The Algerian regime, led by President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, continued its support for Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorial rule until the very last moments before his fall, standing by his claim of fighting “terrorist groups” that allegedly threatened Syria’s sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, security, and stability.

Algeria was one of the few regimes that expressed regret over the overthrow of the Syrian dictator. It remained silent for weeks regarding the changes in Syria before eventually reluctantly accepting the new reality and sending an envoy to Damascus to meet with the new leadership.

Fighters Within Assad’s Forces

Algerian Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf, after being received by Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, reaffirmed Algeria’s willingness to strengthen bilateral cooperation with Syria, particularly in the energy sector, trade, investment, and reconstruction. This echoed the same rhetoric heard from other Arab ministers who have recently visited Damascus.

However, it seems that the visit of President Tebboune’s special envoy to Damascus also touched on another sensitive issue of concern to the Algerian regime—the Algerian fighters in Syria. But this was not about those who joined the revolution against Assad; rather, it was about those who fought alongside his forces.

While there were some Algerian fighters who stood with the Syrian opposition, the Algerian government has never acknowledged them nor expressed any desire to have them return to the country—even if only to put them on trial. Instead, it seems keen to get rid of them altogether. In contrast, it sent a special envoy to discuss the fate of Algerian fighters who had fought for Assad.

With the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in early December, the issue of foreign fighters who had fought within his forces resurfaced—among them were Algerians. Reports indicated that Syrian opposition forces had surrounded approximately 500 Algerian fighters, along with fighters from the separatist Polisario Front, in the city of Aleppo.

Following the opposition’s full control over the city, armed groups managed to capture these fighters, detaining them in prisons to be held accountable and tried at a later stage, alongside other foreign combatants.

At the time, the Algerian authorities chose to remain silent regarding these reports. This silence stood in stark contrast to Algeria’s usual habit of responding to any accusations directed at it, yet in this case, it opted not to comment.

Al-Sharaa Refuses Extradition?

The Algerian envoy to Damascus discussed the future of bilateral relations between the two countries but focused primarily on the issue of fighters, according to media reports. He requested their extradition to Algeria, but the new Syrian leadership, under President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, rejected the request.

According to both local and international media reports, the Syrian president informed the Algerian official that his government refuses to hand over the Algerian fighters. Instead, they will stand trial alongside remnants of Assad’s regime forces, who were captured in recent military operations that led to the fall of the “Butcher of Damascus.”

Reports from previous years indicate that the issue of Algerian fighters within Assad’s forces first surfaced in 2015, as the fighting in Syria intensified. In May 2016, the Syrian army announced the death of the first Algerian who was fighting alongside Bashar al-Assad’s forces.

At the time, sources close to the Algerian pro-regime newspaper Echorouk confirmed the death of Hussein Ben Issa, also known as Abu Adi, in battles in Darayya, a town in the Damascus countryside that played a pivotal role in the early Syrian revolution against Assad’s rule.

Ben Issa was a member of the “Arab Nationalist Guard,” a militia led by Lebanese commander Asaad Hammoud, also known as “Hajj Dhu al-Fiqar.” This group fought alongside Assad’s forces, and Ben Issa participated in multiple battles against Syrian opposition factions.

Ben Issa was not the only Algerian fighting in these battles. Many other Algerians also joined Assad’s forces, and some were involved in massacres against unarmed civilians in Darayya and other Syrian cities.

Many Algerians transitioned from merely supporting Bashar al-Assad online and in the media to actively taking up arms, traveling to Syria to fight against civilians demanding political change and democratic transition. They were lured into joining pro-Assad militias, which operated under the banner of Arab nationalism.

The Arab Nationalist Guard” is composed of four battalions:

-The “Mohamed Brahmi Battalion,” named after the leader of the Tunisian “Popular Current” party, who was assassinated in 2013.

– The “Wadie Haddad Battalion,” named after the leader of external operations for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

– The “Haider Al-Amili Battalion,” named after Hussein Asaad Hammoud, a member of the Popular Committees and Links Union.

– The “Jules Jammal Battalion,” named after the Syrian officer who was killed in Egypt during the Tripartite Aggression.

Additionally, the militia includes hundreds of Arab fighters from different nationalities.

Since the beginning of the 2011 protests demanding Assad’s ouster, the regime has worked to bring in foreign mercenaries and form militias to suppress civilians, fighting alongside Syrian government forces and sectarian militias of various origins.

Despite reports from Syrian and international media that the new Syrian leadership refused to extradite Algerian fighters, the regime has remained silent on the matter, further confirming the credibility of these reports.

Iran and Polisario Fighters

According to reports, Algerian fighters were transported to Syria with the help of Iran, which maintains strong ties with the Algerian regime and with Polisario elements operating near the disputed Western Sahara region between Morocco and the Polisario Front.

Iranian intelligence played a key role in convincing a significant number of Algerians, particularly members of the Polisario Front, to join Assad’s forces and fight in his war against Syrian civilians.

Despite these mercenaries operating under the command of the Syrian army, they receive direct funding and support from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah leaders. They are also trained under their supervision, effectively turning them into a tool for Tehran to execute its agenda in Syria and the broader region.

The Algerian regime was fully aware that some Algerians had joined Assad’s forces, yet it did not oppose it. Both President Tebboune and his predecessor, the late Abdelaziz Bouteflika, were keen on ensuring the continuity of the Assad family’s rule, despite the numerous massacres committed against the Syrian people.

Western Sahara, the Gulf, and Syria

Algeria’s support for the Assad regime was not limited to sending fighters. It also provided economic, political, and diplomatic support, prioritizing the survival of Assad’s rule—even at the cost of the mass killing of Syrians, the destruction of cities and villages, and widespread devastation.

Algeria was one of the few Arab countries that maintained strong diplomatic ties with Bashar al-Assad’s regime in recent years. It also backed Syria’s return to the Arab League in 2023, after more than a decade of suspension.

Algeria’s support for the Assad regime is also driven by its opposition to the Gulf states that back Morocco. Algeria opposes anyone who supports Morocco in order to secure additional votes in favor of its stance on the Western Sahara issue.

Additionally, this support aligns with Algeria’s broader opposition to the Arab Spring. The Algerian regime views the fall of Assad as a victory for the Arab Spring, a success that could threaten the rule of Algeria’s military leadership. For this reason, supporting the “Butcher of Syria” with force was seen as necessary to protect its own power.

With the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Algeria has lost a strong ally in the Arab region. However, it is now looking to restructure its relations with the new leadership, hoping to maintain its old alliances despite the regime change. For Algeria, the priority is to avoid losing further leverage that could weaken its already fragile regional standing.