Mona, one of those who left Al-Hol camp for the village of Al-Baghouz, where she originally lived, tells Daraj: “I am divorced and have three children with disabilities… The tent in Al-Hol didn’t protect us from the cold, heat, insects, skin diseases, and more, but Al-Baghouz now is like a ghost town. There are no services, no aid, and almost total destruction. There are no job opportunities, and I don’t even know where my house used to be—it’s just desert and barren land now.”
In 2019, Al-Baghouz, a village in the Deir ez-Zor countryside, witnessed the final battles between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Coalition Forces against what news agencies described as the “last pockets of ISIS.” During these battles, many civilians were evacuated to Al-Hol camp, which is controlled by the SDF. Now, as Mona returns to her village, she reflects: “Here in Al-Baghouz, things are even harder. Where will my children go? Who will they play with? They are isolated, and other children stay away from them.”
According to an administrative source within the camp, “The new group left for their original areas of residence, with their family and personal information processed, and all security procedures completed.” The source added that this wave only included families from Deir ez-Zor and its countryside, excluding those displaced from Raqqa and Hasakah. The returning families were supervised by local organizations and support programs like “Al-Furat” and “Al-Rashad,” funded by the U.S. State Department, which only cover the costs of the journey itself.
The source also noted that the return process was coordinated “in cooperation between the camp administration, the Deir ez-Zor Civil Council, and some local organizations. Those leaving took all their household belongings with them. Some of the returning families are relatives of former ISIS members, and the majority are women and children, with a few men among them.”
In April, 76 families left Al-Hol camp in Hasakah province in northeastern Syria, returning to their villages in Deir ez-Zor as part of a unified convoy of buses and trucks carrying household belongings, accompanied by internal security forces and the SDF.
“Exiled” Outside the Camp
The journey out of the camp was not easy. Shaima, a resident of Al-Bukamal who spent four years in Al-Hol with her children, described the trip to Daraj: “They brought in large trucks and piled us on top of each other, along with our belongings and luggage. For two days, we wandered through the desert. At night, we had to sleep in that desert, in complete darkness where you couldn’t even see your own hand. On top of that, there was the constant fear and terror—no one knows what you might encounter out there, a hyena, a bandit, or a gang. Then we finally reached Al-Baghouz. I can’t return to Al-Bukamal. My family won’t take me back, and my husband’s family won’t recognize my children.”
Shaima, who remains in Al-Baghouz, adds: “The scene here is overwhelming. Total destruction. A few houses took in some people, but others refused to let in those they called the ‘remnants of terrorism,’ who have now gone to unknown places. My children and I face constant bullying. I have become a servant to the demands and orders of the homeowners, carrying the stigma of being ‘camp people,’ even though life here is worse than in the camp. What I wish for is a small room for my children and me, and a job opportunity, but we need capacity-building and skills training. I feel like I am living in exile.”
Alia Mohammed, who also left Al-Hol for Al-Baghouz, laments the situation of her children: “My two sons should be in the third grade, and my daughter in the second. We left the camp, but my husband can’t work because of his disability. My children are isolated at home, as if they are autistic. The school is too far from the ruins we live in, and the neighborhood children mock and bully them, refusing to play with them. Our neighbors don’t greet us or visit us. I hope that some organizations will come and provide us with psychological and social support sessions and job opportunities.”
Alia concludes her conversation with Daraj, saying: “We survive on small bits of aid from those with a sense of compassion, but the stigma of being from the camp follows us everywhere.”
What About Those Who Left the Camp Earlier?
This is not the first time that groups have been allowed to leave Al-Hol camp for their original areas in Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and Tabqa. Since 2021, tribal leaders and community elders have been encouraging Syrian families wishing to leave the camp to return to their hometowns. According to documentation from the Conflict Resolution Committees and the Raqqa Bayn al-Jisrayn organization, there are more than 4,000 Syrian children outside the formal education system, deprived of their right to schooling. Of these, only 300 students have managed to return to education, either through child-focused organizations or schools, provided they have the necessary documentation, have not aged out of the system, or have not been pushed into the labor market from an early age.
Rufayda Al-Jazzah, a Deir ez-Zor native and employee at a civil organization working on issues related to displaced persons and refugees, told Daraj: “The situation of those who recently left the camp is not much different from those who left as early as 2021. The public perception hasn’t changed as much as it should have, and the organizations have failed to shift the entrenched stereotypes and fears surrounding these individuals. The local community still hasn’t reached the stage of fully accepting them, a sentiment that applies to those who left earlier and to the recent wave in April of this year.”
According to Al-Jazzah, “A large portion of families refuse to take their daughters back, fearing the perceived shame associated with their return. The vast majority refuse to acknowledge their grandchildren or daughters-in-law, with only a small minority willing to accept their return.”
This stark divide between the earlier and recent returnees is evident in the stories of Hussa, who left Al-Hol in 2021 at the request of tribal leaders, and Rabia, who recently left the camp. The two women were reunited in Al-Baghouz. Hussa told Daraj: “Years ago, we lived in the same neighborhood in Al-Mayadin. We fled as the fighting intensified and lost touch with each other. Our families forced us to marry foreign fighters, and we met again in Al-Baghouz. I was a widow, and my husband was injured, and then we were moved to Al-Hol camp.”
