We should also wait and see how the party will label this incident, and whether it will be the same as the labels it has given to many of its other incidents before: to them, May 7 was a “glorious day,” and the port explosion was a “painful accident.” Now, we wait to see how Kahale’s tragedy will be labeled.
According to members of Hezbollah, the people of the town “intruded” on the truck, which was passing on a public road. This statement is not a form of political sarcasm. It is the truth, or moreso, Hezbollah’s truth; for the citizens’ concern about a fallen truck carrying weapons for Hezbollah is, to them, an intrusion.
The party has established a comprehensive system that allows its trucks to cross where they must. And the people of Kahale are unwilling and unknowing parts of that system and unspoken deal.
Let’s go back a bit in history; what is the function of the party’s investments in the Free Patriotic Movement in the elections? And what resulted from these investments in terms of electing deputies representing Kahale, other than cementing the “custom” of allowing a truck carrying weapons to cross through the town?
Gebran Bassil, the leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, who is negotiating with Hezbollah today for “expanded decentralization” in exchange for a president chosen by the party and approved by the party, does not find the crossing of the truck carrying weapons as a source of concern: in fact, the truck is not included as an item within the negotiations. The deal does not include “sovereignty,” and in this sense, weapons have become the norm, and apparently, the people of Kahale should refrain from intruding on a truck that passes through their own town!
The reality is that the Kahale incident is one of the transient events resulting from the Lebanese perhaps misunderstanding the situation they are in. Hezbollah has accomplished its mission, leaving the Lebanese with tourism, or what the existence of their weapons makes possible in terms of it, in exchange for the party’s control over everything else: the borders, the airport, the port, the public roads, and any incident that fate brings into these spaces. For them, the Lebanese must avert their eyes from any of the aforementioned, even if it’s an explosion the size of a nuclear blast that devastated a quarter of their capital, killed hundreds, and displaced tens of thousands!
The mission of the party, which involves making the Lebanese accept the presence of weapons, trucks carrying these weapons, and fighters wielding them, appears challenging, especially when incidents like a truck overturning and a stray bullet hitting a child occur. Yes, we must stop being surprised and shocked, as the passage of the truck through Kahale is not a departure from what a significant portion of the Lebanese political forces, especially Christian forces, have accepted. The deal with Hezbollah did not include the truck nor the weapons, and yet the impact of the Kahale tragedy will last for a few days, after which Gebran Bassil will resume his negotiations with Hezbollah on administrative decentralization, oil, gas, and ministerial portfolios.
Anyone outside this equation will be excluded from the scene. The Lebanese Forces, the Kataeb Party, the reformist MPs, and the independents have all been pushed out of Hezbollah’s sphere of influence, and at the moment when Bassil deviated from the discussed plan of action with the party and nominated Jihad Azour as a competitor to Hezbollah’s candidate, he was made aware that his “investment” and political future were at risk. He then adjusted his stance and welcomed the party’s envoys, laden with promises.
Among the questions prompted by the Kahale incident, which was preceded by the Ain Ibl incident where a former Lebanese Forces official, Elias Housrani, was killed, is the question of whether Gebran Bassil can continue negotiating with Hezbollah on the presidential election matter. He has no choice but to continue the negotiations; the Kahale incident may help him enhance his bargaining power on oil or ministerial portfolios, but he will not veer towards discussing the truck’s path.
Moreover, this question comes late, given that Hezbollah has spent years of hard work, wars, and investments to solidify such trucks’ roadmaps. Also, the pressures that his ally Gebran Bassil will face as a result of his deviation are only transient ailments to the party that can be healed with some concessions. However, the fact that Fadi Bejjani, the victim of Kahale’s incident, is not far removed from the Free Patriotic Movement and has photos with Hezbollah’s former ally, Elie Hobeika, indicates the deep rift between the political options (loyal to the party) and local affiliations.
The killing of Fadi Bejjani, preceded by the assassination of Elias Hasrouni from Ain Ibl, the murder of Hezbollah member Ahmed Qassas, and the killing of a fighter in the Resistance Brigades in the town of Wadi al-Zeina, are all part of the usual killing events in the “Hezbollah Republic.”
We must avert our gaze from them, just as the people of Kahale should avert their eyes from a regular truck carrying weapons that overturned on the roadside in their town.
Returning to the previously mentioned sarcasm, there is always something that will mar the party’s mission of making its weapons a norm, as they are not normal nor ordinary; they are a means to subjugate the Lebanese. Despite the political cover it has secured, it remains illegal, and in the context of other groups, it is a sectarian weapon.
This explains the “intrusion” of the people of Al-Khala onto a truck carrying “ordinary” weapons that overturned in their town.
