning the Damascus–Suwayda highway into a daily crisis, effectively imposing an intermittent siege on the governorate. The Masmiya checkpoint and the entire al-Mutalla area in rural Damascus—through which the road passes—were handed over to a public security force composed of Bedouin tribes from al-Lajat. The checkpoint committed various sectarian violations against Druze travelers, and the road was repeatedly cut by gunfire in al-Mutalla, causing deaths, injuries, arrests, and kidnappings.
At the same time, the Transitional Administration worked to dry up Suwayda’s financial resources and cut government spending on institutions. Suwayda’s governor, Mustafa Bakkour—appointed by the administration—abandoned the governorate on May 21, after armed local Druze stormed the governorate building demanding the release of one of their detainees in Damascus.
Since then, no expenditure orders for service institutions were signed by the governor, who had been paying these institutions from a personal account under his name via the Sham Cash application, according to local sources. The Executive Council of Suwayda was forced to convene in Damascus on June 18 to sign a backlog of decrees all at once, after Bakkour agreed to meet them.
In the last week of June, a delegation from the Transitional Administration led by Mustafa Bakkour visited Sheikh al-Hijri at his residence in the town of Qanawat, to propose new amendments to the May 1 Agreement. These included the demand that part of the public security forces in the governorate be drawn from non-Suwayda recruits within the security apparatus, and that Suwayda factions surrender their heavy weapons and dissolve their armed groups.
Sheikh al-Hijri regarded these demands as a reneging on the May 1 Agreement and rejected the new conditions outright.
Decision-Making and Operation Preparations
A private source explained to the writer that a meeting was held in Damascus, immediately after Bakkour’s visit to Qanawat. Present were the most senior political, security, and military officials in the Transitional Administration, along with the head of the Security Committee in Daraa, Abu al-Baraa (the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham security officer responsible for the Druze file), the security officer for Sweida governorate, Ahmad al-Dalati, and the governor of Suwayda.
The meeting concluded with a final decision to carry out a military-security operation in Sweida aimed at eliminating Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, imposing the authority of the Ministries of Interior and Defense and the security agencies over the governorate, confiscating weapons from the factions and dissolving them, and consolidating new military and security leaderships—some of them Druze collaborators—while rehabilitating certain Druze notables and politicians.
After the meeting, preparations began to create the right conditions for the operation. Al-Dalati and Abu al-Baraa moved to the rugged volcanic al-Lajat area between Suwayda and Daraa, inhabited by Bedouin tribes divided in loyalty between two branches: one tied to the Doukhi family, which includes a senior official in the current Syrian intelligence apparatus, and the other to the Baydar family, which includes the public security chief for southern al-Lajat. A conflict had recently broken out between the two branches over control of the Suwayda–Damascus highway, but mediation succeeded in uniting them, and large numbers of al-Lajat tribesmen were recruited into the ranks of Public Security. These men would later form a striking military bloc in the operation against Suwayda.
Sources familiar with the course of the operation noted that after success in al-Lajat, preparations began to ready Daraa’s “40th Division,” part of the Ministry of Defense and Public Security forces, for battle. Public Security in Daraa consists of two main blocs: the larger bloc, the more ideological and most mobilized to fight Druze as “apostates,” is made up of former displaced persons to Idlib who had refused the 2018 reconciliation agreement. The majority of these belong to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, with some former members of Khalid bin al-Walid Army, which pledged allegiance to ISIS in the Yarmouk Basin of Daraa. The second bloc, smaller in number, is made up of new recruits to Public Security, most of them young men driven primarily by economic motives, hoping to seize spoils from fighting.
Preparations did not stop with the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Public Security, and Intelligence. Other service ministries also coordinated, preparing to cut off electricity and water (a charge denied by the Ministry of Energy), impose electronic blackouts, and sever communications. These measures were tested on a partial scale during the first week of July, before being fully implemented during the operation’s execution from July 13–20.
Battlefronts
To storm Suwayda governorate, battlefronts were chosen, most of them advancing from eastern rural Daraa and the al-Lajat area toward northern Suwayda (al-Liwa region) and western Suwayda (al-Muqran al-Gharbi). The main assembly points for attacking forces were prepared in four locations: al-Lajat, the town of Busra al-Harir, the town of Umm Walad, and Kherbet Samar near Busra al-Sham.
From these, seven principal axes of advance were planned, branching into numerous secondary routes. All preparations for the battle were completed prior to July 13, the date of the first incursion into Suwayda’s western countryside.
First: Al-Lajat
The al-Lajat area was divided into two sectors, from which Public Security forces recruited from local Bedouin tribes launched their attacks.
Northern Sector: Forces gathered in the area of Housh al-Hammad, under the command of a leader believed to have previously belonged to the Islamic State (ISIS). From this sector, a main axis of advance was formed, pushing toward control of the villages of al-Soura al-Kabira, Khalakhala, Dhukayr, and on to Lahtha—covering the entire al-Liwa area north of Sweida governorate, along the Damascus–Suwayda highway.
On a secondary axis, these forces seized the villages of al-Haqf and al-Khalidiyah to the east. From Lahtha, the forces continued along the Damascus–Sweida road, taking al-Mutuna and al-Suwaymira, and reaching Umm al-Zaytoun north of the city of Shahba.
Supporting this axis was Damascus’ “70th Division” of the Ministry of Defense, which seized al-Safa, Qaa al-Banat, and Kherbet al-Ambashi in eastern Sweida countryside.
