As Israel continues its airstrikes on southern villages and areas in the Bekaa, the seventeenth meeting of the “Mechanism” committee has been postponed since its reactivation in its current form following the ceasefire agreement of November 2024.
This suspension, for which no official reason has been given, is the most significant since the committee’s representation was expanded to include civilian figures, represented on the Lebanese side by former ambassador Simon Karam.
Talk is currently circulating about a new meeting date at the end of February, but nothing is guaranteed amid continued Israeli pressure on the ground and strained relations among the major Western parties represented in the committee, including divergences between the United States and Israel on one hand, and France on the other.
Amid diverging Lebanese positions and shifts in the regional and international landscape, some argue that the Naqoura table no longer satisfies the Israeli side, which is seeking to transform the Mechanism from a security implementation tool into a platform of pressure aimed at pushing Lebanon toward negotiating tracks that may go beyond the security framework, while residents of southern villages remain under fire.
But has the committee’s role truly been suspended in line with messages conveyed to Beirut by U.S. envoy Thomas Barrack and U.S. President Donald Trump, pointing toward the Damascus track?
Diplomatic sources suggest that matters are heading toward an escalation of negotiations, particularly as vital issues are now on the table related to a border economic zone. Lebanon has insisted that any such discussion be linked to the return of residents to border villages, a position it has clearly communicated to both the American and Israeli sides.
Yet with imbalances of power and shifting U.S. policies and global alliances, how will Lebanon be affected? And what path will developments in the south take?
Between Postponement and Israeli Leverage
Journalist and political analyst Daoud Rammal argues that “it is inaccurate to speak of a suspension of the Mechanism’s work,” explaining that “the postponement of its meetings is linked solely to the absence of the committee’s chair, U.S. General Joseph Clearfield.”
He notes that Clearfield’s absence is due to two factors: first, regional developments and the potential escalation toward Iran; and second, the Lebanese Army’s announcement that it has completed its mission south of the Litani River, except for the five points still occupied by Israel. According to available information, Rammal says, the committee’s first session will be held next month, following Army Commander General Rodolphe Haykal’s anticipated visit to Washington on February 2–3 and a government meeting at which Haykal will present his plan related to areas north of the Litani.
Rammal stresses that the real issue is not the committee’s temporary absence, but rather the divergence between Hezbollah’s position and that of the Lebanese state. “Hezbollah considers that the committee’s mandate ended with the completion of the issue of restricting weapons south of the Litani, and that it has no authority north of the river,” he says. “The Lebanese state, by contrast, sees the Mechanism as the primary guarantor after the end of UNIFIL’s mandate, especially since UNIFIL has no authority north of the Litani. This means the committee would effectively assume the role played by peacekeeping forces south of the river since the ceasefire agreement.”
Rammal warns that Israel may exploit this divergence, arguing that “its interest lies in portraying the obstruction of the Mechanism as stemming from a Lebanese position rather than an Israeli one, at a time when it is seeking to impose new military realities north of the Litani and push for additional demands.” Among these, he notes, is the proposal previously put forward by U.S. envoy Thomas Barrack, based on adopting the Syrian model: bypassing the Mechanism and its Naqoura meetings in favor of direct talks between Lebanon and Israel outside Lebanon, under exclusive U.S. sponsorship.
From a Control Mechanism to a Grey Zone
Military and strategic expert Brigadier General Hassan Jouni told Daraj that “Israel no longer accepts the Mechanism and is seeking political communication at the ministerial level outside its mandate, which is limited to implementing Resolution 1701, with some additions stipulated in the agreement signed on November 27, 2024.”
Jouni explains that Israel views the outcomes of the recent war, the tightening of pressure on Hezbollah, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, and Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency as “a valuable opportunity to secure broader political gains beyond the November 2024 agreement, which no longer reflects the new balance of power.”
By contrast, Jouni says, “the Mechanism’s work in its current form remains confined to security matters, particularly in southern Lebanon, and has no connection to politics or political relations between Lebanon and Israel.”
The Mechanism initially operated as a tripartite committee composed of Lebanon, Israel, and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). It emerged from UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the July 2006 war, and functioned under the resolution until its work was suspended on October 8, 2023, following the expansion of the war from Gaza to southern Lebanon.
