Lebanon is facing a critical crisis as the Israeli war continues, amid growing domestic and international pressure to disarm Hezbollah and place weapons solely under the control of the Lebanese Army. The pressure has escalated to the point of sparking mutual campaigns centered on the army and its role, particularly after U.S. criticism of Army Commander General Rodolphe Haykal.
The criticism has also extended internally, where several voices, especially figures aligned with the so-called “sovereigntist” camp, have raised concerns about what they see as the army’s lack of initiative and its inability to take decisive action.
The latest development concerns reports of deepening tensions between Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and Army Commander General Rodolphe Haykal, reflected in statements made by MPs close to Salam and other political figures.
According to sources close to Salam, the prime minister is seeking to halt the war and engage in serious negotiations that would prevent further destruction and casualties, while fulfilling the promise in his ministerial statement to disarm Hezbollah and place all weapons under the authority of the Lebanese state, namely the army. By contrast, the army commander recognizes that carrying out such a task under current circumstances is nearly impossible, as suggested by several of his recent positions.
Salam is attempting to send a message to the international community that the Lebanese state will assert control over weapons and over the decision of war and peace, and that it is the legitimate party authorized to negotiate the country’s future. However, the army leadership appears more focused on preventing a slide into internal conflict and less willing to bear the cost of a direct confrontation with Hezbollah under the current balance of power.
Meanwhile, President Joseph Aoun adopted a sharper tone in defending the army and its commander. During a visit to the Ministry of Defense amid the campaign targeting the army, he said the visit was intended to express “full solidarity with the army and its leadership and to reject campaigns that target them or question their patriotism.” He stressed that the army “is not a party to political disputes” and warned against turning it into “a subject of internal political quarrels,” noting that “the strength of the state begins with the strength of its institutions, foremost among them the army.”
Earlier this week, Aoun described Hezbollah as “an armed group operating outside the state that shows no regard for Lebanon’s interests or the lives of its people,” arguing that those who launched the rockets “sought to bargain away the fall of the Lebanese state in favor of the Iranian regime.”
On the other side, the rhetoric of Mohammad Raad, head of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc Loyalty to the Resistance, was equally escalatory. He said that “Lebanon today is not faced with a choice between war and peace, as some claim, but between war and surrender to the humiliating conditions the enemy seeks to impose on the government, the country, and its people.”
Earlier this week, Aoun described Hezbollah as “an armed group operating outside the state that shows no regard for Lebanon’s interests or the lives of its people,” arguing that those who launched the rockets “sought to bargain away the fall of the Lebanese state in favor of the Iranian regime.”
On the other side, the rhetoric of Mohammad Raad, head of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc Loyalty to the Resistance, was equally escalatory. He said that “Lebanon today is not faced with a choice between war and peace, as some claim, but between war and surrender to the humiliating conditions the enemy seeks to impose on the government, the country, and its people.”
Assigning the Army the Monopoly on Weapons
Why does the army appear today as a central pillar of any solution amid the catastrophic war on Lebanon?
The story begins with Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, when the Lebanese state and army were expected to assert full authority over Lebanese territory, particularly by ensuring that weapons remained exclusively in the hands of the state. That did not happen, however, due to Syrian and Iranian influence through Hezbollah, which consolidated the formula then known as the “Army, People, and Resistance.” This reality expanded the presence of an armed force operating outside the framework of the state.
At the time, the Lebanese Army had limited capabilities and was unable to engage in an internal confrontation to settle the issue of exclusive control over weapons, which could have threatened civil peace or reignited the civil war. As a result, an unwritten arrangement emerged based on an informal division of roles between the army and the “resistance.”
A unique Lebanese reality thus took shape: a state with an official army that simultaneously coexists with a parallel military force that in some areas exceeds the army’s capabilities and often wields considerable influence over security decisions. Since 2000, the same question has repeatedly surfaced: can the Lebanese Army truly monopolize weapons, or does the regional and domestic balance of power still prevent that? In practice, the regional balance of power long prevented such a shift, until the so-called “support war,” its catastrophic repercussions, and the ongoing war today.
In the latest ministerial statement delivered by Salam, the Lebanese government announced a ban on Hezbollah’s military and security activities, describing it as an organization operating outside the law. The statement linked this decision to the principle of placing weapons exclusively under state authority and reinforcing full sovereignty over Lebanese territory. Aoun reiterated this point earlier this week, while Salam also stressed that “the decision of war and peace rests solely with the state,” and that any military or security activity launched from Lebanese territory outside legitimate state institutions is “completely unacceptable.”
In practical terms, the government has asked all military and security agencies to take immediate measures to prevent the launch of rockets or drones, or the execution of military operations from Lebanese territory outside the authority of the state. This places the army at the forefront of implementing the decision to disarm and to control the southern front at the same time.
Sami Halabi, policy director at the Alternative Policy Institute, told Daraj that the core of the problem lies in the gap between the political mandate and the army’s actual capacity to implement it. “The prime minister is acting politically, but implementation requires someone to carry it out on the ground,” he said. “Here the army comes in, but its position is well known: it does not possess the political decision-making power nor sufficient capabilities. In practice, what is being required is the removal of weapons from people’s homes. If things reach that level, the army’s task becomes nearly impossible, because there is no army truly equipped for such a mission.”
