The Syrian Ministry of Interior announced that it had “foiled a large-scale terrorist plot” and “dismantled a cell affiliated with Hezbollah,” which, according to the ministry, had been planning to target five Syrian provinces and carry out a series of assassinations. The ministry stated that members of the cell had received training in Lebanon, including “the militia’s direct official in charge of the assassination file.” Ministry spokesperson Nour al-Din al-Baba said the cell had been under surveillance for three months and that some of its members were former officers in the Bashar al-Assad regime.
Several hours later, Hezbollah issued a statement denying any responsibility for or connection to the cell, adding yet another chapter of accusation and denial between the two sides to the long and evolving relationship between the party and the Syrian government. The latter continues to accuse Hezbollah, which, in turn, consistently denies responsibility each time without delay or omission, raising questions about the nature and dimensions of this new conflict.
The Collapse of the “Axis of Resistance”
Since Bashar al-Assad fled Syria, and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham came to power in Damascus, incorporating various “factions” into the Ministry of Defense, perceptions of the new relationship between Syria and Lebanon have largely revolved around two main issues. The first concerns Syrian refugees and their return, including detainees held in Roumieh Prison. The second concerns Hezbollah, which directly participated alongside Assad in the killing of Syrians.
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has repeatedly stated that Syria will remain neutral and will not engage in wars with neighboring countries. However, the status of Hezbollah as a militia operating outside the authority of the Lebanese state has left the matter unresolved, especially since security coordination visits between Syria and Lebanon have not addressed Hezbollah or those who participated in the fighting in Syria. Instead, discussions have focused solely on demands to hand over former Syrian regime figures hiding in Lebanon.
Hezbollah’s position following the “Support Front” war, the pager operation, and the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah has left the group in its weakest state since its founding, particularly after supply lines with Iran were cut following the fall of the Syrian regime. With the opening of a second support front against Israel in 2026, the party suffered successive blows at Israel’s hands, strikes that continue to this day.
What is striking, however, is the repeated discussion of Hezbollah in Syria: ongoing accusations from Syrian government security and military institutions alleging that the party continues to interfere in Syrian affairs. This interference is said to take the form of “weapons smuggling” and “sabotage operations,” as though Hezbollah has become a permanent “enemy” of the Syrian government, an enemy whose notorious history in Syria cannot be denied, yet whose presence persists even after the regime’s fall.
This hostility could also be observed in the incitement campaigns targeting Lebanese civilians fleeing the war into Syria. The rhetoric was explicit and, at times, openly vindictive, directed at Hezbollah and its “support base,” with growing calls to prevent them from entering Syria altogether.
It is impossible to absolve the party of its intervention in Syria, just as it is difficult to independently verify the Syrian government’s accusations, given that both sides suffer from a profound credibility crisis. What stands out, however, is the ongoing cycle of accusation and denial between them, alongside the Syrian government’s apparent effort to construct an “external enemy,” perhaps as part of a broader “counterterrorism” policy that also targets hardline Islamist groups, under which Hezbollah itself may now be categorized.
We are therefore facing a political discourse that seeks to redraw the boundaries between allies and enemies, consolidating Hezbollah as an “external enemy” with internal networks and influence. This aligns with the ambitions of the new Syrian government to tighten border control, sever the links of the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” and cut the supply routes between Iran and Hezbollah.
Targeting Tunnels and Supply Routes Between Syria and Lebanon
Securing the Syrian-Lebanese border after the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime became a major concern for the new Syrian government, which has consistently publicized official reports about raids on and closures of cross-border tunnels. Most recently this year, two tunnels were shut down in Al-Qusayr in Homs, an area known for the presence of Hezbollah fighters. Hours later, another tunnel was discovered, and reports of newly uncovered tunnels and government seizures continue to emerge periodically. These tunnels are described as routes used for smuggling “weapons and drugs.”
Yet the greatest threat to Hezbollah’s supply lines comes from Israel, which has not limited itself to targeting tunnels alone, but has also threatened official border crossings. Israel warned it could strike the Masnaa Border Crossing because Hezbollah was allegedly using it for military purposes. The same crossing had previously been bombed by Israel following Assad’s flight from Syria.
This suggests that the effort to control the border and isolate Hezbollah’s supply network is being carried out on the ground by the Syrian government, and from the air by the Israeli military. Perhaps this is one way to interpret the emerging “security coordination” between the two countries.
Border Clashes and Arrests Inside Syria
Less than a month before Bashar al-Assad fled Syria, the Israeli military announced that it had targeted a Hezbollah “intelligence unit” in Damascus. After Assad’s escape, and following one of the largest Israeli strikes on Syrian territory, discussion of Hezbollah briefly faded, while videos began circulating of Shiite fighters and civilians fleeing Syria out of fear of the new authorities and sectarian violence.
That violence indeed erupted along the Syrian coast, beginning with an ambush targeting General Security forces, in which dozens of Defense Ministry and General Security personnel were killed by armed groups loyal to Assad. What followed was a wave of exterminatory violence directed against Alawite communities along the Syrian coast.
Amid the incitement and sectarian atmosphere surrounding the coastal massacres, Hezbollah was accused of involvement in the attack against General Security forces. The party quickly denied any role, calling on media outlets “not to be dragged into disinformation campaigns.”
Hezbollah nevertheless continued to feature prominently in the Syrian context, particularly on the security and military fronts. The official Syrian news agency, Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), reported that Hezbollah had abducted three members of the Syrian Ministry of Defense near the Zaita Dam west of Homs and executed them in the field. The ministry vowed to “take all necessary measures following this dangerous escalation by the Hezbollah militia,” while Hezbollah denied responsibility for the incident. The three bodies were later handed over to the Syrian government.
