Following the results of the fourth and final round of municipal elections in Lebanon, a friend told me: “The results from all four rounds indicate that we were out of touch with reality.” And since people don’t usually lash themselves the way our friend did, we must at least acknowledge the ruling system’s ability—not just to survive—but to outmatch us in forming alliances, identifying its interests, and taking its flexibility to shocking extremes.

While we naively assumed that this “flexibility” could be weaponized in our election campaigns, we failed to realize that we are driven by values that cannot be translated into ballots.

Yes, the alliance between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces in the Beirut municipality reveals the emptiness of both groups’ sectarian rhetoric. But who ever said that Hezbollah and the Lebanese Forces were competing over two distinct projects each trying to win over the other’s audience?

The Lebanese Forces mobilized voters based on the principle of “the necessity of equal power-sharing,” while Hezbollah mobilized to protect Shiite seats and prove that its capacity to rally supporters had not been shaken by the war. The goals of each party are not problematic for the other—hence, they allied in Beirut, and clashed elsewhere for the same reasons.

We did not possess what these two groups had in terms of mobilizing power. We had nothing to say to the two voting blocs that the rival parties dragged to the ballot boxes. We may criticize their sectarian inclinations, but that’s not something we can turn into electoral capital, and they, in turn, don’t deny the very things we accuse them of.

The ruling establishment won across Lebanon, not just in Beirut. It has the ability to shed its skin and adapt: It took on a “sovereigntist” face in Zahle; in Nabatiyeh and Tyre, it conveyed messages about Hezbollah’s weapons; and in Jezzine, it worked to reinforce the Free Patriotic Movement despite the damage and defections it has faced. The system is powerful, professional, and flexible; whereas we appeared as amateurs, fractured and disorganized, overly cautious about forging the temporary alliances necessary to signal a viable path for next year’s parliamentary elections.

There is nothing new in the projects of the winners. Hezbollah clings to the issue of its weapons; the shy reappearance of the Future Movement in Beirut and Sidon serves only to signal its continued presence should the Saudi stick be lowered. The Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement are locked in battles over Christian representation. Meanwhile, the daily suffering of the Lebanese people lies far outside the concerns of the factions that won the elections.

The concerns that transcend primary sectarian loyalties found no one to represent them in the electoral process. The depositors, the victims of the port explosion, the residents of destroyed border villages, not to mention the rampant corruption ravaging public institutions—all of these issues lost in the municipal elections. And we must have the courage to say: we failed to represent them in this electoral milestone. Sectarian distress outweighed civic distress. The ruling establishment prevailed, even after suffering a few bruises.

The municipal elections offer a major lesson: the establishment is not all-powerful, and the 2022 parliamentary elections proved that.

But the establishment learned from 2022. The experience of independent MPs in parliament made the task of the ruling parties more difficult. That’s why eliminating the phenomenon of independent MPs has become a necessity for these parties. Parliament looked entirely different with their presence. The smear campaign by MTV against them is a necessary prelude to this mission, and the municipal elections served as a trial by fire to begin sidelining them.

There is information about the grooming of alternative public figures that would limit the notion of “change” to the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons, while banks are reportedly funding the campaigns of the “new changemakers” now appearing on the same TV station and in the newspaper it owns.

We’ve heard a lot of talk about the need for painful decisions, the search for new faces, and realism in forming alliances that might allow for competition or even victory. But before any of that, the task requires a different program: not one designed merely to forge alliances, but one that brings us back to some level of realism in confronting a scene the establishment has shaped from A to Z.

Ultimately, Hezbollah is fighting to defend a weapon that has neither function nor future, while its rivals in the establishment have nothing to offer but a narrative of hostility toward that same weapon—one that will soon rust.

Between these two voids, there may lie a chance to catch our breath.