Southern Sector of al-Lajat: Public Security forces launched a main axis of advance through the plain separating northern and southern al-Lajat, capturing Dama and Majadil, while secondary routes led to the capture of Jrayn, Labin, and Haran, until reaching the village of Ariqa, which resisted and remained outside Public Security control despite being besieged for many days.
Second: Eastern Daraa Countryside
Public Security forces from Daraa, along with Daraa’s “40th Division” of the Ministry of Defense, advanced along multiple axes from the eastern countryside of Daraa.
The first axis originated from Busra al-Harir (east of Daraa) toward the village of al-Dour in Sweida. From there, it split into three sub-axes:
First sub-axis: capturing Ta’ara, Qrasa, and Najran.
Second sub-axis: capturing Samia, Sama al-Huneidat, and al-Tira.
Third sub-axis: pushing toward the town of al-Mazraa.
Al-Mazraa was adopted as an operational headquarters. From there, forces regrouped and launched two sub-axes: the first toward al-Majdal and Kafr al-Lahf, the second toward Raymah Hazim and Lagha, and from there to al-Omran roundabout in the city of Suwayda.
Also from eastern Daraa countryside, Public Security and the 40th Division advanced from Umm Walad on two routes, one seizing al-Tha’la, the other Knaakir. From these points, forces advanced on two axes directly into Suwayda city.
From southeastern Daraa as well, groups advanced from Kherbet Samar near Busra al-Sham toward al-Mujaymir, Ara, Rassas, and Sahwat Balatah. They briefly entered these villages before withdrawing, unlike other axes, which remain under their control to this day.
Another main battlefront involved fighters from Bedouin tribes of Suwayda governorate mobilized under the “Southern Tribes Assembly,” led by Syrian-Jordanian Sheikh Rakan al-Khudair. These forces operated in the villages of al-Mansura and al-Shaqrawiya, as well as the neighborhoods of al-Maqous, al-Mashourib, al-Haroubi, and Rajm al-Zaytoun around Suwayda city. Tribal forces shelled populated areas, including Suwayda city itself, with mortars and drones in an attempt to confuse and disperse Druze factions. For example, from al-Mashourib alone, 140 mortar shells and 18 suicide drones were launched at Qanawat village, according to observers of the battle.
Additional Participating Forces
Sources following the course of the operations reported that, alongside the 40th and 70th Divisions and Public Security, numerous other forces joined the operation to carry out specific missions. These included: the Red Bands (elite forces of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham), Harith Brigade, Special Tasks Forces, the Republican Guard, the Second Brigade, al-Amshat, and the 76th Division.
Observers also recorded significant participation on July 14 by forces from the 44th, 52nd, and 62nd Divisions. On the morning of July 16, as the tide turned and Sweida’s local factions and popular resistance shifted from absorbing the initial shock to counter-offensives, the Transitional Administration brought in reinforcements that included “foreigners,” among them Turkmen forces.
By midday July 16, following Israeli strikes on the General Staff headquarters and on some of the attacking convoys, the Transitional Administration was forced to accept the ceasefire proposed by the U.S. envoy to Syria, and to alter its strategy—pulling back Defense and Interior Ministry forces to the rear lines and pushing tribal forces forward into the clashes.
These tribal reinforcements were mobilized through emergency call networks orchestrated by senior security and military officials. Alongside them, groups from the Ministry of Defense’s “80th Division” entered, composed of a large bloc of former jihadists, known for previously posting videos of their “heroes marching toward the Syrian coast.”
A Complex Maneuver
The military operation reveals that its objectives were mixed: combining the desire for total decisive control with the aim of imposing coerced negotiations. The assault was preceded by political, administrative, and economic groundwork: drying up public spending, disrupting the Damascus–Suwayda highway, and then attempting to amend an existing agreement to extract concessions regarding the composition of local Public Security forces, the surrender of heavy weapons, and the dismantling of local factions.
The structure of the attacking force shows heavy reliance on tribal blocs from al-Lajat, alongside more hardline elements, with prominent roles played by units that included jihadists and foreigners. This reliance gave the operation a shocking momentum, especially in the early days, when multiple axes from al-Lajat and eastern Daraa advanced simultaneously. The tactic of concurrent battlefronts achieved rapid breakthroughs in Suwayda’s northern and western countryside. To this day, Public Security and tribal forces still hold most of those areas, preventing displaced residents from returning.
From a planning perspective, the operation appears to have been a highly complex, multi-layered maneuver—professionally designed and costly in both human and logistical terms. Its phases unfolded gradually: preparing the environment, unifying and assembling fighting blocs in defined staging areas, distributing roles across ministries and state agencies, and culminating in electronic blackouts that reduced the enemy’s response capacity. This structure points to a joint command center capable of coordinating multiple axes and firepower, synchronizing them in a single operational timeframe, with fallback positions and alternative scenarios ready.
The use of multiple axes was intended to fragment defenses, creating gaps into which shock units could rapidly advance, leaving behind holding forces to consolidate. At the turning point on July 16, the flexible dimension of the plan became evident. The Israeli airstrike on Damascus forced an immediate adjustment: regular army forces were pulled back to the rear, and tribal forces were pushed forward to the frontlines—reducing the political and military risks to the core force, while maintaining enough pressure on the ground to continue “negotiation by fire.”
This rapid shift confirms that the operation was designed with alternative scenarios in mind, and that Damascus’s leadership possessed temporal and spatial margins of maneuver that allowed it to rotate roles between multiple axes and forces without losing sight of the central objective. In other words, the operation was built on a calculated sequence: indirect preparation, multi-front breakthroughs, and the capacity to change tempo whenever necessary.