In the same context, retired Brigadier General Naji Malaeb told Daraj that the government “has taken the bold decisions expected of it,” noting that “everyone domestically and internationally had been calling for the army to be officially tasked with this mission.” At the same time, he emphasized that the military institution “has already carried out enormous tasks in southern Lebanon, not only military duties but also civil defense work, reopening roads, and protecting civilians.” He pointed to the destruction of dozens of tunnels and the confiscation of hundreds of thousands of weapons and ammunition south of the Litani River.
“It is impossible to ask the army to implement a decision to disarm Hezbollah while military operations and Israeli attacks are ongoing,” he said. “Today Lebanese diplomacy must become more effective and reach a result, at the very least a cessation of hostilities. If hostilities stop, there will be no justification for the army to take such action, because the government’s decision was clear: the civil war is behind us, and no one is threatening us with it anymore.”
Salam–Haykal Dispute and the Limits of Change
The disagreement between Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and Army Commander General Rodolphe Haykal is no longer a behind-the-scenes detail. According to converging reports, including those aired by the Lebanese channel Al-Jadeed, no official request has yet reached Beirut to dismiss the army commander. However, international dissatisfaction has reportedly been recorded regarding the performance of the military institution and the statements made by Haykal. Despite this, there appears to be no current will to remove him while Lebanon remains at war, as decision-makers prefer to avoid any shock at the top of the military establishment.
Behind the scenes, the names of Intelligence Director Brigadier General Tony Kahwaji and Operations Director Brigadier General Georges Rizkallah are being circulated as possible successors to Haykal, should politicians decide to open the leadership file. For now, however, President Joseph Aoun remains committed to Haykal’s position and continues to support him, considering any targeting of the military institution at this moment a blow to what remains of the state’s cohesion.
During his visit to the Ministry of Defense and the army command in Yarzeh, Aoun stressed that “the army is a national institution that serves the interests of Lebanon and the Lebanese,” adding that the campaigns targeting the army and its commander “will not affect its performance.” He warned that “if the army is shaken, the entire nation will be put at risk,” affirming that he would stand “as a solid barrier against any attempt to undermine this military institution and its leadership.” For his part, Haykal reiterated the army’s commitment to its role in protecting internal stability and preventing internal strife.
Continuing his analysis, Sami Halabi argues that the army’s natural role is “to defend the country against aggression,” but that the government’s decision places it “before a fait accompli.” In his view, what is being asked of the army today is effectively “to take on the task of disarming Hezbollah,” even though “Hezbollah’s weapons are currently facing the Israeli soldier on the ground.” He added that “the party fills the vacuum, whether through weapons or by imposing a reality on the ground,” warning that “any attempt to strip it of this role without a genuine international umbrella would expose the army and the country to the risk of a wide internal explosion.”
Halabi asks: “Today we are told the army must assume its role, but it is also forbidden from being used against Israel. So whom exactly is it supposed to confront?” He concludes that exiting this equation “requires a major international decision and a genuine national defense strategy, not fleeting political slogans.”
For his part, Malaeb explains that “the growing international interest in the Lebanese Army is not accidental,” citing statements by former U.S. officials, such as envoy Tom Barrack, who have argued that “Israel will not be able to disarm Hezbollah.” He adds: “As military professionals, we know that air power alone does not end a battle.”
Nevertheless, Malaeb notes that the army’s mission will remain “nearly impossible unless its tasks are facilitated through a ceasefire.” As long as what he describes as “the constant rampage in Lebanon’s skies” continues, the army’s movement on the ground remains constrained, even if the institution is ready to face difficult confrontations, provided it holds a political “mandate” enabling it to act.
The Risk of Civil War and the Army’s Attrition
Fears of a new civil war are not unfounded. Halabi explains that “Hezbollah remains a key military actor, and any direct attempt to weaken it or reduce its role could be perceived as an existential threat,” particularly after large segments of its support base have rallied around it during the war.
In this climate, the army’s task, according to Halabi, becomes “separating people from one another rather than confronting Hezbollah.” Instead of acting as an institution regulating weapons, it risks turning into a fragile social safety valve, exhausted in managing tensions in the streets rather than enforcing the authority of the state.
Historically, the Lebanese Army experienced serious divisions during the civil war. However, Halabi notes that this does not mean “the same fate is inevitable today.” No serious political actor in Lebanon has an interest in the army’s fragmentation. Yet keeping it without a strategic vision and without the capacity to play an integrated role in defending the country’s borders leaves it trapped between external pressure and internal political exploitation.
Caught between the mandate to disarm Hezbollah on one hand and the fear of civil war on the other, the Lebanese Army finds itself facing an equation that cannot be solved through rhetoric alone. Salam promises that weapons will be placed exclusively under state control, while Haykal is acutely aware of the fragility of internal peace and the many challenges facing the military institution he leads.
Whether Haykal remains in his position or is replaced in the future, the problem clearly runs deeper than individuals. What is needed, Halabi argues, is “a genuine national defense strategy that draws on all available sources of strength, including Lebanon’s Arab and international relations,” along with long-term reforms that redefine the army’s place within the political and security system. Otherwise, the army risks remaining merely an instrument for containing social crises, a mailbox for international pressure, or a façade for political decisions that the authorities themselves lack the will to implement.
