Lebanon woke up today on the edge of a war it did not declare — and does not want.

In his press conference Monday, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam stated that the Cabinet had decided to prohibit any security or military activity by Hezbollah and confine its role to political work. He declared that no military operations should be launched from Lebanese territory outside legitimate state institutions and instructed security agencies to prevent such attacks. Salam also said his government is prepared to resume negotiations with Israel and asked the army to begin implementing its plan north of the Litani.

This is the clearest position adopted so far by Salam’s government. Whether it will be enough to halt Israeli military escalation remains uncertain.

At dawn on Sunday, missiles were launched from its territory. Across the country, many Lebanese initially assumed it could not be Hizbullah. For months since the ceasefire, the party had refrained from responding to repeated Israeli violations in the south. People expected clarification — perhaps even denial.

Instead, the statement arrived, clear and unambiguous.

Hizbullah confirmed the missiles were fired in revenge for Ayatollah Khamenei.

That is not a minor detail. It means the action was framed not as defense of Lebanon, but as participation in a wider regional confrontation.

Israel’s response was swift and severe. The southern suburb of Beirut was hit heavily. Strikes extended across Beirut, the south, and the Bekaa. Residents said the explosions echoed the day Nasrallah was killed. The first attack came without warning, leaving more than 40 dead and dozens injured. Evacuation warnings followed. Residents of more than twenty villages in southern Lebanon were told to leave their homes and move at least 1,000 meters away. Families fled in pajamas. Thousands slept in their cars with their children.

This is not abstract geopolitics. It is lived trauma — revived. And it may only be the beginning.

Israeli officials have said a ground invasion is “not yet” on the table but have warned that Lebanon will bear responsibility unless the state acts decisively. Calls are already circulating demanding that the Lebanese government designate Hizbullah a terrorist organization or face consequences.

This is where the risk of miscalculation deepens.

Lebanon now risks being pulled into a war of labels at precisely the wrong moment.

The recent visit of the Lebanese Army commander to Washington is instructive. By most accounts, the meetings were substantive and serious, focused on stability, coordination, and preventing escalation. But what dominated headlines was the public exchange with Senator Lindsey Graham, who pressed the commander to declare whether he considers Hizbullah a terrorist organization. Optics eclipsed substance.

Whether the United States designates Hizbullah a terrorist organization is not new. That position has been consistent for decades. But demanding that Lebanon center its response today around terminology risks missing the strategic point entirely.

Sovereignty is not established through adjectives. It is established through authority.

The Lebanese government’s priority must be clear and unambiguous: protect Lebanon and protect the Lebanese people — all of them.

Technically and politically, designating Hizbullah a terrorist organization is not a simple act. Hizbullah holds seats in parliament and is represented in government. A blanket designation would reverberate through state institutions and destabilize an already fragile political structure.

But the deeper risk is societal.

Lebanon carries the memory of civil war in its recent history. Even if Hizbullah’s popularity has eroded within parts of the Shia community, it would be politically reckless to push a third of the population into feeling collectively targeted or excluded.

The Shia community constitutes roughly a third of Lebanon’s population. It is not an appendage. It is a central social and cultural pillar of the country. Today, many of the displaced families sleeping in cars are from that very community. They are not proxies. They are citizens.

For more than a year, Israel has repeatedly violated the ceasefire in southern Lebanon. Civilians have been killed. During much of that period, Hizbullah did not escalate proportionally. On the contrary, it largely refrained from responding.

Yesterday marked a shift. The missiles were explicitly framed as revenge for a foreign leader.

That is precisely why this moment demands clarity from the Lebanese state.

Lebanon does not need to call Hizbullah anything today. The facts are visible. When rockets are launched in retaliation for events beyond Lebanon’s borders, the question is no longer semantic. It is constitutional. Who decides war and peace in Lebanon? And for what purpose? And in service of whose agenda?

The answers are now painfully clear.

The government’s responsibility is not to win rhetorical battles abroad. It is to assert exclusive authority over decisions that determine whether its citizens live in safety or in permanent vulnerability.

This is not only the task of the prime minister. It is the responsibility of the president, the army commander, and the speaker of parliament. The response must come from all of them — in action. Sovereignty cannot be selective.

Lebanon cannot afford to become a platform for regional revenge. It cannot drift into confrontation because others choose escalation.

Most importantly, Lebanon cannot allow its narrative to be shaped by external voices. In an interview with Fox News, Senator Lindsey Graham compared Hizbullah to someone who boarded the Titanic after watching the film. The metaphor is powerful — but misapplied.

This is not a moment for theatrical blame. It is a moment for strategic clarity.

Asking Lebanon now to prioritize terminology over authority risks distracting from the immediate task: preventing the country from being dragged into a regional conflagration.

The priority is not naming the iceberg. It is steering away from it. The lifeboat is not a word. It is state authority.

Lebanon does not need a new vocabulary. It needs the state to act like a state.

That means confirming, clearly and without ambiguity, that decisions of war and peace belong exclusively to the institutions of the Republic. That means reaffirming that weapons belong in the hands of the state alone. That means prioritizing the safety of Lebanese civilians over alignment with any regional axis. This is a rare and dangerous moment — but also an opportunity.

An opportunity for the Lebanese state to live up to its responsibilities.

An opportunity to demonstrate that sovereignty is not a slogan.

Because in the end, leadership is not measured by how loudly it names an adversary.

It is measured by whether Lebanese children sleep tonight in their homes — or in their cars. 

And that is the responsibility of the state.