Rabia adds: “Hussa left with the support of the tribal elders, but I stayed behind. When I finally left and arrived in Al-Baghouz, I saw Hussa with her children. We embraced for a long time. Now we live together in a partially destroyed house, but we have no other choice. The families who forced us into these marriages now refuse to acknowledge us.”
Both women agree that life outside the camp can be even harsher than life inside. They explain: “Most people avoid greeting us or responding to our greetings. We face the struggles of daily life alone, and it is incredibly difficult. We have no work, no income, and not even a proper house for shelter.”
Tribal Initiatives in Need of Ongoing Support
In late 2021, a coalition of tribes from Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor formed the Conflict Resolution Committee to address the situation of families trapped in the camp who wish to return. In a conversation with Daraj, Amir Al-Khabour, a tribal leader from Raqqa and a member of the Conflict Resolution Committee, said their work focuses on “identifying non-material needs, resolving social issues faced by returning women and children, supporting their reintegration into local communities, addressing bullying, and helping them move past the traumas of war.”
Al-Khabour added that their efforts also include “integrating women into vocational training programs and other economic empowerment initiatives to help them enter the labor market, as well as supporting the reintegration of children into schools and society.”
However, Al-Khabour also noted the challenges his committee faces, including “obtaining personal identification documents, accessing basic services like bread and fuel, and navigating the patchy landscape of available healthcare in the region.”
Fawwaz Al-Ali, a resident of eastern rural Deir ez-Zor, explained that “these committees face many difficulties in providing the necessary support, whether for those who returned earlier or those who left the camp recently.” He said the main obstacles include the lingering suspicion that returnees were affiliated with, or supportive of, ISIS, making it difficult for them to be reintegrated into normal daily life, which has its own set of suffering and bitterness.
Al-Ali told Daraj: “I am torn. On the one hand, the husbands of these women often caused the widowing and orphaning of thousands, and the wives were often alongside them with their children. But on the other hand, what about the women who may have been forced into these marriages, or whose families married them off out of financial desperation? And what about the children, who are innocent and had no choice in this? How can I protect my own children if they interact with children exposed to extremist ideologies? Rejecting them is harsh, but accepting them is even harder. What are we supposed to do? And this concerns previous and current incoming waves of people.”
The Lasting Stigma of “Terrorism”
Four years ago, several civil organizations, including A Better Future for Tabqa, Oxygen Youth, Insaaf for Development, and Our Euphrates for Development, launched the “Among Your Own” campaign in October 2021 to help families returning from Al-Hol camp to their original communities in Raqqa and the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor.
Bashar Al-Karraf, the executive director of Oxygen Youth, told Daraj: “Most of the returning women and children live in rented houses or in homes offered by local residents, often incomplete structures lacking basic amenities. These are families led by women without any stable source of income, which affects their ability to reintegrate into their original communities and access education and essential services. They face significant social rejection due to their perceived association with ISIS.”
According to Fawwaz Al-Ali, “There is no difference between the situation of families that have come before and those that have come recently, they’re perhaps in quite similar situations.”
Al-Karraf outlined the services and goals provided by these organizations, saying: “We have worked to resolve conflicts and aimed to change the negative stereotypes surrounding these families, facilitate their reintegration into their original communities, and promote social acceptance. This includes establishing community integration centers, providing economic and vocational empowerment to help them enter the job market, and offering protection and psychosocial support. We also aim to reduce the protection risks they face and provide legal assistance for those without identification documents, particularly Syrian women married to foreign fighters. Additionally, we focus on literacy programs, as illiteracy is highly prevalent among these populations, especially their children.”
However, Fawwaz Al-Ali told Daraj: “Currently, there is no aid, no capacity building, and no job opportunities. The infrastructure in Al-Baghouz and other rural areas is destroyed and crushed. The suspension of support and funding from donors has severely reduced the role of civil society organizations in supporting the host communities, which were already unprepared and struggling with declining basic services, worsening living standards, deteriorating agriculture, and weakened education.”
Lawrence Al-Borsan, a leader from the Al-Walda tribe in Raqqa, called for a change in societal attitudes toward those returning from Al-Hol camp. Speaking to Daraj, he said: “Those who returned, both in the past and more recently, were often forced by circumstances to become tools of war. We must consider their psychological state, as they were coerced into adapting to the extremist group’s way of life, and their children were indoctrinated with these ideas. These people need rehabilitation and real solutions to their problems.”
Al-Borsan added: “While men who returned from Al-Hol have generally adapted and reintegrated more naturally, the biggest challenge for women is finding stable livelihoods and overcoming the lack of job opportunities, particularly those without any form of family support. Many have been forced to scavenge through garbage or work as cleaners to secure their daily sustenance. Despite the many sessions and programs offered by civil society organizations to support their reintegration, these efforts have often failed to produce the desired outcomes, falling short of providing meaningful and lasting support.”