The ceasefire agreement of November 27, 2024 expanded the Mechanism’s mandate and reconstituted it as a five-member committee by adding France, with the United States assuming the chair, according to Jouni.
In addition to assisting in the implementation of Resolution 1701, the five-member committee’s tasks include overseeing the ceasefire agreement, ensuring Israel’s withdrawal from all Lebanese territory, monitoring disarmament starting south of the Litani, verifying the dismantling of Hezbollah’s infrastructure in those areas by the Lebanese Army, receiving complaints from both sides regarding violations, and working to address them in coordination with all parties.
However, under Israeli military pressure and U.S. political backing, the Mechanism entered a new phase with the appointment of former Lebanese ambassador Simon Karam as head of the Lebanese delegation, and Israel’s representation by National Security Council Deputy Head Yossi Dreznin. “This development gave the Mechanism a different dimension,” Jouni says, “but the negotiating agenda itself remained ambiguous.”
Jouni argues that Israel has effectively prevented the Mechanism from carrying out its duties. The Lebanese Army noted in a statement that “the continuation of Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory, the occupation of several sites within it, and the establishment of buffer zones restricting access to certain areas negatively affect the completion of required tasks, and consequently the extension of state authority and the exclusive control of weapons by the Lebanese armed forces.”
Jouni describes the situation as follows: “Israel is leaping over the committee to push Lebanon toward negotiations that may begin at a minimum as a security arrangement, or a political agreement enshrining a truce similar to that signed in 1949, and at their highest ceiling could reach a peace treaty.” He adds: “Israel does not want areas it considers hostile, but rather a state committed to a condition of peace and economic exchange.”
In this context, Rammal notes that “Israel does not want to establish a competing economic zone, but is instead seeking economic cooperation in the energy sector.” In the event of gas discoveries in Lebanese waters, Israel, he says, aims “to link Lebanese gas to the Israeli-European pipeline rather than the Turkish-Syrian one, ensuring its integration into Europe’s energy supply network controlled by Tel Aviv.”
The Negotiation Dilemma: Vague Headlines and Elastic Terms
Since the signing of the ceasefire agreement in November 2024, its provisions and the boundaries of its implementation have remained unclear. This ambiguity, combined with contradictory statements by the parties to the conflict — the Lebanese state, Israel, and Hezbollah as a non-state armed actor — has produced three core dilemmas in the negotiation process, according to Jouni.
The first concerns the geographical scope of Resolution 1701: whether it applies only south of the Litani or across all Lebanese territory. This remains a point of internal Lebanese dispute and contention between Lebanon and Israel. Jouni explains that “Resolution 1701 and the latest agreement deliberately avoided a clear determination, relying instead on elastic language.” The agreement, he notes, stipulates that the Lebanese state and army are to restrict weapons and dismantle Hezbollah’s infrastructure starting south of the Litani, without specifying a clear timeline or final geographical scope, opening the door to conflicting interpretations.
The second dilemma relates to the very nature of the negotiations, which the Lebanese side has kept deliberately ambiguous, particularly through divergent positions among the three presidencies. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam used the phrase “negotiations have gone beyond the military,” without clarifying whether this implies a political or economic track. President Joseph Aoun justified the expansion of the Mechanism by including Ambassador Simon Karam as a means of “sparing Lebanon another war,” suggesting the possibility of going beyond a purely military framework. Meanwhile, Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri insisted on keeping negotiations confined to the security and military spheres.
By contrast, following the committee’s meeting in December, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office announced that the meeting had discussed “ways to enhance economic projects.”
The third dilemma, according to Jouni, concerns disarmament. While it enjoys broad support among Lebanese as a cornerstone of sovereignty and state authority, Hezbollah views it differently, arguing that disarmament weakens the state in the face of Israel.
In light of these dynamics, the central question remains: will the committee return to the Naqoura table in its original role and succeed in addressing the fragility of the ceasefire agreement, or will both the table and the track be replaced altogether, at a moment when regional and international rules are being redrawn by force rather than law?