The border clashes coincided with broader “security campaigns,” as the Syrian Ministry of Defense announced the arrest of a “cell affiliated with Hezbollah” in the Sayyida Zainab area near Damascus, accusing it of “planning criminal operations in the region.” This came amid clashes west of the city of Al-Qusayr involving Hezbollah fighters who later retreated toward Lebanon. The Syrian Ministry of Defense also seized ammunition allegedly belonging to them, especially as the Al-Qusayr area witnessed reciprocal shelling between Syrian forces and individuals the ministry identified as Hezbollah members. The escalation was eventually reduced in coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces.
Each time, however, Hezbollah denied the accusations leveled against it by the Syrian Ministry of Defense. In Homs, for example, authorities announced the arrest of a Hezbollah-linked cell accused of “attempting to carry out terrorist acts” using explosive devices, an allegation the party also denied. The same pattern repeated itself with another cell arrested in the Damascus countryside. At the time, the commander of Internal Security in Damascus announced the seizure of 19 Grad rockets and launch platforms, yet Hezbollah once again denied any connection to the group.
Accusations against Hezbollah are not limited to the Syrian Ministry of Defense. Israel has also claimed that the group maintains a presence in Quneitra, using this allegation to justify its military incursions, according to Quneitra Governor Mohammad al-Saeed, who insisted at the time that the area had been free of Hezbollah fighters since the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation.
The Israeli presence returned to the forefront following reports of a potential security agreement between Syria and Israel, with discussions focusing on intelligence-sharing and border security. As for Hezbollah, Ahmed al-Sharaa previously made remarks that angered many observers when he stated: “I forgive the wounds that Hezbollah inflicted on Syria.” He added, “Some portray us as terrorists and an existential threat, while others want to use the new Syria to settle scores with Hezbollah. We are neither this nor that.”
At the end of 2025, Brad Cooper, commander of the United States Central Command, congratulated the Syrian security forces for “recently intercepting multiple weapons shipments that were destined for the Lebanese Hezbollah.”
In 2026, Hezbollah Enters the War Once Again… and Syria Refuses to Intervene Once Again
The year 2026 began with Israeli strikes targeting border areas between Syria and Lebanon, which the Israeli military claimed were being used by Hezbollah for smuggling operations. The attacks also killed Mohammad Awda, who was reportedly overseeing “weapons transfers to Hezbollah through a front company that transported prohibited goods from various countries, including Iraq, Syria, and Gulf states.”
Later, the Syrian Ministry of Defense accused Hezbollah of targeting the Mezzeh district in Damascus with three shells, before announcing the arrest of a cell allegedly preparing to launch rockets from Daraya and Kafr Sousa. Hezbollah once again denied the accusations, insisting that it “has no activity, connection, or relationship with any party in Syria, and maintains no presence on Syrian territory.” The party added that it is “fully committed to Syria’s unity and the security of its people,” noting that “this position has long been declared and is not new.”
The position of the Syrian authorities has not changed. They have reiterated their support for the Lebanese state’s efforts to disarm Hezbollah, while also affirming that they would not target Hezbollah positions inside Lebanon despite the deployment of Syrian forces along the border. Although reports have suggested that the United States has pressured Syria to intervene in Lebanon to disarm the party, the Syrian government’s official stance has remained neutral.
However, with the outbreak of the Iranian-American war and Hezbollah’s entry into the confrontation through the launch of six rockets, two major developments emerged in this context.
The first involved a cell allegedly planning to target a religious figure in Damascus. Authorities announced that an explosive device had been dismantled and five suspects arrested. Official Syrian media did not identify the targeted figure, but the Ministry of Interior accused the cell of being affiliated with Hezbollah. Meanwhile, media outlets close to the Damascus government claimed that the intended target was Rabbi Mikhail Khoury, an allegation that Hezbollah also denied.
The second incident, as shown in circulated images, involved the alleged discovery of a “sabotage plot” by a Hezbollah-linked cell in Quneitra, where Israeli forces have advanced militarily. According to reports, the group had been preparing a rocket attack, and authorities arrested several individuals while confiscating rockets and a launcher. It was not specified whether the intended attack targeted Israel or Syrian territory. Hezbollah once again denied any connection to both the cell and the planned attack.
Rumors and speculation also circulated about Syrian fighters affiliated with the former regime joining Hezbollah in combat operations in southern Lebanon, though no confirmed information has emerged regarding these claims.
What stands out most in Hezbollah’s story after the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime is the repeated cycle of accusations from the Syrian government and repeated denials from the party itself. This is particularly striking given that the Syrian government, following the collapse of the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” has consistently asserted that it does not seek war and will not engage in wars, especially with Israel. Instead, both Ahmed al-Sharaa and Syrian diplomacy have emphasized adherence to United Nations resolutions regarding the occupation of the Golan Heights and the need for Israeli withdrawal, meaning that no official discourse of “resistance” or “confrontation” currently exists at the state level.
Yet the Syrian government appears to need an “external enemy,” and Hezbollah may be the most suitable candidate at this stage. On one hand, the party is now at its weakest; on the other, its notorious history in Syria makes hostility toward it appear justified in the eyes of many. Still, with the credibility of both Hezbollah and the Syrian government under question, all of the above remains part of an official narrative, as well as part of the “achievements” promoted by a government that has been in power for barely a year and a half, particularly regarding “border control.”
Moreover, the Syrian government has not pursued judicial action against Hezbollah or its backer Iran, whether at the international or regional level, nor in terms of formal condemnation nor demands for reparations. Such an approach may hold symbolic value, but abandoning it raises broader questions about the true nature of the government’s hostility toward Hezbollah and Iran, and about the kind of justice the Syrian authorities claim to seek for the Syrian people.
